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THE PUBLIC SENSIBILITIES FORUM
Leslie Gielow Jacobs'

INTRODUCTION

The constitutional rule is clear: the government, and the public that it
serves, must tolerate even "outrageous" 1 and "offensive" 2 speech to fulfill
the First Amendment's guarantee of a robust and wide open marketplace of
ideas. 3 The quintessential Free Speech Clause evil is government action
that suppresses some speech because others do not want to hear it.4 So, the
government cannot police the private speech market to ensure that expression is in good taste, decent,5 or not upsetting. 6 It cannot "forbid particular
words" in public speech to "protect the sensitive" from a "distasteful mode
of expression," 7 or even prohibit hate-motivated speech that may cause listeners extreme emotional distress. 8 Because such "public sensibility" stan-

Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law.
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) ('"Outrageousness' in the area of political
and social discourse has an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability
on the basis of the jurors' tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular expression.").
2
E.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("[T)he government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."); Street v.
New Y.ork, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) ("It is firmly settled that .. . the public expression of ideas may not
be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.").
3
See Hustler, 485 U.S. at 50 ("At the heart of the First Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern.");
N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) ("The [First Amendment] 'was fashioned to assure
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people."' (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S .
616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) {"[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market .... ").
4
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) {"The First Amendment generally prevents
government from proscribing speech ... because of disapproval of the ideas expressed .").
5
Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S . 844, 849 (1997) (invalidating the Communications
Decency Act, which prohibited , inter alia , "indecent" communications over the Internet to persons under
18 years old).
6
See Madsen v. Women's Health Center, 512 U.S. 753, 773 (1994) (stating that patients' finding
"images observable" outside clinic "disagreeable" is not sufficient reason to prohibit them).
7
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S . 15, 26 (1971) ("[W]e cannot indulge the facile assumption that one
can forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process.").
8
Hustler, 485 U.S. at 53 ("[E]ven when a speaker or writer is motivated by hatred or ill will his expression [is] protected by the First Amendment.") . But see id. at 56 (noting that a state can punish such
I
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dards would homogenize what should be a diverse offering of expression,
the Constitution places the burden on those who dislike the speech to avoid
it.9 That the government acts in response to the complaints of offended
constituents-even a large number of them-does not justify restricting the
unpopular speech . Rather, such a response constitutes an unconstitutional
"heckler's veto" of protected expression. 10
The exception to this rule is that the wvemment itself can speak, and
when it does so, it can choose what to say. 1 It can cater to public sensibilities when crafting its own speech. It can deliberately favor some types of
speech and disfavor others. If the government wants to speak homogeneously, it can do so. Specifically, pursuant to its responsibility to serve the
interests of the public who elected it, it can discriminate in its own speech
against unpopular ideas or modes of expression that are constitutionally
protected when privately uttered. 12
Between the extremes of private speech and government speech lies
the vast middle ground of government/private speech interaction. This type
of interaction occurs in the many instances where the government subsidizes private speech by allocating funds or property access to support it.
Some points within this middle ground are charted . Treated more like government speech are interactions where the government mingles its expression with the favored private expression, such as when it finances private
speakers as its agents to pursue a legitimate public policy, 13 acts as an editor
speech if it falls into the "fighting words" category, i.e., words "w hich by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace" (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)) .
9
See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 773 (noting that a clinic can "pull its curtains" to protect patients from
"images observable" outside); Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 208-09 (1975) (stating that the
government's ability to "protect its citizens against unwilling exposure to materials that may be offensive" is limited to circumstances where "the degree of captivity makes it impractical for the unwilling
viewer or auditor to avoid exposure"); Cohen, 403 U.S. at 2 ("Those [offended by vulgar word on a
jacket] could effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their
eyes.") .
10
See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237 (1963) (noting that the state cannot silence expression simply because it is "sufficient ly opposed to the views of the majority of the community to attract a crowd and necessitate police protection").
11
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) ("[T]he government [may] regulate the content of what is or is not expressed when it is the speaker .... "); see also
Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys . v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000) (noting that "when the
govern ment speaks , for instance to promote its own policies or to advance a particular idea ," the constitutional analysis is "altogether different" from the analysis that applies when the government regulates
private speech).
12
See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) ("W hen Congress established a National
Endowment for Demo cracy to encourage other countries to adopt democratic principle s, 22 U.S.C.§
4411 (b), it was not constitutionally required to fund a program to encourage competing lines of political
philosophy such as communism and fascism.").
13
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833 ("[W]hen the government appropriates public funds to promote
a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes."); Rust, 500 U.S. at 194 ("[A prohibition
against funded entities' counseling about abortion] is not a case of the Government 'suppressing a dan-

1358

95:1357 (2001)

The Public Sensibilities Forum

to compile private speech into a publication, 14 or funds expression pursuant
to a program designed to select and encourage "excellent" expression. 15
Public sensibilities can be used to allocate access to these types of government subsidies. 16 In particular, when deciding among art grant applicants
the government may consider whether the art is "decen[t]" and "respect[s] .
. . [the] values of the American public," 17 even though these criteria would
be impermissible in speech regulations. 18
But the instances where government assistance to private speakers becomes government speech are limited to those where government expression is a primary purpose of the program . 19
Treated more like regulation of private speech are the many instances
where the government maintains or creates a "forum" for private speech
without itself "speaking ." 20 When the government creates a private speech
forum, it has more discretion to discriminate among the types of speech that
occur in it than it does when it restricts private speech generally. 21 Still,
limits to its discretion apply .22 The standards of access to any forum 23 must
gerous idea,' but of a prohibition on a project grantee or its employee s from engaging in activities outside of the project's scope.").
14
See Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674-75 (1998) (noting that "when a
public broadcaster exercises editorial discretion in the selection and presentation of its programming, it
engages in speech activity" which "as a general matter does not lend itself to scrutiny under forum doctrine") .
15
See Nat'! Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 586 (1998) ("[T]he inherently content based 'excellence' threshold for NEA support sets it apart from ... objective decisions on allocating
public benefits .").
16
See. e.g., Finley, 524 U.S. at 572-73 (holding that the NEA can consider general standards of
"decency and respect" for diverse beliefs and values of the American public in distributing art funding);
Forbes, 523 U.S. at 674 ("To comply with their obligation to air programming that serves the public interest, broadcasters must often choose among speakers expressing different viewpoints."); Rust, 500
U.S. at 193 (1991) (noting that the government may favor speech about childbirth over speech about
abortion).
17
Finley , 524 U.S. at 576 (noting that, in allocating arts funding, the NEA must "tak[e) into consideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public" (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 954(d))) .
18
Id . at 587-88 ("[T]he Government may allocate competitive funding according to criteria that
would be impermissible were direct regulation of speech or a criminal penalty at stake .").
19
See Legal Services Corp. v. Velasquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (holding that speech condition in attorney funding statute is not government speech because "there is no programmatic message").
20
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995) (government
speech analysis does not apply "when the [government] does not itself speak or subsidize transmittal of
a message it favors but instead funds to encourage a diversity of views").
21
See id. at 829 ("The necessities of confining a forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for
which it was created may justify the State in reserving it for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics ."); Int'! Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679-80 (1992) ("(T]he government-like other property owners-'has power to preserve the property under its control for the use
to which it is lawfully dedicated."' (quoting Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 826 ( 1976))).
22
See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 121 S. Ct. 2093, 2100 (2001) ("The State's power to
restrict speech [in a private speech forum] is not without limits.") .
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at least be reasonable, meaning that the government can articulate some legitimate reason for excluding certain types of speech or speakers from the
forum, and viewpoint neutral, meaning that the exclusion cannot be based
24
on the viewpoint of the speaker.
What constitutes viewpoint discrimina25
tion is far from clear.
The prohibition against it at least means, however,
that the government may not exclude "speech discussing otherwise permissible subjects" from a forum because of its particular viewpoint. 26 It means
that access to a forum cannot depend upon a majority vote. 27 It also means
that access standards cannot be so vague or subjective as to create the risk
that such viewpoint discrimination will occur in the forum's administration. 28
Despite the fact that they pose these viewpoint discrimination dangers,
the "public sensibilities forums" exist, and are thriving. In a wide range of
situations that do not constitute government speech, governments have created opportunities for private speakers to gain access to public property or
funds and have conditioned access on standards such as the speech being in
30
31
good taste, 29 decent, not controversial
or not offensive. 32 Often the stan23

See Perry Educ . Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass 'n, 460 U.S. 37 , 45-46 (1983) (articulating
three types of forum- traditional public, limited public, and nonpublic - and the rules that apply to
each).
24
See Lee , 505 U.S. at 679 (holding that in a nonpublic forum , where access standards are subject to
the most "limited review," a "challenged regulation need only be reasonable, as long as the regulation is
not an effort to suppress the speaker ' s activity due to disagreement with the speaker ' s view").
25
Rosenberg er, 515 U.S. at 831 (noting that the distinction between content and viewpoint discrimination "is not a precise one").
26
Good News Club, 121 S. Ct. at 2102; Rosenberger , 515 U.S. at 831-34; Lamb ' s Chap el v. Ctr.
Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 392-93 (J 993) .
27
Santa Fe lndep . Sch. Dist. v. Doe , 530 U.S . 290, 304 (2000) ("[S]tudent election s that determine,
by majority vote , which expressive activities shall receive or not receive school benefit s . . . (do] nothing
to protect minority views but rather place[] the students who hold such views at the mercy of the majority."); Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth , 529 U.S. 217 , 235 (2000 ) ("The whole
theory of viewpoint neutrality is that minority views are treated with the same respect as are majority
views . Access to a public forum , for instance, does not depend upon majoritarian con sent.").
28
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975) ("(T]he danger of censorship
and of abridgement of our precious First Amendment freedoms is too great where officials have unbridled discretion over a forum's use."); United Food & Commercial Worker s Union , Local 1099 v.
Southwest Ohio Reg'! Transit Auth., 163 F.3d 341, 359 (6th Cir. 1998) (deciding that in administering a
private speech forum, official's decision to limit access must be "constrained by objective criteria" and
not rest on "ambiguous and subjective reasons " (quoting Desert Outdoor Adver. , Inc. v. City of Moreno
Valley, 103 F.3d 814 , 818 (9th Cir. 1996))).
29
See United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 163 F.3d at 346 (6th Cir. 1998) (advertising on
public transit vehicles must be "aesthetically pleasing"); Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Dep't of Aviation of
Chicago , 45 F.3d 1144, 1148 (7th Cir . 1995) (advertising in display case must be "in good taste") ; Claudio v. United States , 836 F. Supp . 1230, 1235 (E.D.N .C. 1993) (holding that government may insist that
art displayed in federal courthouse be compatible "with the image and sense of decorum [of] the Federal
Government "); Kahn v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles , 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 6, 9 (Cal. Ct. App . 1993) (noting that
vanity plates may not "carry connotation s offensive to good taste and decen cy" (quoting CAL. YEH.
CODE§ 5105(b) (West 1992))) .
30
See AIDS Action Comm . of Mass. v. MTBA , 42 F.3d I , 3 (J st Cir . 1994) (establishing guideline s
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<lards forbid specific types of speech, such as those which pertains to sexual
conduct, 33 are derogatory toward particular groups, 34 disparage a deity, 35 or
relate to an intoxicating substance. 36 While the decision-making authorities
operate under some type of written guidelines, they also frequently rely on
citizen complaints as the basis for determining when particular speech offends public sensibilities and should be prohibited. 37 Both these standards
and the "heckler's veto" method of enforcement violate the rules of any
type of "forum."
Examples of the de facto "public sensibilities forum" include "vanity"
license plate programs, 38 advertising in public spaces, 39 and art displays in
public places. 40 Despite their prevalence, their constitutional status is reof"good taste" and "decency"); Kahn, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 9.
31
See United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 163 F.3d at 346 (excluding as a matter of policy
"(a]dvertising of controversial public issues" from all Metro Bus advertising space) (alteration in original) .
32
Claudio v. United States, 836 F. Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D.N.C . 1993) (holding that courthouse officials can refuse to place painting in lobby because it constitutes a "visual horror").
33
See, e.g., AIDS Action Comm. of Mass., 42 F.3d at 4 (forbidding advertisements that describe
sexual conduct "in a patently offensive way ").
34
See, e.g., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Glendening, 954 F. Supp. I 099, 1100 (D. Md.
1997) (recounting how specialty license plates with confederate flag logo were recalled because of its
"negative racial connotations").
35
See, e.g., Jean Godden, Foo/in ' State on Your Plate NOEZTSK, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 16, 1995,
at BI (noting that Washington state vanity plates cannot have letter combinations that are "blasphe mous") .
36
See id. (noting that Washington state vanit y plates cannot have letter combinations that "relat[e]
to illegal substances") ; Frank J. Prial , Wine Talk, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1997, at C8 (noting that Oregon
vanity plate rules forbid letter combinations that "refer to any intoxicating liquor or controlled substance
or their use") .
37
See, e.g., AIDS Action Comm. of Mass., 42 F.3d at 3 (noting that the record includes letters of
complaint lodged by transit authority riders who were offended by the advertisements at issue); Confederate Veterans, 954 F. Supp . at 1100 (noting that the administrator explained his decision to recall specialty plates based on the "numerous , substantial complaints . .. received in recent days") ; Mike Royko,
Profane Car Plates and All That Jazz, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 25, 1987, at 3 (describing an Arizona driver with
"JAZZME" plate who received a letter beginning , "Since a complaint was filed with this office, I must
recall the plates .").
38
See, e.g., CAL. CODEREGS. tit. 13, § 170.00(c)(3)(D) (2000) . In California , drivers may apply for
configurations on their license plates, except that they cannot be "offensive to good taste and decency , or
. .. misleading ," which exclusions include a configurat ion that "has a sexual connotation or is a terrn of
lust or depravity ," "is a vulgar terrn; a terrn of contempt , prejudice, or hostility ; an insulting or degrading
terrn; a racially degrading terrn; or an ethnically degrading term," "is a swear word or term considered
profane, obscene or repulsive, " "has a negative connotation to a specific group," or "misrepresents a law
enforcement entity." Id.
39
See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1099 v. Southwest Ohio Reg ' I Transit Auth ., 163 F.3d 341, 346 (6th Cir. 1998) (prohibiting advertising on the exteriors of metropolitan
buses and shelters "that adversely affect [the] ability to attract and maintain ridership "); Air Line Pilots
Ass ' n v. Dep 't of Aviation of Chicago, 45 F.3d 1144, 1148 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that advertising displays at O' Hare International Airport must be "in good taste," and not "political , immor al, or illegal ").
40
See, e.g., Sefick v. Gardner, 164 F.3d 370, 373 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding that government can prefer "sedate and decorou s exhibits . . . while excluding the comic, the caustic, and the acerbic") ; Claudi o
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markably uncertain. Disputes about application of the access rules are often
41
These resolutions come to public attention only
resolved informally.
when a reporter takes interest 42 or the aggrieved subsidy applicant has the
tenacity to sue. In the former situation, the government's censorship becomes the butt of joking journalist commentary 43 and sometimes heated
44
In the latter, confusion reigns as courts 45 and individual
reader reaction.
46
judges struggle to reconcile their intuitions about the appropriate scope of
the government's discretion to discriminate among private speakers in the
context at issue with the rule that forbids viewpoint discrimination in the
administration of private speech forums.
The confusion reveals a crucial weakness in the current "forum" doctrine. As the Court has collapsed the distinctions between different types of
government-created forums, the inquiry that has emerged as determinative
to the constitutionality of them all is whether the access standards discrimiv. United States, 836 F. Supp. 1230, 1235 (E.D .N.C. 1993) (finding that the Public Buildings Cooperative Use Act, which allows artists to apply for permits to place art in public buildings, does not compel
the government "to display a vulgar, shocking and tasteless painting in the lobby of [a] (f]ederal
[b]uilding "); Marjorie Heins , Viewpoint Discrimination, 24 HASTINGSCONST. L.Q . 99 , 138 (noting that
the Fairfax County Arts Council's guidelines for use of exhibit space in the county government building
exclude "[n]udes , weaponry , drug paraphernalia, and works which reflect violence, religious scenes, political expression or unpatriotic subjects " (quoting Form Letter of Agreement from the Fairfax County
Council of the Arts, Government Center Exhibitions)) .
41
See , e.g ., AIDS Action Comm. of Mass ., 42 F.3d at 3-4 (describing the back-and-forth as advertiser and transit authority negotiated the content of advertisements); Godden, supra note 35 (describing
how computerized no-no lists guide motor vehicle departments and applicants as to inappropriate configurations) .
42
See, e.g ., Alice Giordano, N.H. "Hate Plate" Challenges Licen se lo Free Speech, BOSTON
GLOBE,Dec . 19, 1999, at 816 (discussing disputes about "H8DCYF " (division of Children , Youth , and
Family) plate in Massachusetts, and "PROLIF" in Florida) ; Prial, supra note 36, at C8 (discussing wine
shop owner's protest of denial of"VINO" plate) .
43

See, e.g., Godden, supra note 35 ("The job of the censor is never an easy one, but, hey, someone's got to do it.") .
44
See, e.g., John G. Sims , IV, Letter s to the Editor : License Plat es and the Righi to Offend, WASH.
POST, Nov . 15, 1993, at A18 ("Last time I checked , we still claimed to be a free country . Yet the DMV
now claims the right to censor free speech if it deems it 'offensive ." ').
45
Compare Kahn v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 6, 10 (Cal. Ct. App . 1993) (finding
that California vanity plate program does not create a forum and so department of motor vehicles can
prohibit "offensive" configurations), with Lew is v . Wilson , 89 F. Supp . 2d 1082, 1091 (E.D. Mo. 2000)
(finding that Missouri ' s vanity plate program creates a nonpublic forum and standard prohibiting messages "contrary to public policy " is unconstitutionally vague when it results in exclusion of"ARYAN-1"
plate), and Pruitt v . Wilder, 840 F. Supp. 414, 417-18 (E.D. Va . 1994) (finding that Virginia 's vanity
plate program at least creates a nonpublic forum and exclusion of "GODZGUD " configuration consti tutes unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination ).
46
Compar e Gentala v. City of Tucson , 213 F.3d I 055 , I 062 -65 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the
city fund to defray costs of cultural events was a "limited public forum" and that the exclu sion of National Prayer Day event from funding was "impermissible viewpoint discrimination"), with id. at 107583 (Pregerson , J., dissenting) (arguing that fund was not a forum at all and so viewpoint neutrality requirement did not apply, but that even if it was a forum, the decision to exclude the National Prayer Day
event was not impermissibly viewpoint discriminatory) .
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nate according to viewpoint.
But a unitary concept of "viewpoint discrimination" fails to include the considerations of context that must bear on
the government's discretion to discriminate among private speakers. Its application leads to results that conflict with sound intuitions about the proper
balance of constitutional interests.
For example, prohibiting references to religious practices or figures
may constitute invidious viewpoint discrimination when allocating access
to a civic center 48 or funds for student publications. 49 But is a state really
required by the Constitution to issue vanity license plates that proclaim
"GODZGUD" 50 or "PRA Y" 51 ? Similarly, that swear words, sex talk and
52
ethnic epithets are l_Xrical to someone may justify protecting their use in
3
city-owned theaters or in publications that receive discounted postage .54
But must a state be required to allow such words and imagery in its public
transit advertising? 55 Further, regulating violent speech or images may be
fraught with constitutional danger in the context of a municipal auditorium. 56 But must a federal courthouse, when it agrees to display private art,
47

See Rosenbergerv. Rector& Visitors of the Univ . of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829-30 (1995) ("[I]n determining whether the State is acting to preserve the limits of (a limited public] forum ... we have observed a distinction between , on the one hand, content discrimination, which may be permissible if it
preserves the purposes of that limited forum, and, on the other hand , viewpoint discrimination, which is
presumed impermissible when directed against speech othezwise within the forum's limitations."); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def . & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 {1985) ("Although a speaker may be excluded from a nonpublic forum if he wishes to address a topic not encompassed within the purpose of
the forum ... or if he is not a member of the class of speakers for whose especial benefit the forum was
created, .. . the government violates the First Amendment when it denies access to a speaker solely to
suppress the point of view he espouses on an othezwise includible subject.") .
48
See Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch . Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393 {l 993) (holding
that where school facilities were opened for use by community groups, denying religious group access to
show film that addressed child-rearing issues "from a Christian perspective" was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination when forum otherwise allowed groups to address family and child-rearing issues).
49
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 823 (deciding that denying student activities funding to a publication
that "primarily promotes or manifests a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality" is unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination when other funded publications can address the same subjects).
50
See Pruitt v. Wilder, 840 F. Supp. 414, 418 (E.D . Va. 1994) (finding that banning speech that relates to deities is unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination) .
51
See Gordon Oliver, DMV Says Vanity Plates Aren't License to Titillate, PORTLAND
OREGONIAN,
Nov. 4, 1996, at BI (noting that an Oregon court ordered the Department of Motor Vehicles to issue
"PRAY" plate).
52
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) ("[O]ne man ' s vulgarity is another ' s lyric.") .
53
See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad , 420 U.S. 546, 549 (l 975) (holding that a city cannot limit theater access to productions that are "culturally uplifting").
54
See Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech , l 06 YALE L.J. 151, 157 (1996) (noting that the government cannot discriminate according to viewpoint in the distribution of second-class mailing privileges). For
a list of cases considering the issue of second-class mailings as subsidized speech, see id. at 157 n.36.
55
See AIDS Action Comm. of Mass. v. MTBA, 42 F.3d I, 13 (!st Cir. 1994) (noting that, despite
the invalidity of exclusion at issue, the transit authority "may well be entitled to exclude from the interiors of its cars speech containing a certain level of sexual innuendo and double entendre") .
56
See Michael Baker, Unplugged , FRESNO BEE, Apr. 28, 1999, at Al (reporting that city considers

1363

NORTHWESTERN

UNIVERSITY

LAW

REVIEW

devote the wall of its entrance to a larger-than-life depiction of a dead,
bloody fetus? 57
Different conclusions about the scope of the government's discretion to
exclude private speakers from the speech opportunities according to their
context may seem to make sense. The problem, however, is that it strains
current doctrine to explain the different results according to a single concept
of "viewpoint discrimination." Rather, the proper inquiry is what risks of
viewpoint discrimination are constitutionally tolerable in the context of the
particular forum. 58 Although the particular access standards and their administration remain relevant to the constitutional inquiry, it is a combination of characteristics that defines the legitimate public sensibilities forum.
This Article spells out these characteristics that identify the legitimate
public sensibilities forum. Part I discusses the spectrum of constitutional
government speech promotion. This Part accepts the current boundaries as
mapped by the Supreme Court and identifies the public sensibilities forums
as operating within a middle ground the Court has not yet charted. Part II
defines the legitimate public sensibilities forum. Subpart II.A. argues for its
legitimate existence despite the risks of viewpoint discrimination that it
poses. Subpart II.B. identifies the factors that characterize a legitimate public sensibilities forum . These factors are the government's assumed responsibility for discriminating according to public sensibilities, its authority to
employ public sensibilities standards in the particular context, the limited
impact of its speech opportunity and the precision, content, and the administrative procedure of the standards. Finally, Part III applies this analysis to
the public sensibilities forums that have generated such confusion .
I.

THE SPECTRUM OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT SPEECH
PROMOTION

The Supreme Court's articulations as to the meaning of the First
Amendment establish a range of discretion within which the government
may operate to discriminate with respect to the content of expression . This
discretion can be arranged conceptually on a spectrum. 59 The outer edges
are defined . The murky middle ground is not well charted. It is within this
area that the public sensibilities forum is operating.

canceling Marilyn Manson concert because of violence but "stops short" because of free speech concerns).
57
See Claudio v. United States, 836 F. Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D.N.C. 1993) (characterizing the depiction as a "visual horror") .
58
See Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes , 523 U.S. 666, 674 (I 998) ('"[C]alculated risks of
abuse (of the discretion to discriminate among speakers]"' may be justified when they "'preserve higher
values."' (quoting Columbia Broad . Sys. , Inc., v. Democratic Nat'! Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 125 (1973))).
59
See Randall P. Bezanson , The Government Speech Forum: Forbes and Finley and Government
Speech Selection Judgments, 83 IOWA L. REV. 953, 964 (1998) ("It may turn out ... that government
speech selection judgments fall along a complex spectrum , not a bipolar one.").
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A. The Established Points on the Government/Private Speech Interaction
Spectrum
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech." 60 Although not absolute, 61this guarantee
applies most strongly to limit government 62 efforts to suppress private
speech that seeks entry into the marketplace of ideas. 63 The core value protected by the free speech guarantee is "the free flow of ideas and opinions
on matters of public interest and concern." 64 The prime threat to this value
is government censorship or favoritism that skews public dialogue, 65 presumably shaping it to endorse the majority's point of view. The government cannot regulate such speech in a message-sensitive way unless it can
show that the restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. 66 Protecting the public from speech that is distasteful, 67 offensive,68 controversial, 69or contrary to public values 70is not generally 71a
60

U.S . CONST.amend. I.
See, e.g., Neb. Press Ass'n. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976) ("This Court has frequently denied that First Amendment rights are absolute."); see also William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court
and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. I, 5 (1965) ("The absolute
view [of the First Amendment] has not prevailed with the Court .").
62
The guarantee of free speech applies to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gitlow v. New York , 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) .
63
See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell , 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988) ("[The Court has been] vigilant to ensure that individual expressions of ideas remain free from governmentally imposed sanctions . . . . '[T]he
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market ...
(quoting Abrams v. United States , 250 U. S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting))).
64
Hustler, 485 U.S. at 50.
65
See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992) ("The government may not regulate . .. based on hostility-or favoritism-towards
the underlying message expressed."); First Nat'!
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S . 765 , 785-86 (1978) ("Especially where . .. the legislature ' s suppression of speech suggests an attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an advantage in
expressing its views to the people, the First Amendment is offended.").
66
See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S . 803, 879 (2000) ("If a statute regulates
speech based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest."
(quoting Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S . 115, 126 (1989))).
67
See Hustler, 485 U.S . at 55 (finding that the Constitution forbids jurors from imposing liability on
speech because it conflicts with their "tastes or views") .
68
See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S . 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle underlying
the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,
745 (1978) ("[T)he fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing
it."); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) ("It is firmly settled that .. . the public expression of
ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hear ers .").
69
Police Dep't of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (deciding that the government cannot deny the use of a forum "to those wishing to express ... more controversial views").
70
See id. (deciding that the government cannot deny use of a forum to " less favored" speech) .
71
But see Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights , 418 U.S. 298, 303-305 (1974) (holding that a city can
exclude political advertising from transit advertising space in part to protect a "captive audience " from
61
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compelling ~overnment interest. Rather, the government must permit and
even protect 2 outrageous speech 73 in order to preserve an uninhibited 74
flow of ideas. Even when it regulates private speech without respect to the
message, impacting only its time, place, or manner, 75 the government must
demonstrate that the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a substantial
·
76
government mterest.
The permissible range of government action is different when it promotes speech, rather than restricts it. On one side of the spectrum, government itself can speak. 77 When it does, it necessarily chooses to emphasize
some topics and viewpoints over others .78 So, for example, the government
can advocate democracy, 79 attempt to persuade teenagers to "Just Say No"

speech that is "controversial "); Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 , 740 (1970)
(holding that Congress can authorize postmaster to withhold "offensive" mailings upon homeowner's
request) .
72
See, e.g., Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 112 (1969) (holding that the police cannot
arrest protesters for disorderly conduct because onlookers become unruly) .
73
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) ("An 'outrageousness' standard [for exclud ing speech from First Amendment protection] runs afoul of our longstanding refusal to allow damages to
be awarded because the speech in question may have an adverse emotional impact on the audience .") .
74
Id. at 53 ("Debate on public issues will not be uninhibited if the speaker must run the risk that it
will be proved in court that he spoke out of hatred ... ." (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73
(1964))) ; N.Y. Times v. Sullivan , 376 U.S. 254 , 270 ( 1964) ("[D]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited , robust, and wide-open .... ").
75
See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) ("[R]estrictions on the time,
place or manner of protected speech" are '"justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech."' (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984))).
76
See id. at 798 ("[A] regulation of time, place or manner of protected speech must be narrowly tailored to serve the government's legitimate , content-neutral interests but ... it need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so.") .
77
See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys . v. Southworth , 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000) (noting
that "the government can speak for itself' and that when it does so, the constitutionality of its action is
"evaluated on [that] premise " rather than the premise that it is regulating private speech); see also MARK
G. YUDOF, WHENGOVERNMENT
SPEAKS 14 (1983) ("[T]here are a variety of ways government may
attempt to influence behavior in accordance with its legitimate authority ."); Steven Shiffrin, Government
Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565, 606 (1980) ("Government has legitimate interests in informing , in educating, and in persuading .").
78
See Rosenberger v . Rector & Visitors of the Univ . of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (" [W]hen the
State is the speaker, it may make content-based choices ."); see also Nat'! Endowment for the Arts v.
Finley , 524 U.S. 569, 610-11 (1998) (Souter, J., dissenting) (acknowledging "the role[] of governmentas-speaker ... in which the government is of course entitled to engage in viewpoint discrimination") ;
David Cole, Bey ond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government
Funded Speech, 67 N.Y .U. L. REV. 675, 681 ("While non-neutral prohibitions on speech are only rarely
justified, non-neutr al government support of speech is often necessary in running a democratic government.").
79
See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S . 173, 194 (1991) ("When Congress established a National Endowment for Democracy to encourage other countries to adopt democratic principles , 22 U.S.C. § 441 l(b) , it
was not const itutionally required to fund a program to encourage competing lines of political philosoph y
such as communi sm or fascism .").
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to drugs 80 and advise the American public to eat less fat, 81 without being required by the Constitution to promote competing policies. This selectivity,
while highly suspect and almost always unconstitutional when the government regulates private speech, 82 fulfills the ideal of democratic selfdetermination in the government speech context. 83
By extension, the government has this same ability to favor certain
subjects and viewpoints when it funds private parties to be its agents in pursuing its policies. 84 Because the government can legitimately decide to
promote childbirth over abortion it can, in distributing subsidies to family
planning agencies, direct that their doctors not use the funds to talk to patients about abortion. 85 This obvious favoritism of one viewpoint over another does not violate the Constitution because, rather than regulating
private speech, the government is using its definition of the public interest
to define the scope of its spending .86
In many other ways, however, the government can promote private
speech without designating the favored speakers as the government's
agents. Because the government provides assistance to private speech as
private speech, the constitutional values that allow the government great
discretion in choosing the content of its own speech do not apply. Instead,
the competing constitutional concern of governmental distortion of the private speech market comes into play. Because of the government's vast control over places and means for all communication-both governmental and
80

See, e.g., Jennings Parrott, First Family Stresses Three Lillie Words: Just Say No, L.A. TIMES,
May 21, 1986, at 2 ("During a White House ceremony after Congress proclaimed 'Just Say No Week,'
[President] Reagan praised the first lady [for her campaign for young people to 'Just Say No' to
drugs] .").
81
See, e.g., Rosie Mestel, The Food Pyramid: Does It Miss the Point?, L.A. TIMES, Sept. I, 2000,
at Al (reporting that the government published its "first dietary guidelines" in 1980 "which are the basis
for government nutrition and education program s today," including the food pyramid) .
82
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828 ("In the realm of private speech or expression, government
regu lation may not favor one speaker over another.").
83
See Bd. of Regents of the Univ . of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000) ("When
the government speaks, for instance to promote its own policies or to advance a particular idea, it is, in
the end , accountable to the electorate and the political process for its advocacy .").
84
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833 ("[W]hen the government appropriates public funds to promote
a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes."); Rust, 500 U.S. at 194 (deciding that
where federal funding for family planning services forbids recipients from using the funds to speak
about abortion it "is not a case of the Government 'suppressi ng a dangerous idea,' but of a prohibition
on a project grantee or its employees from engaging in activities outside the project's scope").
85
See Rust, 500 U.S . at 193; see also Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461
U.S. 540, 551 (1983) (holding that Congress does not engage in impermissible viewpoin t discrimination
when it subsidizes lobb ying by veterans' groups and no others) . But see Legal Services Corp. v.
Valasquez, 121 S. Ct. 1043, 1049 (2001) (stating that the government cannot discriminate among viewpoints in funding lawyers to represent welfare claimants because, unlike the funded doctors' speech in
Rust, the attorney's speech "cannot be classified as government speech even under a generous understanding of the concept") .
86
Rust, 500 U.S. al 194.
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private-the "forum" doctrine limits the government's ability to selectively
advantage or disadvantage private speakers when it provides aid for private
speech; this limit is analogous to the limits that apply to private speech restrictions. 87 The '" forum based' approach" originated as a way to "assessfJ
restrictions that the government seeks to place on the use of its property."
It has now been extended to evaluate "metaphysical forums" where the
government distributes money for speech rather than access to engage in it. 89
The traditional public forum is at the most speech-protective end of forum analysis. The public forum includes government property such as
streets, 90 parks 91 and sidewalks, 92 which have by history and tradition been
open to public access and expression. 93 Despite government ownership, the
objective characteristics of this property "require the government to accommodate private speakers ." 94 Because the traditional public forum is a
place vital for the free flow and exchange of private speech, 95 the limits on
government grants of access to a traditional public forum are as stringent as
when it affirmatively restricts expression. 96 Any sort of exclusion that de-

87

On the history and theory of the public forum doctrine, see Harry Kalven , Jr., The Concept of the
Public Forum : Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. I; Robert C. Post , Between Government and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713 (1987); Geoffrey R.
Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Pu/;!licPlaces, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 233 .
88
Int'! Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992); see also Perry Educ .
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
89
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830 (deciding that a student activity fund is "a forum more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense, but the same principles are applicable"); see also Bd. of
Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth , 529 U.S. 217, 230 (2000) (finding principles of the
public forum cases "controlling"); Gentala v. City of Tucson, 213 F.3d 1055, 1062 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Although the [Civic Events] Fund is not a forum for speech in the physical sense, as a government-created
source of funding to cover costs associated with engaging in behavior deserving First Amendment protection , the Fund is a forum within the meaning of the First Amendment.") .
90
See Lee, 505 U.S . at 679 (stating that '"streets and parks' " are traditional public forums (quoting
Hague v. Comm. for Indus . Org., 307 U.S. 496 , 515 (1939))); Frisby v. Schultz , 487 U.S. 474, 481
(holding a residential street to be a traditional public forum); Perry, 460 U .S. at 45 (listing "streets and
parks" as examples of traditional public forums) .
91
See Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette , 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995) (considering a
park area surrounding the Ohio state capitol building); Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 .
92
See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 315 (1988) (involving sidewalks outside embassy); United States
v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 173 (1983)(considering sidewalks outside the U.S. Supreme Court building) .
93
See Ark . Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998) ("Traditional public fora
are defined by the objective characteristics of the property , such as whether , ' by long tradition or by
government fiat,' the property has been 'devoted to assembly and debate ."' (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at
45)) .
94
Id. at 678 .
95
See LAURENCE H. TRIBE,AMERICAN CONSTITUTIO
NAL LAW 987 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that pub lic forums are "areas playing a vital role in communication") .
96
Int'I Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992) (" [R]egulation of speech
on government propert y that has traditionall y been available for public expres sion is subject to the highest scrutiny .") .
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pends on the content of a speaker's expression is subject to strict scrutiny. 97
So, government can make almost no subject matter exclusions from a public forum, 98 and is even less likely to be able to exclude speech based upon
its viewpoint. 99 The determination of what constitutes a public forum depends crucially upon a history of its being open for public discourse. 100 The
category thus appears limited to the streets, parks, and sidewalks already
declared to be such traditional public forums.
The next two types of forum are the "designated" public forum 101 and
the nonpublic forum. 102 A designated public forum is property, such as
meeting spaces 103 or theaters, 104 that the government intentionally opens for
public expression. 105 A nonpublic forum is government property on which
the government permits some "selective access" for private expression, but
which is not generally open for public discourse . 106 Nonpublic forums in97

See Forbes, 523 U.S . at 677.
See Police Dep't of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94 (1972) (explaining that government cannot distinguish between labor and all other picketing in granting access to the sidewalk) .
Bui see Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (holding that the government can exclude political
speech from within I 00 feet of entrance to polling places on election day).
99
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ . of Va., 515 U.S . 819, 829 (1995) ("Viewpoint
discrimination is ... an egregious form of content discrimination ."); R.A .V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S.
377, 382-83 (1992) (listing categories of speech that government may regulate) .
100
See Lee, 505 U.S . at 680 (" [G)iven the lateness with which the modem air terminal has made its
appearance, it hardly qualifies for the description of having 'immemorially .. . time out of mind' been
held in the public trust and used for purposes of expressive activity. " (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus . Org., 307 U.S. 496 , 515 (1939)).
101
The two terms "designated" and "limited" public forum initially referred to different scopes of
government action in creating a public forum. A "designated public forum" is a property which the
government, through its explicit and intentional conduct, has designated as a forum generally open to the
public for expressive activity . See Perry Educ. Ass ' n v. Perry Local Educators ' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 4546 (1983) . The government can, however, limit a designated public forum to certain topics or classes of
speakers. See id. at 46 n.7. This type of designated public forum is a limited public forum. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def . & Educ. Fund , 473 U.S . 788, 804-06 (1985); Perry, 460 U.S. at 47 . In practice , the government does not designate forums without limitation. See, e.g., Bd . of Regents of the Univ .
of Wis . Sys . v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 232 (2000) (explaining that even where university funds
speech "distinguished not by discernable limits but by its vast, unexplored bounds, " forum is limited because it funds only student speech) . Most recently, the Court has merged the terms . See Lee, 505 U.S .
at 678 ("The second category of public property is the designated public forum, whether of a limited or
unlimited character-property that the State has opened for expressive activity by part or all of the public."); Forbes , 523 U.S. at 677 (same) .
102
Lee, 505 U.S. at 678-79 (noting that the nonpublic forum category consists of "all remaining
public property").
103
See, e.g., Lamb 's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist. , 508 U.S. 384, 386-87 (1993) ;
Widmarv . Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
104
See Southeastern Promotions , Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 , 547 (1975).
105
See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677 ("Designated public fora . . . are created by purposeful governmental action." "'The government does not create a [designated] public forum by inaction or by permitting
limited discourse , but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional public forum for public discourse. "'
(quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800)).
106
See id. at 679 ("[T]he governm ent create s a designated public forum when it makes its property
98
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elude household mail boxes, ' 07 open areas of a military base, 108 a school's
09
internal mail system, ' the federal ?overnment's annual charity drive, 110
sidewalk areas around a post office, 1 1 airport terminals, 112 and a televised
candidate debate. 113
The rules that limit the government's discretion to exclude particular
speakers from a designated and a nonpublic forum supposedly differ. In
particular, although the government does not have to create a designated
public forum, once it does so the strict rules of the traditional public forum
are said to apply. 114 By contrast, "[t]he government can restrict access to a
nonpublic forum 'as long as the restrictions are reasonable and [are] not an
effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the
speaker's view. "' 115 This distinction's limiting effect on government discretion is illusory, however, because the government's definition of the forum's scope determines its boundaries. In creating either a designated or
nonpublic forum, the government can restrict access to a limited class of
speakers or for limited topics. 116 Because only the limits of reasonableness
and viewpoint neutrality restrict the how the government can define the
boundaries of either t~e of forum, there is no important analytical difference between them. 11 Instead, the "designated public forum" label is degenerally available to a certain class of speakers," but "does not create a designated public forum when
it does no more than reserve eligibility for access to the forum to a particular class of speakers, whose
members must then, as individuals , 'obtain permission' ... to use it." (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at
804)).
107
See United States Postal Serv . v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114 (1981).
108
See Greer v. Spock , 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
109
See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 39 (1983).
110
See Cornelius, 473 U.S . at 790 .
111
See United States v. Kokinda , 497 U.S . 720 ( 1990).
112
See Int ' ! Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 674 (1992).
113
See Ark. Educ. Television Comm ' n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 669 (1998).
114
See id. at 677 ("If the government excludes a speaker who falls within the class of speakers to
which a designated public forum is made generally available, its action is subject to strict scrutiny.");
Lee, 505 U.S. at 678 ("Regulation of [a designated public forum] is subject to the same limitations as
that governing a traditional public forum.").
115
Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677-78 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S.
788, 800 ( 1985)) (second alteration in original).
116
See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ . of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) ("The
necessities of confining a forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for which it was created may justify the State in reserving it for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics.").
117
See id. (characterizing funding mechanism as a limited public forum, but applying rules of the
nonpublic forum-exclusions must be "reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum" and may
not "discr iminate against speech on the basis of its viewpoint" (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def.
& Educ . Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 804-06 (1985))); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 825-27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(explaining that rules of limited public forum and nonpublic forum are not meaningfully different); Gentala v. City of Tucson, 213 F.3d 1055, 1062 n.4 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he distinction between a limited
public forum and a nonpublic forum is a semantic distinction without an analytic difference."); Warren
v. Fairfax County, 196 F.3d 186, 194 n.8 (4th Cir. 1999) (en bane) (agreeing with Justice Blackmun's
observation in Cornelius that the "lim ited public forum [is] analytically indistinct from a nonpublic fo-
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scriptive only, seeming to identify particular types of nonpublic forums that
the government has chosen to make more generally available to private
speakers than other government property or funds. 118
In determining the government's discretion to make distinctions when
aiding private speakers, the current forum doctrine thus looks most fundamentally to whether the government's action creates a traditional public or a
permissibly more restrictive forum. While the traditional public forum rule
recognizes that the the government's vast power to control private expression by controlling access to public resources requires some degree of mandatory open access, the less speech-protective rules that guide
administration of nonpublic forums recognize that most government property serves purposes other than free expression and that , to function properly, the government must be able to limit the use of its property to its
intended purposes. 119 As noted above, restrictions on speech in a nonpublic
forum must be viewpoint neutral and reasonable "in light of the purpose of
the forum and all the surrounding circumstances." 120 The reasonableness
inquiry occasionally seems to look to the compatibility of included and excluded types of speech with the property at issue, 121 but more often accords
wide deference to the government's judgment as to appropriate exclusions. 122 Thus the requirement of viewpoint neutrality is left as the operational principle that limits the government's discretion to discriminate among

rum") ; Diloreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. ofEduc., 196 F.3d 958, 964 (9th Cir. 1999) (characterizing the Supreme Court's terminology as "us[ing] the term 'limited public forum ' to refer to a type
of nonpublic forum ").
118
See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 679 ("A designated public forum is not created when the government allows selective access for individual speakers rather than general access for a class of speakers.").
119
See Lee, 505 U.S. at 679-80 ("[T]he government-like other property owners - 'has power to
preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated ."' (quoting Greer v .
Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976))) ; Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800 (" [T)he extent to which the Government
can control access depends on the nature of the relevant forum .").
120
Cornelius, 473 U .S. at 809 .
121
See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 681 (The format of the debate and the number of ballot-eligible candidates renders it reasonable to exclude some to avoid "cacophony" and promote "the educational value
and quality of (the] debate." (quoting TWENTIETHCENTURYFUND TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL
DEBATES, LET AMERICADECIDE 148 (1995)) ; Lee, 505 U.S, at 683-84 (finding solicitation ban in airports reasonable because of "the disruptive effect that solicitation may have on business " and the "risks
of duress " presented by the activity) ; id. at 689 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (" Face-to-face solicitation is
incompatible with the airport's functioning in a way that the other, permitted activities are not.") .
122
See, e.g., United States v. Kokinda , 497 U.S. 720, 732-33 (1990) (excluding solicitation from
sidewalk between parking lot and post office is reasonable) ; Cornelius, 473 U.S . at 811 (excluding certain types of charities from fund drive is reasonable); Perry Educ . Ass 'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n , 460 U.S. 37, 46-47 (1983) (excluding rival union from school mail system is reasonable) . But
see Lee , 505 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring ) ("Because I cannot see how peaceful pamphleteer ing is incompatible with the multipurp ose environment of the Port Authority airports , I cannot accept
that a total ban on that activity is reasonable without an explanation as to why such a restriction 'preserv[ es] the property ' for the several uses to which it has been put." (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 50-51))
(alteration in original ).
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private speakers when distributing speech subsidies that create a forum. 123
Working inward from one end, the spectrum of government control
over the content of the private expression it facilitates runs from very little
when it regulates private speech that occurs without government subsidy or
in the traditional public forum, to more control in a nonpublic forum. At the
other end, the spectrum of control runs from almost absolute when the government speaks for itself, to great control when it enlists private people to
speak as its agents. In the middle, between the nonpublic forum and the instance where government speaks through private apents, is the less charted
realm of government/private speech interaction. 12 In this area, the government subsidizes private speech as private speech. Its action thus falls
outside the category of speech by government agents. At the same time, the
government places access limits on its subsidies which, although perhaps
not incontrovertibly aimed at suppressing a particular point of view, create a
realistic danger of being applied in that way or having that effect. Government action in this area, then, does not clearly meet the viewpoint neutrality
requirement of a legitimate nonpublic forum.
Two recent Supreme Court decisions touch certain aspects of this
murky middle ground. In Arkansas Educational Television Commission v.
Forbes, the Court clarified that the government can discriminate among
private messages when it acts as an editor, compiling a range of private
pieces into a unique act of expression. 125 It is "the nature of editorial discretion," which requires "choos[ing] among speakers with different viewpoints," that "counsels against subjecting [public] broadcasters to claims of
viewpoint discrimination." 126 Similarly, "like a university selecting a commencement speaker, a public institution selecting speakers for a lecture series, or a public school prescribing its curriculum, a broadcaster [exercising
its editorial discretion] ... will facilitate the expression of some viewpoints
instead of others ." 127 Although government editors '"can and do abuse this
power . .. [c]alculated risks of abuse are taken in order to preserve higher
values . "' 128 Because the exercise of journalistic discretion by a government

123

Bd . of Regents of the Univ . of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth , 529 U.S . 217, 235 (2000) (noting that a
university may use mandatory student fees to promote open discussion so long as "viewpoint neutrality "
is the operational principle); see also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ . of Va ., 515 U.S.
819, 829 (1995) ("[T]he State (may not] excercis[e] viewpoint discrimination , even when the limited
public forum is one of its own creation .").
124
See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 678 ("Where the property is not a traditional public forum and the government has not chosen to create a designated public forum, the property is either a nonpublic forum or
not a forum at all.") .
125
Id. at 673 .
126

Id.

127

Id. at 674 .
Id. at 673-74 (quoting Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., v. Democratic Nat'! Comm. , 412 U.S. 94,

128

124-25 (1973)) .
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editor is "speech activity,"
the values that protect the government's discretion to choose the content of its own speech place the government editor's action on the government speech side of the spectrum.
The Forbes challenge, however, was to a candidate's exclusion from a
broadcasted debate. The Court found this particular program a "narrow exception" to the rule that a public broadcaster has the discretion of a government speaker. 130
Both because of the "design" and "implicit
representation" as to the nature of the debate-as a forum for speech that
131
was not the broadcaster's own -and because of the peculiarly important
132
nature of political speech,
the Court found the debate to be a nonpublic
forum. 133 In this context, viewpoint discrimination would not represent an
acceptable '[c]alculated ris[k],' but rather would produce "an inevitability
of skewing the electoral dialogue." 134 The Court then went on to find
Forbes's exclusion appropriately based on his status as a candidate with little public support, and thus not impermissibly viewpoint based. 135
In the other case, National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 136 the
Court addressed the government's discretion to set standards for arts funding. In response to controversy over federal government funding of several
pieces of art, Congress amended the National Endowment for the Arts's authorization to state that "artistic excellence and artistic merit are the criteria
by which [grant] applications are judged, taking into consideration general
standards of decencr and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the
American public ." 13 The NEA distributes money to private organizations
and individuals to further a "national policy of support for the .. . arts." 138
The art produced, however, is neither government speech nor the speech of
government agents in furtherance of an underlying substantive policy. 139
Accordingly, in upholding the provision the Court did not immediately and

129

Id. at 674 .
Id. at 675.
131
Id. ("[T]he debate was by design a forum for political speech by the candidates," and
"[ c Jonsistent with the long tradition of candidate debates, the implicit representation of the broadcaster
was that the views expressed were those of the candidates, not its own.") .
132
Id. (" [I]n our tradition, candidate debates are of exceptional significance in the electoral process .") .
133
See id. at 680.
134
Id. at 676. (quoting Columbia Broad . Sys., Inc., v. Democratic Nat'! Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 125
( 1973) (alteration in original) .
135
The Court noted, "[!]here is no substance to Forbes ' suggestion that he was excluded because his
views were unpopular or out of the mainstream . His own objective lack of support, not his platform ,
was the criterion. " Id. at 683.
136
524 U.S. 569 (1998).
137
20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(l) (1994) .
138
Finley, 524 U.S. at 573 (citing 20 U.S.C . § 953(b) (1994)) .
139
See id. at 611 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The Government freely admits ... that it neither speaks
through the expression subsidi zed by the NEA , nor buys anything for itself with its NEA grants .").
130
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exclusively rely on precedents in these areas. 140 Nor did the Court hold that
the provision was constitutional as a basis upon which to administer any
type of private spe~ch forum. The concurrence and dissent labeled the "decency and respect" criteria viewpoint discriminatory. 141 The Court acknowledged that its subjectivitv and vagueness might render it invalid in the
. . l or regu l atory context. f42
cnmma
Instead, the Court distinguished the government funding at issue from
government subsidies that create a forum. In contrast to government subsidies that "indiscriminately 'encourage a diversity of views from private
speakers"' or require "comparably objective decisions on allocating public
benefits," the NEA funding is "competitive," "highly selective," and allocated for the purpose of rewarding and encouraging "artistically excellent"
projects. 143 The "mandate to make aesthetic judgments" and "the inherently
content-based 'excellence' threshold" are fundamentally incompatible with
the "neutrality" required when the government administers a private speech
forum. 144 Consequently, the Court placed this arts funding more toward the
government speech and government agent end 145 than the forum 146 end of
the subsidy spectrum. It held the "decency and resJ?ect" provision facially
consistent with substantive free speech principles. 1 It also held that, "in
the context of selective subsidies," the standards were not unconstitutionally vague, noting that although "as a practical matter, ... artists may conform their speech to what they believe to be the decision-making criteria in
order to acquire funding," "when the Government is acting as patron rather
than as a sovereign, the consequences of imprecision are not constitutionally severe." 148
140

See id. at 587-88 (referring to the government agent decisions as "final" considerations after upholding the constitutionality of the provision) .
141
See id. at 590 (Scalia, J. concurring) ("By its terms, [the NEA authorization] establishes contentand viewpoint-based criteria upon which grant applications are to be evaluated."); id. at 600 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) ("The decency and respect proviso mandates viewpoint-based decisions in the disbursement
of government subsidies ... .") .
142
id. at 587-87 ("[T]he government may allocate competitive funding according to criteria that
would be impermissible were direct regulation of speech or a criminal penalty at stake."); id. at 588
("The terms of the provision ... could raise substantial vagueness concerns [in the criminal or regulatory context].) .
143
Id . at 585-87.
144
id. at 586 .
145
See id. at 588 ("Congress may selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest' [and] [i]n doing so, 'the Government has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other."' (quoting Rust
v. Sullivan, 500 U.S . 173, 193 (1991))) .
146
See id. at 586 (distinguishing the NEA ' s mandate to make esthetic judgments from the fund subsidy in Rosenberger, which was nonselective, and from other access subsidies , which are "comparatively objective").
147
See id. at 587 ("[W)e have no occasion here to address an as-applied challenge in a situation
where the denial of a grant may be shown to be the product of invidious viewpoint discrimination .").
148
Id . at 589. The Court also added,"[s]ection 954(d)(I) merely adds some imprecise considera-

1374

95:1357 (2001)

The Public Sensibilities Forum

In both Forbes and Finley, the Court acknowledged the two ends of the
spectrum of government speech promotion. On one hand, in Forbes and
Finley the Court effectively excised two related types of government subsidies of private speech from the murky middle ground and placed them on
the government speech end of the spectrum, where the government has
broad discretion to discriminate among speakers. On the other hand, however, both cases emphasized the limits of the government speech-related
categories. In both cases the Court confirmed that merely aiding private
speech, by providing access or funding, does not give the government the
same discretion it has with its own speech to discriminate according to message. Something more is required.
Both Forbes and Finley make clear that what distinguishes cases in
which the government may employ viewpoint discrimination from cases in
which it may not is a feature that infuses government's ~rivate speech promotion with the values that attach to government speech. 49 These cases are
best understood as instances where the Court examined the nature of the
government action and found the government selection process itself to be a
speech act that would be thwarted if the forum rule prohibiting viewpoint
discrimination were applied. Public broadcasters communicate messages
by "compil[ing] ... the speech of third parties." 150 The NEA, as arts patron, "make[s] esthetic judgments" that communicate what meets its '"excellence' threshold for ... support." 151 Not only is it appropriate to award
discretion to the government to discriminate in these instances because the
government intended to communicate in making its private speech selections, but it is also crucially important that the public understands this intention so that the government is politically accountable for its speech
selections. 152 These "editorial" and "competitive quality" judgments by the
government in interacting with private speakers thus constitute the innermost points on the spectrum where the government retains discretion to discriminate among speakers in a way that creates a substantial risk of
viewpoint discrimination.

tions to an already subjective selection process ." Id. at 590.
149
See Alan E. Bronstein, Alternative Maps for Navigating the First Amendment Maze, 16 CONST.
COMMENT. IOI, 135 (1999) ("[W)hen the government property, program , or subsidy system at issue
serves some expressive purpose, government selectivity in employing private speech to further that pur pose should not be understood to create a forum for First Amendment purposes .") .
150
Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674 (1998).
151
Finl ey, 524 U.S. at 586; see also Bezanson , supra note 59, at 971 ("The government's role was
purposive and express ive, a status in which it must, to express its own preference , discriminate aga inst
competing viewpoints .").
152
See Finley , 524 U.S. at 586 ("The NEA ' s mandate is to make esthetic judgment s."); Forbes , 523
U.S. at 675 (explaining that public broadcast licensees are "accountable for broadcast performance ;" debate is nonpublic forum because of the "implicit representation of the broadcaster . .. that the views expressed were those of the candidates , not its own").
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B. The De Facto Public Sensibilities Forum
Although the boundaries of the "editorial discretion" and " competitive
quality judgment" subsidies are not entirely clear, 153 even at their broadest
they do not include most of the realm of government/private speech interaction. Specifically, these cases do not address the constitutionality of the
"public sensibilities forum." A public sensibilities forum differs from the
government/private speech interactions that occur when the government exercises editorial discretion or makes competitive quality judgments because,
in a public sensibilities forum, the government opens a speech opportunity
to applicants without intending to send a message of its own. Instead, the
intent and appearance of the speech opportunity is as a "forum" where private speakers, not the government, are accountable for the content of the
expression.
A public sensibilities forum resembles these other government/private
speech interactions, however, because its access standards pose the same
sort of "risk" of viewpoint discrimination as in these other contexts. In particular, the "decency and respect for public values" standard for arts funding
is much like the access standards used in many of the de facto public sensibilities forums. On one hand, these standards are often not viewpoint discriminatory on their face and will not inevitably be applied to suppress
disfavored viewpoints. 154 On the other hand, their reference to majority
· sensibilities and their vagueness create a substantial danger that they will be
applied in this way. The Court acknowledged this danger in reviewing the
"decency and respect" standard for arts funding. 155 Rather than label the
public sensibilities standard viewpoint neutral, and therefore permissible
even if the funding constituted a nonpublic forum, the Court took pains to
distinguish the context of arts funding from forums where the prohibition
against viewpoint discrimination would apply. 156
Public sensibilities standards, like the "decency and respect" standard
applied to arts funding, condition access to a speech opportunity upon meeting standards that depend upon the public's reaction to the private speech.
Although constitutionally tolerable in the context of arts funding, these
standards applied in nonpublic forums create the substantial possibility that
they will act as a "heckler's veto," skewing speech in an unconstitutionally
viewpoint-sensitive way. It is this tension between the two inconsistent
153

See, e.g., Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ . of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085 (2000) . The Ku Klux
Klan argued that underwriting of public television programs is like advertising and should be analyzed
under forum doctrine. See id. at I 092. The Court disagreed , holding that such decisions fall under editorial discretion and so the station can reject the Ku Klux Klan as sponsor. See id. at I 094-95 .
154
See Finley, 524 U.S. at 582 (noting that hortatory language and legislative history "undercut respondents' argument that the provision inevitably will be utilized as a tool for invidious viewpoint discrimination") .
155
See id. at 588 (noting that public dislike of particular pieces of art by particular artists prompted
adoption of the standards and that its terms were "undeniably opaque").
156
See id. at 587-89.
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concepts drawn from opposite sides of the government/private speech spectrum-(potentially
viewpoint-based) public sensibilities 157 with (mandatorily viewpoint-neutral) forum 158-that creates the uncertain status of this
type of government/private speech interaction . A sampling of these de
facto "public sensibilities forums" follows.

1. Vanity License Plates.-Under personalized or vanity license
plate programs, drivers, for an extra fee, can choose the configuration of
numbers and letters on their plates. Typical standards forbid "[a]ny combination ... that may carry connotations offensive to good taste and decency,
or which could be misleading." 159 Often, the Department of Motor Vehicles
(DMV) places the policy on the vanity plate application. 160 Usually, the
task of determining what combinations are unacceptable is delegated to an
administrative employee, 161 who can refer controversies to a several-person
panel. 162 The DMV mat) have a "no-no list" to aid it in its initial determinations of offensiveness . 1 3 Once plates are issued, the DMV reacts to citizen
complaints in deciding to recall plates. 164 Plates recalled under this type of
157

See id. at 588 ("So long as legislation does not infringe on other constitutionally protected rights,
Congress has wide latitude to set spending priorities."); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 ( 1991)
("Within far broader limits than petitioners are willing to concede, when the Government appropriates
public funds to establish a program it is entitled to define the limits of that program .").
158
See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995) (deciding that viewpoint-based restrictions are not proper "when [a) university does not itself speak or subsidize transmittal of a message it favors but instead expends funds to encourage a diversity of views from
private speakers"); Rust, 500 U.S. at 199-200 ("[T)his Court has recognized that the existence of a Government 'subsidy,' in the form of Government-owned property, does not justify [certain types of] restrictions of speech.").
159
See, e.g., CAL. YEH. CODE§ 5105 (West 1987).
160
See Royko, supra note 3 7, at 3 (noting standard on Arizona plate applications).
161
See, e.g., Lewis v. Wilson, 89 F. Supp . 2d 1082, 1085 (E.D. Mo . 2000) (acknowledging that
clerk initially reviews vanity plate application); Pruitt v. Wilder, 840 F. Supp . 414, 416 (E.D. Va. 1994)
(recognizing that DMV branch office personnel make the initial determination).
162
See Lewis, 89 F. Supp . 2d at 1085 (recognizing that clerk's initial decision to issue plate is "forwarded to a review committee"); Pruill, 840 F. Supp. at 416 ("!f[a letter) combination is not on the list
[of unacceptable combinations] but appears questionable in light of the policy, the combination is referred to a 'word committee' for a determination of whether it violates DMV policy."); Godden, supra
note 35, at Bl ("In Washington, the censor's job falls to the Personalized Plate Review Committee, four
employees at the Department of Licensing .").
163
Pruitt, 840 F. Supp . at 416 (noting that Virginia DMV "got a so-called 'No-No' list from California," which it uses to make its initial determinations of unacceptability).
164
See, e.g., Lewis, 89 F. Supp . 2d at 1085 ("From time to time, the [Department of Rev enue] receives complaints regarding particular vanity plates that have been issued . When the DOR receives such
a complaint the General Counsel of the DOR reviews both the complaint and the configuration [and)
makes a decision as to whether to recall the plate."); McMahon v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 522 N. W.2d
51, 56 (Iowa 1994) ("Public complaints are . .. a gauge by which the [Office of Vehicle Registration]
may determine how offensive a particular plate is to the public. Complaints serve to tip the scale in fa.
vor of revocation of a questionable plate ."); Jack Cheevers, Vanity Plates: One Man's Slur is Another
Man's Badge, L.A . TIMES, Aug. 21, 1990, at A3 ("The Department of Motor Vehicles' recall of 333
vanity plates inscribed with the words wop or dago was init iated at the urging of the Sons of Italy, an
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policy include "JAZZME" from a jazz historian because another driver understood it to have a sexual connotation, 165"4 JIHAD" from Jihad Jaffer
because it could be "misconstrued as a declaration of support for Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein's call for jihad, or holy war, against the United
States," 166"GOVT SUX" because of "vulgar, obscene language," 167and letter combinations understood as slurs by various groups. Recent recalls on
this ground include plates with variations of "DAGO" or "WOP," at the instigation of the Sons of Italy, 168and those with variations of "REDSKIN,"
at the instigation of Native American Groups. 169Those who protest the censorship invoke an individual right to self-expression, 170while state officials
claim that vanity plates are a privilege to which the Constitution does not
apply.111
Courts have differed widely as to whether the free speech guarantee
limits the government's discretion . According to California courts, the
state's vanity plate program does not create "a forum for the free expression
of ideas." 172 Rather, in this context, "First Amendment considerations are
at best minimal, if present at all." 173 The letter combinations on a license
plate are "at best expressive conduct, not speech per se," and so the appropriate constitutional analysis is the deferential one established in United
States v. O'Brien. 174 The standard used to determine unacceptable letter
85-year -old fraternal organization that says the terms are deeply offensive to most Italian-Americans .");
Royko, supra note 37, at 3 (ment ioning a letter to driver that reads "[s]ince a complaint was filed with
this office , I must recall [your] plates") ; 'Zyklon ' Plates Cause Outrage, THE JERUSALEMPOST, May 13,
1997, at 4 (reporting recall of"ZYKLON B" plate at request of Anti-Defamation League) .
165
See Royko, supra note 37, at 3.
166
California Recalls '4 JIHAD' Car Tags, ORLANDOSENTINELTRIB., Feb . 21, 1991, at Al 9.
167
Steve Twomey, A Plateful of Inanity over Vanity, WASH.POST,Nov. 4, I 993, at Cl .
168
See Cheevers, supra note 164, at A3 (reporting that California DMV recalled 333 vanity plates
with such inscriptions) .
169
See Personal License Plates Offend , SAN DIEGOUNION-TRIBUNE
, Mar. 10, 2000 , at Al (reporting on Washington Redskins fan asked to give up RDSKINS plate because of American Indian complaint) .
170
See, e.g., Katz v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 108 Cal. Rptr. 424, 428 (Cal. Ct. App . 1973) ("(Plate
owner] insists he has the right to express himself within the limited confines of the six letters on a governmentally issued vehicle identification mechanism.") ; A License Plate Debate: Italian Slurs or Pride?,
N.Y . TIMES, Oct . 10, 1990, at Al2 (noting debate among Italian-Americans about recall of "DAGO"
and "WOP" license plates); License Plates and the Right to Offend, WASH. POST, Nov . 15, 1993, at A 18
("Last time I checked , we still claimed to be a free country . Yet the DMV now claims the right to censor free speech if it deems it ' offensive."') .
171
James Steve, Californian Vanity Initially Insulting, EVENINGPOST (Wellington) , Oct. 24, 1997,
at 15 ("[DMV spokesman] says : ' There is no First Amendment (freedom of speech) issue herebasically it' s a privilege (to have personalised plates) . !fit is found to be offensive to the general public,
then it will be recalled .").
172
Katz, 108 Cal. Rptr . at 428 ; see also Kahn v . Dep't of Motor Vehicles , 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 6, IO
(Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
173
Katz , 108 Cal. Rptr . at 428 .
174
Kahn , 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at IO (citing United States v. O' Brien, 391 U.S . 367 (1968)) .
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combinations-that they not "carry connotations offensive to good taste and
decency"-is not unconstitutionally vague because it does not penalize the
plate holder, 175 but instead provides general directions to administrative
employees charged with carrying out a legislative mandate. 176 Thus, according to these decisions, the California Department of Motor Vehicles is
virtually unrestricted in its ability to react to citizens' complaints and its
own judgment in rejecting or recalling "offensive" vanity plate mottos. 177
By contrast, the United States District Court for the Northern District
of California in an unpublished opinion required California's DMV to issue
an "HIV POS" vanity plate. 178 The court characterized California's vanity
plate program as at least a nonpublic forum. 179 Although the court implied
that the DMV could enforce some public sensibilities standards by, for example, prohibiting "inherently offensive" racial, ethnic, and religious slurs,
the plate at issue did not fit into this category. 18 For this and other reasons, 181 the DMV's denial of the plate constituted unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. 182
Similarly, Virginia's vanity plate program, which is modeled on California's, 183 constitutes at least a nonpublic forum. 184 In this nonpublic forum, Virginia's ban on references to deities is unconstitutionally viewpoint
based . 185 Accordingly, Virginia must issue a "GODZGUD" license plate. 186

°

175

Katz, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 426 ("[Plate holder 's ] right to express the language of his choice remains
totally unimpaired by the statute as Katz is free to put on his car or in the metal frame surrounding the
license plate any combination of words and letters that he chooses.").
176
Id. at 427 ("(L Jegislative standards for administrative acts may be expressed in general terms
and need not precisely detail the factors that are to govern the administrative agency and its employees.") .
177
See Kahn, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 13 (holding that DMV can reject plate with four-letter epithet
written in stenographer's shorthand even though only a small portion of the population would understand it); Katz, I 08 Cal. Rptr. at 429 (rejecting plate holder's argument that DMV's action is unconstitutionally arbitrary because it has "issued some personalized license plates that have combinations at least
as offensive, if not more so, than the one he submitted").
178
Dimmick v. Quigley, No. 96-3987 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 1998).
179
Id., slip op. at 7 & n. I (stating that the California Court of Appeals in Katz and Kahn did so as
well).
180
Id., slip op. at 9.
181
The court also rejected the DMV's claim that it could reject the plate under a policy that prohibited the advertisement or disclosure of confidential medical information because the OMV did not have
a consistent policy with respect either to medical conditions generally or to HIV. Id., slip op. at 7-8 .
182

Id., slip op. at 7-9 .

183

Pruitt v. Wilder, 840 F. Supp. 414, 416 (E.D. Va. 1994) ("In fashioning its CommuniPlate program, DMV relied in large part on the CommuniPlate system utilized in California.") .
184
Id. at 417 n.2 (assuming that plates are nonpublic forum, as opposed to public forum, in deciding
summary judgment motion) .
185
Id. at 418 ("[B]y allowing one sub-set of religious speech - that not directly referring to a deity- to be placed on Communiplates, while denying another sub-set of religious speech-that referring
to deities - the OMV policy discriminates on the basis of the speaker's viewpoint.") .
186
In the Virginia case, the OMV voluntarily altered its policy to remove the ban on references to
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Missouri's vanity plate program is also a nonpublic forum. 187 Language
that permits state officials to reject letter combinations that are "contrary to
public policy" is unconstitutionally vague 188 and in fact "is designed to target particular vie'Yfcoints." 189 So, the state cannot recall an "ARYAN-I"
plate on this basis. 1 0
In other states, courts have upheld state officials' discretion to refuse or
revoke vanity plates according to these same types of standards and procedures without considering Free Speech Clause objections. The Iowa Supreme Court has found its state's vanity plate review procedure to be
"reasonable and rational" as well as the Department of Transportation's decision "to weigh a public complaint heavily in favor of revocation of particular plates." 191 Moreover, because vanity plates "do not involve a
fundamental right or suspect classification, equal protection analysis affords
governmental bodies broad discretion in pursuing legitimate governmental
interests." 192 In this context, the government has a legitimate interest in
"protecting the public from offensive messages." 193 Thus, the state can
choose to reject letter combinations with messages that are "sexual in con194
notation or otherwise offensive ."
In Utah, the State Tax Commission upheld the Motor Vehicle Division's decision not to revoke "REDSKIN"
plates. The Commission based its decision on the conclusion that only a
small portion of the public found the term offensive. 195 The Utah Supreme
Court reversed and remanded, holding that the "offensiveness" provisions
in the MVD's rule require it to look to the perspective of the "objective,

deities after initiation of the lawsuit, so an injunction was not necessary . Id. at 416. In addition, the
Court noted that the DMV might be able to defend its refusal to issue the plate on Establishment Clause
grounds if it expanded its policy "to ban all religious references," which it did not choo se to do. Id. at
418.
187
Lewis v. Wilson, 89 F. Supp . 2d 1082, 1090 (E.D. Mo . 2000) .
188
Id. ("In order to be constitutionally specific, a statute must provide standards for those who enforce it provisions.").
189
Id. at 1091.
190
Id. ("[B]ecause the Director might still have constitutionally permissible grounds for denying or
revoking petitioner's vanity plate, the Court will deny petitioner's prayer for injunctive relief .").
191
McMahon v. Iowa Dep't ofTransp., 522 N.W .2d, 51 , 56 (Iowa 1994).
192
193
194

Id. at 56.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 55. The Iowa rule provides: "No combination of characters shall be issued which is sexual

in connotation; defined in dictionaries as a term of vulgarity, contempt, prejudice, hostility, insult, or
racial or ethnic degradation; recognized as a swear word; considered to be offensive; or a foreign word
falling into any of these categories." IOWAADMIN . CODEr. 761-401.6 (2001).
195
McBride v. Motor Vehicle Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 977 P.2d 467 , 469 (Utah 1999)
(Commission majority relied on "fact that the term 'Redskin' is used pervasively throughout our society
in reference to sports teams" and is an expression of "positive support"; concurring commissioner relied
on the fact that "the general public 'to date' had not found the term offensive"; dissenting commissioner
thought the fact that " the tenn is offensive to some people ... should be sufficie nt enough grounds to
revoke the ... license plates") .
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reasonable person ."
Applying this standard on remand, the Commission
held that the plates should be recalled. 197

2. Advertising.-Government entities, particularly public transportation systems, often sell advertising space to private speakers to generate
revenue. The Supreme Court has both recognized the free speech interests
of the private speakers 198 and validated some degree of public sensibilities
regulation by the government. 199 In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, the
Court upheld a public transit authority's rule that commercial, but not political, advertisers could gain access to advertising space in rapid transit vehicles . The Court distinguished advertising space from periodical or
newspaper advertisements, noting that with the former the government had
the legitimate purpose of protecting the interests of a captive audience . It
also noted that the scope of the government's discretion was broader when
it was acting in a "proprietary capacity" 200than when it was merely the
manager of a public forum. 20' The Court then found the transit authority's
distinction between "the blare of political propaganda" and "less controversial commercial and service-oriented advertisinf to be reasonable and thus
not to constitute a First Amendment violation. 20
Public transit authorities have seized upon this decision as a green light
for broad public sensibilities regulations. Thus, they solicit and accept private advertising, but retain broad discretion to modify or reject particular
ads that violate norms of "good taste, decency and community standards,"203are "objectionable for any reason ," 204or that discuss "controversial public issues ."205 Pursuant to these policies, the transit authorities may
196

Id. at 470.
John Heilprin, Utah Republican ls liberal with Apologies as U.S. Taxpayer Advocate. SALT
LAKETRIB., March 14, 1999, at Al (reporting that "the commission reversed itself' following Supreme
Court ruling).
198
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec . Corp . v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n ofN.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 582 (1980)
(holding that advertisers have Free Speech Clause interests).
199
See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (explaining that city can limit
access to transit system advertising "to minimize chances of abuse, the appearance of favoritism, and the
risk of imposing upon a captive audience").
200 Id.
197

201

Id. at 303 ("Here, we have no open spaces, no meeting hall, park, street comer, or other public
thoroughfare. Instead, the city is engaged in commerce .") .
202

Id. at 304.
Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Dep't of Aviation of Ch icago, 45 F.3d 1144, 1148 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that "[a]ll advertising shall be in good taste"); AIDS Action Comm. of Mass. v. MTBA, 42 F.3d I, 3
(!st Cir. 1994).
204
Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242, 245 (3d Cir.
1998); Lebron v. Nat'! R.R. Passenger Corp., 69 F.3d 650, 653 (1993); Air Line Pilots, 45 F.3d at I 148.
205
United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1099 v. Southwest Ohio Reg') Transit, 163
F.3d 341, 352 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that transit authority rejects such advertisements because they "may
adversely affect [its] ridership"); Planned Parenthood v. Chicago Transit Auth ., 767 F.2d 1225, 1227
(7th Cir. 1985) (noting that Chicago Transit Authority rejects "controversial public issue advertise203
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require modifications or reject advertisements before they are placed. 206 In
addition, transit authorities may base their decisions to reject or remove particular advertisements on viewers' complaints. 207
Lower courts confronted with particular controversies have limited the
government's discretion to condition advertising access on public sensibilities. These courts have rejected some public sensibilities standards as unacceptably vague. These include standards that forbid ads that are "not in
208
that "pertain[] to sexual conduct," 209 that
good taste" or are "immoral,"
210
are "controversial,"
or "controversial" in a way that "adversely affect[s]
[the transit authority's] image or ridership," 211 and that are not "aesthetically pleasing." 212 Such vagueness "invites abuse by enablinB the official to
administer the policy on the basis of impermissible factors. " 2 3
In other instances, some courts have assumed the validity of particular
sensibility standards, but have required that the government consistently enforce them. 214 So, for example, a transit authority cannot reject condom
ments").
206
United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 163 F.3d at 347 (noting that wrap-around bus advertisement rejected before it was placed because photograph of labor protest showed "a mob of persons, many of whom are holding picket signs and certain of whose facial expressions, body positions
and placement conveyed a solemn, if not angry, tone and an intimidating visual"); id. at 353 (noting that
transit authority has rejected the following advertisements : "an advertisement stating that 'Monday is a
Bitch;"' "an advertisement for Rush Limbaugh's radio talk show displaying a caricature of President
Clinton with his pants down showing a tattoo stating ' ! Love Rush;'" "an advertisement for Enjoy the
Arts stating 'Look Around This Bus and Find Someone to Do It With;'" "an advertisement containing
an outline of a breast;" and "a clothing ad determined to be 'in bad taste' and 'too controversial in content'"); AIDS Action Comm. of Mass., 42 F.3d at 4-5 (transit authority reviews proposed ads, rejecting
some and agreeing to run others with editorial changes); id. at 9 (transit authority had previously rejected "certain Calvin Klein ads which somehow might have been misconstrued as endorsing the Ku
Klux Klan, and an animal rights ad featuring a photograph of a maimed dog").
207
AIDS Action Comm. of Mass., 42 F.3d at 12 (finding that AIDS awareness advertisements "were
rejected only after a number of public letters of protest").
208
Air Line Pilots, 45 F.3d at 1153 n.5 ("The district court correctly determined that taste and morality were standards too vague to be enforced.") .
209
AIDS Action Comm. of Mass., 42 F.3d at 12 ("The purported exclusion of all messages or representations 'pertaining to sexual conduct' is so vague and broad that it could cover much of the clothing
and movie advertising commonly seen on billboards and in magazines .").
210
United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 163 F.3d at 359 ("We have no doubt that standing
alone, the term 'controversial' vests the decision maker with an impermissible degree of discretion.") .
211
Id. at 359-60 (stating that the question becomes "whether in linking the term 'controversial' to
(the transit authority's) commercial interests, the term becomes sufficiently precise so as to constrain the
decision-maker's discretion" and, "(i)n the absence of requiring a demonstrable causality between an
advertisement's controversial nature and [the transit authority's] interests," it does not).
212
Id. at 360 ("The advertising policy's 'aesthetically pleasing' requirement similarly invites arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.") .
213
Id. at 359 (citing Leonardson v. City of East Lansing, 896 F.2d 190, 198 (6th Cir. 1990)).
214
See AIDS Action Comm. of Mass., 42 F.3d at IO ("Even if we ... assume arguendo .. . that the
[transit authority] may constitutionally proscribe sexually explicit and/or patently offensive speech in its
cars, we must decide whether the content discrimination inherent in [choosing between advertisements
with sexual innuendo] is permissible.").
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awareness advertisements pursuant to a policy that prohibits "sexually explicit" or "patently offensive" material when it has accepted a commercial
film advertisement that contained the same degree of sexual innuendo. 215
Nor can a transit authority reject an advertisement portraying a union protest as "too controversial" and "not aesthetically pleasing" when it otherwise accepts "a wide array of political and public-issue speech." 216 Such
laissez-faire enforcement of potentially valid public sensibilities standards
defeats the government's ability to enforce its standards in particular instances. 217 According to these courts, inconsistent enforcement of the standards, like vagueness in the standards themselves, creates an unacceptable
risk of invidious viewpoint discrimination. 218
Despite these occasionally imposed limits, however, public transit authorities and other government entities continue to establish and enforce
public sensibilities access standards when distributing advertising space to
private speakers. Although some types of standards have been defined as
impermissible by some courts in some contexts, the content of permissible
public sensibilities standards, if any, remains uncertain, as does the status of
public advertising space under the existing forum doctrine. 219
3. Displays.-Government
efforts to select among private speakers
have caused controversy when the government permits private speakers to
create displays on public property. When the property constitutes a public
forum, the government cannot exclude "offensive" speakers. 220 Where the
property is not a public forum, however, the government's ability to be selective on these grounds is less certain.
The Supreme Court has addressed "display cases . . . in public facilities" in dicta, noting that "the Constitution does not require" that they "be221
come Hyde Parks open to every would-be pamphleteer and politician."
Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit en bane characterized a university history
department display case as at least a nonpublic forum. 222 It held that the
215

Id. at IO (noting that film advertisements "are at least as sexually explicit and/or patently offensive as the [AIDS] ads") .
216
United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1099 v. Southwest Ohio Reg'! Transit Auth .,
163 F.3d 341, 354-55 (6th Cir. 1998).
217
See, e.g., Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Dep't of Aviation of Chicago, 45 F.3d 1144, 1153 (7th Cir.
1995) (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Chicago Transit Auth., 767 F.2d 1225, 1228 (7th Cir. 1985)).
218
See id., 45 F.3d at 1153 ("The government may not ' create' a policy to implement its newlydiscovered desire to suppress a particular message .").
219
See. e.g., AIDS Action Comm. of Mass ., 42 F.3d at 9 (declining to reach "the public forum question" in part because of "the relatively murky status of the public forum doctrine" with respect to public
transit advertising space).
22
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995) (stating that in a
public forum, state "may regulate expressive content only if such a restriction is necessary, and narrowly
drawn, to serve a compelling state interest") .
221
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 , 304 (1974) .
222
See Burnham v. Ianni , 119 F.3d 668, 675 (8th Cir. 1997) ("In this case, the nature of the forum

°
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chancellor did not have the discretion to remove photographs of gunbearing military history professors from the display. The chancellor argued
that the "disruption caused by the display," and its "aggravation of the atmosphere of fear" stemming from death threats received by several female
faculty members, justified removal of the photographs . The court characterized the removal as unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. 223
By contrast, several courts have been hospitable to claims by government building administrators that they can edit display submissions according to public sensibilities, even though they possess no legislative mandate
to do so. In opening exhibit space to artists, governments have asserted the
ability to select out art that is "controversial," 224 that might offend "conservative voters," 225 that is not "dignified," 226 or that constitutes a "visual horror. " 227 Confronted with a painting of a giant nude woman holding a
bloody, apparently self-aborted, fetus, 228 and a satirical life-sized rendering
of a federal district judge e~u~ped with a viewer-activated tape recording
mocking his reversal record, 2 courts have stated that building administrators must be able to consider "taste, decorum, sensitivity [and] respect" in
rejecting the works at issue. 230 Despite the obvious attempts by both artists
to convey political messages, one of these courts characterized the "preference for the somber over the sardonic" as neither viewpoint nor subjectmatter discrimination, but instead merely "a standard time, place, and manner limitation. "231

4. Other.-In other contexts as well, governments' conditioning of
the distribution of speech opportunities on meeting public sensibilities standards has generated controversy. Some of these other examples include
state "specialty" license plate programs under which motorists can choose
makes little difference") .
223
See id. at 673.
224
Claudio v. United States, 836 F. Supp. 1230, 1233 (E.D.N.C. 1993) (finding that artist received
explanation that "although your display may be in the form of art, it is more properly described as a political expression conc erning the highly controversial issue of abortion").
225
Heins , supra note 40, at I 39 (recounting controversy surrounding use of exhibit space in Fairfax
County government building and quoting Letter from Douglas J. Sanderson to Kent Willis, Director of
the American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia).
226
Sefick v. Gardner , 164 F.3d 370, 372 (7th Cir. 1998) (asking "(W ]hat's wrong with insisting that
exhibits in a federal courthouse be dignified ?").
227
Claudio v. United States, 836 F. Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D.N.C. 1993).
228
Id. at 1232 ("The work's main elements are larger-than-life depictions of a nude woman, a coat
hanger, and a fetus.").
229
Sefick, 164 F.3d at 370 (sculpture is a "disto rted" rendition of judge, who works in the building
at issue, astride a larger-than-life white horse; tape recording states," 'As for the life ofme I can't figure
out why they're overturning all my rulings upstairs.'").
230
Sefick, 164 F.3d at 373 ("Nothing in the First Amendment prevents the government from allowing sedate and decorou s exhibits ... while excluding the comic, the caustic, and the acerbic."); Claudio,
836 F. Supp. at 1234;.
231
Sefick , 164 F.3d at 373 .
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plates with a private group's logo to support the group both expressively
232
trademark certification rules requiring that marks not be
and financiallr,
23
disparaging,
government signs that identify or commemorate particular
234
individuals or groups,
and programs to promote civic events by providing
partial funding for them. 235 In all of these instances, and certainly in others
that have not yet come to judicial attention, governments and courts are uncertain as to the scope of the government's discretion to consider public
sensibilities when it creates a "forum" for private speakers.
II.

DEFINING THE LEGITIMATE PUBLIC SENSIBILITIES FORUM

A. Acknowledging Its Legitimate Existence
The current confusion as to the status of the public sensibilities forum
exists because the concept is internally inconsistent under existing free
speech doctrine. On the one hand, responding to "public sensibilities"
means protecting the public from "offensive" speech, which, in the context
of speech restraints, creates an unacceptably high risk of invidious viewpoint discrimination. 236 On the other hand, access decisions in any type of
232

See, e.g., Rex Bowman, Suit Seeks Rebel Flag License Plate; Free Speech Is Cited in Case Filed
in Federal Court, RJCHMONDTIMES-DISPATCH,July 24, 1999, at 85 (reporting that Rutherford Institute
filed suit seeking to force Virginia to put the Rebel flag on the group's state-approved special license
plate arguing "that the Constitution prevents Virginia from barring speech just because some find it offensive"); Bonna M. de la Cruz, Senators OK Rebel License Tag; Opponents Call Plate Insensitive to
Blacks, TENNESSEAN,May 18, 1999, at IA (reporting that state senate approved Rebel flag plate in
Tennessee); Marina Sarris, MVA to Revoke License Tags Bearing Confederate Flag; Complaints led
Agency to Act Against Plates, BALTIMORESUN, Jan. 3, 1997, at IA ("[S]pecialty" license plates, offered
to raise money for particular groups, revoked Confederate flag logo because it "offends ... citizens."
"The controversy has raised questions about the role of government in allowing clubs to sport their logos
and names - for a price-on license plates.") .
233
Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d . 1828, 1832 (1994) (Trademark Tr. & App . Bd. 1999)
(canceling trademark registration of Redskins because it is "disparaging"); Jendi B. Reiter, Redskins and
Scarlet letters: Why "Immoral" and "Scandalous" Trademarks Should Be Federally Registerable, 6
FED. CIR. BJ. 191 (1996); Virginia Slind-Flor , Redskins Ruling Could Hurt Others: Any Registration
Deemed a Slur Could Also Face Cancellation, NAT'L L.J., April 19, 1999, at Bl.
234
See, e.g., East Timar Action Network, Inc . v. City of New York, 71 F. Supp. 2d 334, 337
(S.D .N .Y. 1999) (denying request for commemorative street sign because its proposed message was
"very political" and would "inflame the diplomatic community"); Suzanne Stone Montgomery, Note ,
When the Klan Adopts a Highway: The Weaknesses of the Public Forum Doctrine Exposed, 77 WASH.
U. L.Q. 557, 558 (1999) (describing mixed results in cases where courts have addressed states' efforts to
exclude the Ku Klux Klan from their Adopt-A-Highway programs, based on the anticipated adverse
public reaction to its participation).
235
Compare Gentala v. City of Tucson, 213 F.3d 1055, 1065 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that city engaged in unconstitutional viewpo int discrimination in a limited public forum in refusing to fund National
Day of Prayer under program to defray costs of civic events) , with id. at l 075 (noting that fund is "not a
forum at all" where city cosponsors events, so city can discriminate).
236
See Texas v. Johnson , 491 U.S . 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle underlying the
First Amendment , it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable ."); Coates v. Cincinnati , 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971)
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free speech "forum" must be viewpoint neutral. 237 Applying a unitary rule
against "viewpoint discrimination" to the many types of public sensibilities
forums would render many of them unconstitutional.
But invalidating public sensibilities forums under the rigid concept of
"viewpoint discrimination" that applies to speech restraints seems to go too
far. As the Court has recognized, tolerating different "risks of abuse" of
government discretion is appropriate according to the context. 238 In particular, tolerating a greater risk of abuse is appropriate when granting the government decision making discretion serves competing constitutional
values. 239 So, while the government may have little discretion to apply
"risky" standards in the context of speech regulations, which might excise
certain speech entirely from the marketplace of ideas, 240 slightly more risk
may be tolerable in the context of a forum that occupies a limited space in
the marketplace of ideas, that the government need not create and can close
at will. 241 Competing constitutional values give the government greater discretion to control access to nonpublic forums than to regulate speech outside a forum. 242 These competing constitutional values that support the quite
wide latitude that the government already has to define access to nonpublic
forums 243 mean that it should have some ability to react to public sensibilities in granting access as well.
Acknowledging the potential legitimacy of a public sensibilities forum
not only serves constitutional values by granting the government discretion
in some circumstances, but also by opening discussion of the ways that a
public sensibilities forum must be limited in order to be legitimate. Currently, the concept of "viewpoint discrimination" is being made to do all of
("(M]ere public intolerance or animosity cannot be the basis for abridgment of [First Amendment] freedoms.").
237
See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998).
238
Id. at 674 (noting that in the context of broadcaster discretion, "[c]alculated risks of abuse are
taken in order to preserve higher values" (quoting Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., v. Democratic Nat'!
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 124 (1973))).
239 Id.
240

See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) ('"Outrageousness' in the area of political and social discourse has an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose
liability on the basis of the jurors' tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of particular
expression. An 'outrageousness' standard that runs afoul of our longstanding refusal to allow damages
to be awarded because the speech in question may have an adverse emotional impact on the audience.").
241
See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 680 ("The . . . distinction between general and selective access furthers
First Amendment interests. By recognizing the distinction, we encourage the government to open its
property to some expressive activity in cases where, if faced with an all-or-nothing choice, it might not
open the property at all.").
242
See Jnt'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679-80 (1992) ("[T]he government-like other property owners-'has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to
which it is lawfully dedicated.'" (quoting Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 ( 1976))).
243
See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 680 ("[That the government's intent determines the status of the forum]
reflects the reality that, with the exception of traditional public fora, the government retains the choice of
whether to designate its property as a forum for specified classes of speakers .").
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the work in determining the legitimacy of a nonpublic forum. Instead, the
analysis must be multifactored. The appropriate task is to determine what
factors can justify a broadening of the government's ability to consider public sensibilities in the nonpublic forum context, and what particular standards pose an acceptably low risk of invidious discrimination that the
government may employ them when the other factors are present.

B. The Factors That Determine the Legitimacy of a Public Sensibilities
Forum
The factors that determine the legitimacy of a public sensibilities forum stem from the values emanating from either end of the government/private speech spectrum. First, at any point on the spectrum, the
government's discretion to make choices depends upon its public account244
ability for them.
The scope of the government's assumed responsibility
for creating and administering a public sensibilities forum is thus a factor
that defines its discretion to do so. Second, the government's discretion to
consider public sensibilities when dealing with private speech must stem
from a legitimate responsibility it has toward the public. Otherwise, it is
tampering with the speech market in a "risky" way without justification.
The government's responsibility to react to public sensibilities, then, is another factor that defines its discretion. Third, the government has discretion
when it speaks because its voice is one among many. This background assumption means that the limited realm of a public sensibilities forum is important to its legitimacy. Finally, the substance of the government's public
sensibilities standards and the procedure for implementing them make a difference because some standards present greater First Amendment risk than
others, and because clear standards limit decision makers' discretion to engage in unaccountable viewpoint discrimination. This subpart will discuss
these factors in tum.

1. Scope of Assumed Responsibility.-The legitimacy of a government speech action-be it speech, the funding of speech, or the compiling
of speech-demands
that the government assume responsibility for whatever viewpoint discrimination may occur as part of that speech action. For
example, the government can discriminate among viewpoints in its own ad245
vocacy because it assumes responsibility for the positions it takes.
Likewise, the government assumes responsibility for its public programs and for
the speech of its agents, and thus these speech actions fall on the govern-

244
See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys . v. Southworth , 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000) (explaining that university funding of student speech is evaluated differently according to whether it is "responsible for its content" as opposed to "having disclaimed that the speech is its own.").
245
See id. at 235 (stating that a government in its own speech may choose to advocate "a particular
idea" because "[i]f the citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could espouse some different or
contrary position").
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ment speech end of the spectrum. 246 Similarly, when a public broadcaster
acts as an editor in compiling private speech, rather than a neutral forumcreator, its broadcasting decisions will be treated as legitimate government
speech, because the public broadcaster assumes responsibility for the decisions it makes. 247 Finally, the government's assumed responsibility for
making selective, quality-based judgments from a range of applicants in
distributing funds for expression distinguishes instances when the government can use subjective, and perhaps viewpoint-based criteria, from instances where it cannot. 248
On the private speech-protective side of the spectrum, however, the
government's assumed responsibility for discriminating among private
speakers remains important, but limits on the government's ability to define
its own boundaries apply. Because the value that animates this end of the
spectrum is protecting diverse private speech from government intervention, public property is a traditional public forum regardless of how effectively the government tries to assume responsibility for discriminating
among private speakers. 249 The tradition of the place and the strong value
of protecting minority speech from adverse majoritarian actions restrict
governmental discretion to discriminate. 250 Moving inward on the spectrum, the government's ability to assume responsibility for discriminating
among private speakers becomes greater. It is the government's assumed
responsibility, or intent, to "open[] a nontraditional forum for public discourse"251that determines when it has created a nonpublic forum, and it is
246

See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 198 (1991) ("The condition that federal funds will be used
only to further the purposes of a grant does not violate constitutional rights. "); Nat'] Endowment for the
Arts v. Finle y, 524 U.S. 569, 610-11 ( 1998) (Souter, J., dissent ing) (acknowledging the "government-asbuyer" category of government/private speech interaction but arguing that arts funding should be distinguished from the government-as-buyer category because the government's assumed responsibility is to
issue "an endorsement of the importance of the arts collectively, not an endorsement of the individual
message espoused in a given work of art") .
247
See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 675 (distinguishing a public broadcaster's exercise of editorial discretion from the candidate debate at issue in part on the ground that "the debate was by design a forum for
political speech by the candidates" and that the broadcaster made "the implicit representation ... that the
views expressed were those of the candidates, not its own").
248
See Finley, 524 U.S. at 581 (distinguishing instances where the government "indisc rimin ately
'encourage[s] a diversity of views from private speakers"' from those where the government attaches a
"mandate ... to make esthetic judgments" to the speech opportunity).
249
See, e.g., Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677 ("[T]raditional public fora are open for expressive activity regardless of the government's intent.").
250
See id. at 667 ("Traditional public fora are defined by the objective characteristics of the property, such as whether, 'by long \radition or by government fiat,' the property has been 'devote d to assembly and debate ."' (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983))); Int ' ! Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992) (explaining that individuals' right to use 'streets and parks for communica tion of views' stems from the notion that these areas "have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the publi c") quoting Hague v . Comm. for
Indu s. Org ., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939))).
251
Lee, 505 U.S. at 680 (quo ting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 805
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the government's intent to grant access "selectively" 252 or by "permission"253 as opposed to " enerally" 254that determines the boundaries of the
forum that it has created. 55
Although the government's assumed responsibility, or intent, is a factor frequently mentioned by the Court to explain its decision to place a government/private speech interaction within a designated category on either
side of the spectrum, it cannot alone be conclusive. In particular, the government's intent to be selective is a determining factor both for a nonpublic
forum, 256and for government editorial2 57 and quality-based 258judgments,
both of which are "not [forums] at all." 259 Thus, selectivity among private
speakers, in one form or another, is the hallmark of the middle ground of
government/private speech interaction. What distinguishes selectivity on
the government speech side of the spectrum from that on the other is that
the standards in the former can to some extent be viewpoint based. 260 Of
course, examining selective government intents to determine whether it assumed responsibility for the risk of viewpoint discrimination could place
the subsidies in either the private speech-protective or government speech
area. But, as the Court has made clear, government assertions of selectivity
in distributing speech subsidies are not self-justifying. 261 Thus, more than

9

(1985)).
252

Forbes , 523 U.S. at 679 ("A designated public forum is not created when the government allows
selective access for individual speakers rather than general acce ss for a class of speakers.").
253
Id. ("[T]he government does not create a designated public forum when it does no more than reserve eligibility for access to the forum to a particular class of speakers, whose members must then , as
individuals , 'obtain permission' to use it." (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def & Educ. Fund, Inc.,
473 U.S. 788, 804 (1985))).
254
Id. at 678 ("To create a [designated public] forum .. .• the government must intend to make the
property 'generally available ."' (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 264 (1981))).
255

See supra note J 17 and accompanying text (noting that there is little analytical difference between the designated public forum and the nonpublic forum).
256
See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 679 ('"[S]elective access' ... indicates the property is a nonpublic forum." (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def . & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 805 (1985))) .
257
See id. at 673 (noting that broadcasters may "c hoose among speakers expressing different viewpoints") .
258
See Nat '! Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S . 569, 586 ( J998) (showing how the "competitive proces s" by which "excellen[t]" speakers are chosen distinguishes arts funding from other ,
"co mparatively objective decisions on allocating public benefits") .
259
Forbes, 523 U.S . at 679; see Finley, 524 U.S. at 586 (noting that "co mpetitive process according
to which ... grants are allocated" distinguishes it from forum cases); Forbes, 523 U.S. at 680 (maintaining that candidate debate is a nonpublic forum because television commission "made candidate-bycandidate determinations as to which of the eligible candidates would participate in the debate.") .
260
See, e.g., Forbes , 523 U.S. at 674, 682 (explaining that a "broa dcaster by its nature will facilitate
the expression of some viewpoints instead of others," but access to a candidate debate , which is a nonpublic forum, "must not be based on the speaker's viewpoint").
261
See id. (stating that the television commission did not have "unfettered power to exclude any
candidate it wished") ; Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 832-36
(1995) (rejecting university's intent to selectively fund all student publications except those that prom ote
or manifest religious belief) ; Int'I Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 689-90 (1992)
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the government's intent is necessary to determine the ultimate constitutionality of a government/private speech interaction. Specifically, an examination of the circumstances is required to determine whether the higher freespeech values served by the government speech action justifies the particular risk of viewpoint discrimination posed. This examination requires consideration of factors beyond the government's intent to assume
responsibility for its action.
The government's assumed responsibility for discriminating when providing a speech opportunity is not dispositive as to its constitutionality;
rather, its significance is on the other side of the inquiry, establishing conclusively when the government does not have the ability to discriminate
among private speakers. That is, the search for government "intent" in the
government/private speech interaction context is the search for the boundaries that the government has set for its own action. 262 The government's assumed responsibility sets the outer boundary of its discretion to
discriminate because this assumed responsibility determines the extent of its
political accountability .263 Political accountability is the element that lends
legitimacy to government selectivity when speaking itself2 64 and when interacting with private speakers. 265
The government's assumed responsibility to be discriminatory includes
several aspects. These are the government's articulated scope of discretion, 266 the public's perception of that scope ,267 and the government's actual
practice in engaging in the private speech interaction. 268
(O'Connor , J., concurring) (rejecting as unreasonable airport's intent to provide access to certain types
of speech but not to leafleting); Rust v. Sullivan , 500 U.S. 173, 199 (1991) ("[F]unding by the Government" is not "invariably sufficient to justify Government control over the content of expression .") .
262
See. e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 ("Once it has opened a limited forum, however , the State
must respect the lawful boundaries it has itself set.").
263
See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of the Univ . of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000) (explaining that where government "disclaim[s] that the speech is its own," Court will not evaluate government/private interaction as government speech but if the government "were responsible for its
content, the case might be evaluated on th[ at) premise").
264
See, e.g., id. at 235 (maintaining that government has discretion as speaker because "it is, in the
end, accountable to the electorate and the political process for its advocacy ").
265
See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991) (deciding that the government may "insist[)
that public funds be spent for the purposes for which they were authorized") .
266
See Lee, 505 U.S. at 679 ; United States v. Kokinda , 497 U.S. 720 , 725 (1990) ; Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund , 473 U.S. 788, 802 (!985 ).
267
See Ark . Educ. Televis ion Comm'n v. Forbes , 523 U.S. 666 , 675 (199 8) (noting that "implicit
representation of the broadcaster" that stems from "the long tradition of candidate debates" support s
conclusion that debate is a nonpublic forum); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual
Group of Boston , 515 U.S. 557, 576-77 (!995) (looking to how speech acts are "understood " and "perceived by [viewers]" to determine whether access requirement unconstitutionally compels speech) .
268
See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677 (" '[T]he Court has looked to the polic y and practice of the govern ment to ascertain whether it intended to designate a place not traditionally open to assembly and debate
as a public forum ." (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802); AIDS Action Comm. of Mass . v. MTBA, 42
F.3d 1, IO (1st Cir. 1994) (" [T]he Court also has stated that the government's intent must be gleaned
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The government's articulated scope of discretion, set out in the politicaJJy visible-and presumably democraticaJJy enacted-government action,
determines the outer possible boundary of its discretion. So, for example, if
Congress establishes a program to place art in federal buildings on an openaccess basis, 269the administrators of the program do not have the discretion
to limit access according to public sensibilities. 270 Even though Congress
might well have the authority to set access limitations according to public
sensibilities, 271administrators of individual buildings cannot later do so, because their decisions would exceed the responsibility that the government
has publicly assumed.
The public's perception can limit the government's articulated scope of
assumed responsibility when the two diverge. In particular, the political accountability that supports broad discretion in government speech does not
exist where the government's role in shaping the private speech is not visible.272 In addition, the First Amendment danger of skewing public perceptions about the public support for particular types of speech occurs if the
government's interaction with private speech is masked. If the "implicit
representation" 273or common understanding of the scope of the government's discretion when interacting with private speakers is narrower than
the government's asserted discretion, the public perception of the government's intent should control until the government effectively disabuses the
public of its perception. Because public perceptions are often difficult to
discern, the burden should be on the government to make clear the extent to
which it is assuming responsibility for the content of the speech it is subsidizing.274
The government's administration of the interaction may modify its intent if its program's administrators do not enforce the outer bounds of the
government's articulated discretion. For example, a local transit authority
from its policy and practice with respect to the property at issue."); see also Grace Bible Fellowship, Inc .
v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 5, 941 F.2d 45, 47 (!st Cir. 1991) (stating that in forum designation inquiry, "actual practice speaks louder than words") .
269

See Public Buildings Cooperative Use Act of 1976, 40 U.S.C. §§ 490, 60la, 606, 611, 612a
(2000); Heins, supra note 40, at 141-42 (describing this statute as "explicitly designed to open appropriate federal property to expressive activities on a content-neutral, first come-first-served basis").
270
See supra note 117 and accompanying text (explaining that the limited and nonpublic forum
points on the spectrum are the same) .
271
See Nat'! Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 572 (1998) (holding that Congress
can establish and fund a program that subsidizes only "excellent" art that reflects "general standards of
decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public").
272
See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIALCONSTITUTIO
N 314 (1993) .
273

Forbes, 523 U.S. at 675 (reasoning behind treating candidate debate as a nonpublic forum rather
than an exercise of editorial discretion is the "implicit representation" that the views expressed are those
of the private speakers without the broadcaster's input).
274
See Carole I. Chervin, The Title X Family Planning Gag Rule: Can the Government Buy Up
Constitutional Rights?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 40 I, 428 (1989) (arguing that the government should have had
this burden when it prohibited funded entities from discussing abortion) .
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might state a policy that advertisements meet standards of "good taste
[and] decency," 275 in particular forbidding ads that use "sexually explicit or
patently offensive language to convey ...
substantive message[s]." 276
When it then denies access to a particular advertisement and relies upon the
policy, the first ~uestion is whether the government's practice is consistent
with its policy. 27 If it is not, the government cannot rely upon the policy
and is effectively left with no reason other than viewpoint to distinguish
among speakers. 278 Requiring that the government's articulated policy
match its actual practice is another critical baseline check of the accountability that supports the government's discretion to discriminate among private speakers. An inconsistently enforced policy suggests ad hoc rather
than principled decision making according to the democratically enacted
standards.
Determining the government's assumed responsibility by examining
these three elements-articulated intent, public perception, and actual practice-is the first layer of analysis in determining the legitimacy of a public
sensibilities forum. Only if the government has effectively assumed responsibility for discriminating according to public sensibilities can it constitutionally do so. By establishing the furthermost point along the speech
subsidy spectrum where the government locates it action, the assumed responsibility determination limits the constitutional inquiry . So, for example, when the government does not assume responsibility for discriminating
according to public sensibilities in allocating airport access to speakers, a
court does not have to determine its ability to do so. 279 By contrast, when
the government asserts that the boundaries of its subsidy are and can be
based on public sensibilities, the constitutional inqui7s is expanded to consider whether the government can be so selective. 80 In both of these
inquiries, however, once the government's asserted range of action has been
established, the constitutional inquiry that occurs within this boundary must
look to other factors.

275

AIDS Action Comm. of Mass. v. MTBA, 42 F.3d I , 3 (!st Cir. 1994).
Id . at 8.
277
See id. at 11 (finding transit authority inconsistent in excluding advertisements with sexual innuendo and double entendre).
278
See id. at 11 (holding that inconsistent application of rule forbidding sexual innuendo and double
entendre leaves the transit authority without "a neutral justification" for exclud ing one advertisement
and not the other) .
279
Compare Int'! Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 683 (1992) (examining
only reasonableness of no-solicitation rule), with Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Dep't of Aviation of Chicago,
45 F.3d 1144, 1157 (7th Cir. 1995) (exa mining claim by airport that it could reject display case advertising that is "critical of airlines") .
280
See Nat'! Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 , 585 (1998) (looking beyond forum
rules to rules that determine constitutionality of selective government funding); Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of the Univ . of Va., 515 U.S . 819, 833 (1995) (examining and rejecting University's argument
that "co ntent-based funding decisions are both inevitable and lawful. ").
276
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2. Authority.-In addition to assumed responsibility, the government
needs actual authority to exercise discretion when it interacts with private
speech. This authority stems from the Constitution and is limited by it.
That is, democratic authority animates the. government speech side of the
spectrum, while limits on that authority when circumstances pose a strong
First Amendment danger emanate from the other side.
In the nonpublic forum context, the "reasonableness" standard embodies the authority requirement. 281 This is not a demanding standard .282 It
does, however, mean that the government must articulate some justification
for its nonpublic forum access restrictions. 283 Moreover, the reasonableness
requirement exists in combination with the requirement that the access
standards not discriminate according to viewpoint. So, the reason that justifies the access requirement cannot itself be viewpoint related. 284
These twin requirements complicate the reasonableness inquiry with
respect to public sensibility access standards. Because public sensibilities
standards pose the risk of viewpoint discrimination, it cannot be enough for
the government to point to the possibility, or even probability, of public offense as the reason for restricting speakers. This would make viewpoint
discrimination self-justifying . Something more than the bare democratic
authority to respond to majority preferences that supports other government
actions is required to justify one that threatens free speech values . In particular, the access restrictions must, at least to some extent, serve a "higher
value" that balances and justifies the risk of viewpoint discrimination posed
by them. 285
Judicial decisions reflect this intuition-that
the government needs
some degree of affirmative authority to employ standards that pose the risk
of viewpoint discrimination when interacting with private speech- by offering a variety of justifications for the government's action. Courts have
said that the government acts as a "patron" 286 or "proprietor" 287 in distribut281

See Lee, 505 U.S . at 683 (explaining that because an airport terminal is a non public forum, the
"restrictions .. . challenged . .. need only satisfy a requirement of reasonableness").
282
See id. ("The restriction 'need only be reasonable; it need not be the most reasonable or the only
reasonable limitation ."' (quoting United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990) (plurality opinion)
(quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def . & Educ . Fund, 473 U.S . 788, 808 (1985)))) .
283
Ark. Educ . Television Comm'n v. Forbes , 523 U.S. 666, 682 (1998) (O'Connor , J., concurring)
("[N]onpublic forum ·status 'does not mean that the government can restrict speech in whatever way it
likes ."' (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 687)) .
284
See Legal Services Corp. v. Velasque z, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) ("Congres s cannot recast a condition on funding as a mere definition of its program in every case, lest the First Amendm ent be reduced to
a mere semantic exercise ."); Forbes, 523 U.S. at 682 ("To be consistent with the First Amendment, the
exclusion of a speaker from a nonpublic forum must not be based on the speaker 's viewpoint and must
otherwise be reasonable in light of the purp ose of the propert y.").
285
Forbes, 523 U.S. at 674 (preserving "higher values" that attach to journalisti c discretion justifie s
"risks of abuse") .
286
See Nat'! Endowment for the Arts v. Finley , 524 U.S. 569, 589 (1998 ) (dist inguishing between
government acting as "patron" rather than "sov ereign").
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ing speech opportunities rather than as a regulator restricting them, 288 that
289
the speech opportunities are scarce,
that the government in distributinffi
the speech opportunity lends its imprimatur of approval to the speech, 29
that the government may restrict speech according to its compatibility with
the place where it occurs, 291 that the government has the didactic authority
to set an example, 292 and that the government has the authority to protect
unwilling listeners. 293 This section will examine each of these reasons in
tum. Many of these reasons do not give the government the authority to
impose public sensibilities standards in a private speech forum. Only the
last two are potentially legitimate.

a.

Illegitimate Reasons

(I) Spending Money.-The mere fact that the government "subsidizes" private speech, by providing property access or funds to support it,
does not give the government the right to set access standards that depend
upon public sensibilities. Forum doctrine makes this clear: where the resource distribution scheme constitutes any type of forum, the government's
ability to condition access according to viewpoint discriminatory standards
is strictly limited .294
Although the Court has stated that different standards apply when the
government spends its money to encourage private speech as opposed to
when it regulates it,295 these observations must be understood in context.
287

See Lee, 505 U.S. at 678 (distinguishing between government acting as "proprietor" rather than

as "lawmaker").
288

See Finley, 524 U.S. at 611 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("(T]he Government would have us liberate
government-as-patron from First Amendment strictures.") .
289
See id. at 586 (rejecting "scarcity of NEA funding," but accepting "the competitive process" as
the ground for validating its discretion to discriminate).
290
See, e.g., Claudio v. United States, 836 F. Supp . 1230, 1235 (E.D .N.C. 1993) (finding that government has property owner's right to control content of art on its premises because the art affects its
"image") .
291
Sefick v. Gardner, 164 F.3d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 1998) (explaining that government can deny access to courthouse lobby to satirical sculpture because it would "disrupt a nonpublic forum and hinder its
effectiveness for its intended purpose" (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473
U.S. 788, 81 l (1985))) .
292
See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier , 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (noting that school can disallow speech that is inconsistent with its "basic educational mission") .
293
See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 ( 1974) (holding that transit authority
can limit advertising access to minimize "imposing upon a captive audience") .
294
See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) ("[T]he existence of a Government 'subsidy,' in
the fonn of Government-owned property, does not justify the restriction of speech in areas that have
'been traditionally open to the public for expressive activity,' or have been ' expressly dedicated to
speech activity."') .
295
See Nat'! Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S . 569 , 587-88 (1998) ("(A]lthough the First
Amendment certainly has application in the subsidy context, we note that the Government may allocate
competitive funding according to criteria that would be impennissible were direct regulation of speech
or a criminal penalty at stake.") .
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The discretion that the government enjoys as "buyer" of private speech depends upon the government to some extent assuming responsibility, and
thus accountability, for the content of the private expression. 296 Property
297
The government needs a democratic
ownership alone is not enough.
mandate to pursue a public policy that requires discriminating among private speakers. 298
The current outer boundary of this discretion to discriminate is a democratic mandate to fund "excellent" expression selectively. 299 Thus, when
the National Endowment for the Arts distributes grants pursuant to a democratically enacted subsidy program established for the purpose of promoting "quality" art, 300 it is this articulated, publicly visible, and
consistently practiced assumed responsibility-not merely the fact that the
government is spending money-that places the subsidy on the government
speech side of the spectrum .301
That the government spends money may, when coupled with a government speech interest, support the government's ability to set public sensibility access standards. In the context of a nonpublic forum, however,
spending simply describes how the government often, but not always, creates the forum. Spending does not alone provide a constitutional "value"
that counteracts the risk of viewpoint discrimination posed by public sensibility standards.

(2) Engaging in Commerce.-The Court has emphasized that different standards of review apply to government actions with respect to private speech when it "act[s] as a proprietor, managing its internal
operations, "302 or otherwise "engage[ s] in commerce. " 303 In these instances,
the government has greater discretion to limit the "forms of speech on
property that it owns or controls" than when it "act[s] as lawmaker with the
296

Finley, 524 U.S. at 586 (noting that the "NEA ' s mandate . . . to make aesthetic judgments" sets
it apart from other subsidies in which the government does not assume responsibility for the content of
the subsidized speech) .
297
Rust, 500 U.S. at 200 (noting that "funding by the government" is not "invariably sufficient to
justify government control over the content of expression") .
298
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ . of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833-34 (1995)
("[W)hen the government appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes . . . . It does not follow, however, . .. that viewpoint -based restrictions are
proper when the [government) does not itself speak or subsidize transmittal of a message it favors but
instead expends funds to encourage a diversity of views from private speakers.").
299
See Rust, 500 U.S. at 571 ("In the context of selective subsidies [that rely on 'excellence' as a
criterion) it is not always feasible for Congress to legislate with clar ity.").
JOOSee id. at 569 (stating that "artistic excellence and artistic merit are the criteria by which [grant)
applications are judged") .
Jot See id. at 588 ("Congress modified the declaration of purpose in the NEA ' s enabling act to provide that arts funding should 'contribute to public support and confidence in the use of taxpayer
funds ." ').
302
Int'! Soc 'y for Krishna Consciousnes s v. Lee , 505 U.S . 672, 678 (1992 ).
303
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights , 418 U.S. 298, 303 (1974) .
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power to regulate or license." 304 What the Court means by this distinction
is that when the government acts as a proprietor in promoting private
speech, it runs a nonpublic, as opposed to traditional public, forum. The
"much more limited" standard of review that applies when the government
acts as a proprietor, then, is the nonpublic forum access standard. 305 Although this standard is less demanding than the "heightened review" that
applies to traditional public forums, it still requires that the access standard
.
. neutra I.:to6
be v1ewpomt
Although the viewpoint neutrality requirement applies regardless of the
government's commercial purpose, this purpose is relevant in determining
the scope of the government's discretion to discriminate among private
speakers. A commercial purpose may help determine the scope of the forum created . For example, the commercial purpose is evidence of an intent
to exclude types of speakers or subject matters inconsistent with that purpose,307 which would tend to increase the government's discretion to exclude speakers. On the other hand, that the government acts to manage its
property or to make money strongly suggests that its action in selecting private speakers is not imbued with government speech values. 308 That is, the
commercial purpose suggests the forum is not something especially government speech-related.
These twin considerations suggest that the government's role as proprietor does not alone provide it with authority to enforce public sensibilities standards. Additional considerations confirm this conclusion . Most
important, the government's involvement through a commercial purpose
does not inject a competing government speech value that can balance the
risk of viewpoint discrimination posed by public sensibilities standards . Instead, the government's participation in commerce can heighten the danger
that the risk of viewpoint discrimination from public sensibilities will be realized. In particular , limiting a speech opportunity's access to "popular"
speakers who will "generate favorable publicity" may be part of a rational
government strategy to maximize profits from the management of its property.309 At the same time, the result is viewpoint discrimination against un304
305
306

Lee, 505 U.S. at 678 .
Id. at 679 .
Id. ("The challenged regulation need only be reasonable , as long as the regulation is not an effort

to suppress the speaker ' s activity due to disagreement with the speak er's view.") .
307
Air Line Pilots Ass ' n v. Dep ' t of Aviation of Chicago, 45 F.3d 1144, 1158 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[J]n
both Lee and Kokinda , ... the fact that proposed speech activities would have interfered with the designated use of the property suggested that the government never intended to dedicate the forum in question
to the type of expression at issue.").
308
See Lee, 505 U.S. at 682 (stating that because of its primary commercial purpose, " it cannot
fairly be said that an airport terminal has as a principal purpose promoting 'the free exchange of ideas .'"
(quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ . Fund , 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985))) .
309
See Chicago Acom v. Metro. Pier , 150 F.3d 695, 700 (7th Cir. 1998) (referr ing to Chic ago ' s
Navy Pier commercial compl ex).
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popular speakers. 310 This motivation, and thus the danger of realized viewpoint discrimination, would seem to be present to some degree whenever
the government's purpose in opening a forum is to make money. The
heightened risk of actual viewpoint discrimination means that the government's commercial purpose alone should not support the legitimacy of a
public sensibilities forum.

(3) Scarcity.-Often, government resources will be limited, and
the government must set access standards when it interacts with private
speakers. The Court has made clear, however, that scarcity alone does not
justify viewpoint discrimination among private speakers. 311 Rather, the additional factor of a "competitive process" under which the government assumes responsibility for making merit-based d.eterrninations is required. 312
Absent some other authority to discriminate, then, the government must "ration or allocate the scarce resources on some acceptable neutral principle." 313
Scarcity's relevance to the legitimacy of the government's use of public sensibilities standards that pose the risk of viewpoint discrimination
should be no different than its relevance to standards that are more blatantly
viewpoint discriminatory. In either situation, the mere fact that the speech
opportunity is limited does not justify allocating access according to standards that threaten free speech values. Because the government's legitimate
interest can be served by employing standards that do not relate to public
sensibilities, this reason does not help to authorize use of such standards.
(4) Imprimatur of Approval.-Another
possible basis of government authority to discriminate in access to speech subsidies according to
public sensibilities is the risk that, absent discrimination, the government
will be perceived to approve of any message presented with its resources.
Under this theory, the government can legitimately act to correct the public
impression that it endorses the speech that occurs in the private speech opportunities it creates. Specifically, the government may impose public sensibilities access standards to prevent the public from acquiring the mistaken
impression that the government approves of speech that offends it.314
310

Id . at 701 ("Such a policy would be a form of the heckler's veto.").
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 835 (1995) ("The government cannot justify viewpoint discrimination among private speakers on the economic fact of scarcity.") .
3 12
See Nat'I Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 586 (1998) ("Although the scarcity of
NEA funding does not distinguish this case from Rosenberger, the competitive process according to
which the grants are allocated does .").
313
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835.
314
See, e.g., McBride v. Motor Vehicle Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 977 P.2d 467, 473 (Utah
1999) (Durham, J., dissenting) ("[P]ublic officials have the obligation to ensure that [racial epithets on
license plates] are not used with the imprimatur of the state ."); Frank J. Phial , Wine Talk, N.Y. TIMES,
May 7, 1997, at CB (reporting that administrative law judge upheld rejection of wine-related vanity plate
application in part because it "could convey the message that the state condones the use of alcoholic
311
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While the government clearly has an interest in protecting the integrity
of messages that are in some important way its own, the question with respect to the public sensibilities forum is whether the possibility of an imprimatur of approval legitimizes the standards when the government has not
actually assumed responsibility for the private speech. A developed, although not completely unified, doctrine exists with respect to this possibility of perceived endorsement. 315
In the context of the Establishment Clause, 316 a plurality of justices
held that an imprimatur of approval cannot justify discrimination against
unwanted speakers where the forum at issue is open. 317 This is true even
where "hypothetical observers may-even reasonab7-confuse an incidental benefit to [a speaker] with state endorsement. " 31 It is the actual, announced contours of the speech opportunity-that is, the degree to which
the government has assumed responsibility for the content of the private
speech-that defines the government's discretion, not the possible assumptions of public viewers.
Other justices take a broader view of when an imprimatur of approval
can justify government discrimination against private speakers. For these
justices, the fact that a hypothetical observer may reasonably assume government approval of the private speaker may justify such governmental action. 319 Still, for most of these justices, the relevant observer is one "aware
of the history and context of the community and forum in which the [speech
occurs]." 320 Therefore, the government's articulated boundaries for the forum and its practice in administering it will still be strong evidence counteracting the concern that a hypothetical observer will reasonably assume
government endorsement, and will still limit the government's ability to
discriminate . In addition, most of these justices who look to a more liberal
standard of endorsement acknowledge that the government can often counteract its possibility by means of an effective disclaimer. 321 In the context
beverages by driver s").
315
See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd . v. Pinette , 515 U.S . 753, 763-4 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
plurality opinion) (discussing endorsement test advocated by other justices in previous cases, but finding
it inapplicable where property at issue is in fact open to all speakers); id. at 772 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (finding endorsement test applicable to a public forum
closely associated with the government).
316
U.S. CONST.amend I.
317
See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 770 (noting that imprimatur of approval does not lead to establishment
clause violation if the property is in fact "a traditional or designated public forum, publicly announced
and open to all on equal terms").
318
Id. at 768 .
319
See id. at 777 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("(W]hen the reasonable observer would view a government practice as endorsing religion, . . . [the Establishment Clause] may require a State, in some
situations, to take steps to avoid being perceived as supporting or endorsing a private religious message.").
320
Id. at 780 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
321
Id. at 776 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("To the plurality 's consideration of the open nature of the
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of compelled speech as well, the Court has found the ability of a speaker to
disclaim association with unwanted speech relevant to the speaker's ability
to discriminate against other speakers. 322
These perceived endorsement precedents lead to the conclusion that
imprimatur of approval alone should not legitimate the government's use of
public sensibilities standards in a nonpublic forum. The endorsement
precedents exist under the Establishment Clause, which affirmatively prohibits the government from advancing religion. 323 No such affirmative constitutional provision supports the government's desire to disassociate itself
from otherwise "offensive" private speech. 324 Rather, the free speech values are on the side of protecting "offensive" speech from government regulation. 325 Moreover, even applying the Establishment Clause endorsement
precedents leads to the conclusion that the government almost always has
the ability to structure its forum-either by initial design or disclaimer-to
avoid reasonable misapprehensions of endorsement. 326 That it chooses not
to do so should not provide authority for the government to discriminate
among subsidized speakers.
The cases in which the Court has considered imprimatur of approval as
relevant to the government's ability to take public sensibilities into account
confinn that this possibility alone does not support the government's authority . These cases both involved public high schools' censoring of "inappropriate" student speech. 327 Although the Court noted in both the
forum and the private ownership of the display, however, I would add the presence ofa sign disclaiming
government sponsorship or endorsement."); id. at 794 (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that disclaimer,
rather than flat out denial of access, was an appropriate response to reasonable possibility of endorsement). But see id. at 817-18 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (reserving the question whether "a sturdier disclaimer" would effectively remove the danger of endorsement); id. at 806 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("! do not think any disclaimer could dispel the message of endorsement in this case.").
322
Compare Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557,
576 (1995) ("[D)isclaimers would be quite curious in a moving parade.") , with PruneYard Shopping
Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 ( 1980) (holding that the owner of a shopping mall "can expressly disavow any connection with the [unwanted) message by simply posting signs in the area where the speakers or handbillers stand") .
323
U.S.CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . . . respecting an establishment of religion.").
324
See Shiffrin, supra note 77, at 606 ( "(T)here can be no room for a non-religious establishment
clause.").
325
See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (noting that the First Amendment's "bedrock principle"
is that government cannot suppress "offensive" speech).
326
See Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 769 (1995) (noting the
possibility that a government "conce rned about misperceptions" could attach a disclaimer to private displays on public property); id. at 777 (stating that the establishment clause "imposes affirmative obligations that may requ ired a State, in some situations, to take steps to avoid being perceived as supporting
or endorsing a private religious message").
327
See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 263 (1988) (noting that the principal's
concerns were for students' and parents' privacy and that some references were "inappropriate for some
of the younger students at the school"); Bethel Sch. Dist. No . 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 678-79 (1986)
(describing how a student was punished for delivering a speech that was "'indecent , lewd, and offensive
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possibility that the schools would be perceived to endorse the private
speaker's message, it was not the imprimatur that gave the school authority
to censor. Rather, the authority to censor stemmed from the legitimate didactic authority of the schools over their students in the context of the particular subsidy . So, a high school does not have the authority to
"disassociate itself' from sexually explicit student speech simply because it
occurs on school property and therefore listeners might believe the school
endorses it.328 Its authority is, more specifically, in the context of a schoolsponsored assembly, "to disassociate itself to make the point to the pupils
that vulgar speech and lewd conduct is wholly inconsistent with the 'fundamental values' of public school education ."329 Similarly, while a high
school newspaper is something that "members of the ~ublic might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school," 33 this reasonable perception occurs when the newspaper is "sponsored by the schoo1"331 and so
is a "part of the school curriculum" over which the school has legitimate didactic control. 332
In sum, where the government's authority to distribute speech subsidies according to public sensibilities is in question, imprimatur alone is not
enough to support the government's authority because the government can
disclaim it.

(5) Compatibility.-Compatibility is an important element of
analysis within the forum area. A traditional ~ublic forum has as '"a principal purpose ... the free exchange of ideas.'" 33 No other government purpose for the property 334 can supercede the purpose of accommodating open
communication. The proferty is, in other words, "inherently compatible
with expressive conduct." 35 Property that is not a traditional public forum
presumptively has uses other than promoting free interaction and expression. The government's ability to set limits on the scope of a forum it ereto the modesty and decency of many of the students and faculty who were in attendance at the assembly"' (quoting hearing officer)).
328
See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 271 (distinguishing the situation where "a stude nt 's personal expression ... happens to occur on the school premises" from "educators' authority over school-sponsored publications ").
329
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685 .
33
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 271.
331
See id. at 271; see also id. at 271 n.3 (distinguishing "between speech that is sponsored by the
school and speech that is not" in establishing the legitimate authority of the school over student expression).
332
See id. at 271.
333
Int'! Soc' y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992) (quoting Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)) .
334
Government purposes that relate to things other than competing functions of the property that
constitutes the traditional public forum can justify content neutral restrictions on expression. See, e.g.,
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 792 (1989) (holding that the city can control noise levels
at Bandshell in Central Park to prevent intrusion into other areas).
335
Warren v. Fairfax County, 196 F.3d 186, 191 (4th Cir. 1999).
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ates stems from its ability to preserve its prqperty for a primary purpose
other than promoting free expression. 336 At the same time, the requirements
that access rules be viewpoint neutral and reasonable limit the government's
discretion to grant access purely according to majority preferences. While
it is not clear that the reasonableness requirement mandates a showing that
excluded expression is incompatible with the purposes of the forum, 337 a
showing of incompatibility demonstrates the legitimacy of the government's access restriction.
The question is whether the government's claim that speech offensive
to public sensibilities is incompatible with the primary purpose of a forum
can legitimate the access standards . The problem with this claim is that in a
nonpublic forum, access rules must not only be reasonable but also viewpoint neutral. 338 It thus eviscerates the test to allow access standards in
through the reasonableness requirement that do not necessarily meet the requirement of viewpoint neutrality. "Compatibility" could swallow any limits to the government's discretion to discriminate if it means an ability of
the government to use public sensibilities standards whenever speech might
be offensive. 339 Where the government's incompatibility claim is with public sensibilities and values, then, factors other than the objective compatibility of the speech with the forum must determine the scope of the
government's discretion.

b.

Potentially Legitimate Reasons

(I) Didactic Authority.-Sometimes the government can set public sensibility standards on its distribution of speech subsidies for the pur pose of educating by example . One circumstance is in special educational
enclaves where it has legitimate didactic authority over a limited population. As noted above, the high school cases are properly understood as
based upon the schools' legitimate didactic, or example-setting, authority .
According to the Court, "[t]he inculcation of these values [of what manner
of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate] is truly
the 'work of the schools. "' 340 Similarly, the justification for selective speech
336
See Lee, 505 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("We have said that a restriction on speech
in a nonpublic forum in 'reasonable' when it is 'cons istent with the [government's] legitimate interest in
"preserv[ing) the property . . . for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.""' (quoting Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 50-51 (1983) (quoting Postal Serv. v. Council of
Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns , 453 U.S. 114, 129-30 (1981)))).
337
See Lee, 505 U.S. at 692 (noting that reasonableness looks to whether excluded speech "is inconsistent with the intended use of the forum") .
338
See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm 'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 682-83 (1998) (holding that
exclusion of speaker from nonpublic forum "based on . .. status" is permissible, as opposed to based "on
views" (quoting Perry , 460 U.S. at 49)).
339
See Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Dep't of Aviation of Chicago, 45 F.3d 1144, 1158 (7th Cir. 1995)
("On some level, every government actor desiring to suppress a message views that message as ' incompatible ' with one of its purposes (hence the desire to suppress) .").
340
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines In-
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restrictions on military bases rests in part on the government's unusual and
legitimate didactic authority over a discrete population. Unlike the government toward the public generally, a military officer may "act[] to avert
what he perceives to be a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale
of troops on the base under his command." 341 Prisons are another area
where the government has greater authority over a limited population. 342 In
each of these instances, the government's special authority to teach and
control a limited population justifies selective speech restrictions that are
not justified toward the public at large.
Whether and when the government has legitimate didactic authority
toward the entire American Eublic that justifies imposing public sensibilities standards is less certain. 43 Certainly, this authority supports discriminating according to public sensibilities in government speech and
government/private speech interactions on the government speech side of
the spectrum. Particularly, when the government itself is speaking, or when
it is speaking through agents, it can pursue a particular didactic policy or
speak in such a way as to set an example. 344 The question is whether this
authority includes the abilty to restrict speech according to public sensibilities when the government distributes speech resources to private parties
without claiming the speech as its own.
Moving closer to the nonpublic forum, general didactic authority in
part legitimates the "quality judgments" forum of arts funding. In making
quality judgments, one legitimate goal of the government is to teach what is
"excellent" by selecting and promoting it.345 Crucial to this authority, however, is a visible acknowledgment by the government that it is making quality judgments and will take responsibility for them. Under these conditions,
the government is accountable for the speech of its own that it fuses with
the private speech.
Absent such an open and visible acknowledgment that the government/private speech interaction is strongly shaped by government speechdep . Cmty. Sch . Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)); see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S.
260, 266 ( 1988) ("A school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its 'basic educational mission,' even though the government could not censor similar speech outside the school.").
341
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S . 828 , 840 (1976); see also Int'! Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v.
Lee, 505 U .S. 672, 691 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (distinguishing restrictions on military base
from those in the Chicago area airports) .
342
See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U .S. 401 (1989) (upholding limitation on publications re·
ceived by prisoners) .
343
JOSEPHTUSSMAN,GOVERNMENTAND THE MIND 85 (1977) ("[T]he teaching power" is "a fundamental power of the state .") .
344
See Rust v. Sullivan , 500 U.S . l 73, 192-3 (1991) ("[T]he government may 'make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion , and . .. implement that judgment by the allocation of public
funds." (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U .S. 464, 474 (1977))) .
345
Nat'! Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 573 (1998) (funding priorities ofNEA include
"artistic and cultural significance ," "professional excellence," and the encouragement of "public knowledge,
education, understanding and appreciation of the arts." (quoting 20 U .S.C. §§ 254( c)(I)·(! 0) (1994))).
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either because the government has recognized didactic authority over a limited realm or because the government will stand accountable for shaping
some of the content of the private expression-a general didactic authority
is in tension with the values that emanate from the private speech protective
side of the spectrum. Of course, the government has a general didactic interest whenever it promotes speech. By denying parade permits 346 or student activities funding 347 to offensive speakers, the government could teach
what type of speech it views as unacceptable. But the constitutional limits
on government discretion in administering these speech opportunities confirm that a generalized didactic interest cannot outweigh the free speech
dangers of viewpoint discrimination .348 Similarly, a general didactic authority is simply too threatening to private speech values to support the
government's use of public sensibilities access standards that pose this
great danger. Only where the government acknowledges and stands accountable for exercising a significant didactic role in a special enclave
should it potentially be able to employ public sensibilities access standards .
A general didactic authority will not legitimate the use of public sensibilities standards in a nonpublic forum.

(2) Protective Authority.-A protective interest is the most frequent reason articulated by the government to justify public sensibilities access standards. As with a didactic interest, a general protective interest
exists whenever the government speaks or interacts with private speakers.
As also with the general didactic interest, the Constitution limits the government's authority to respond to this interest in circumstances that do not
fall on the government speech side of the spectrum. It is the very nature of
public speech to be available to a wide and diverse audience. This audience
will probably include both those willing to hear a wide range of speech and
those who want to, or need to, be protected from it. The general rule is that
the government may not regulate speech available to willing listeners to
protect others. 349 Neither may it regulate access to a traditional public forum on that basis . In addition, the requirement of viewpoint neutrality in
administering nonpublic forums means that the government cannot act to
protect unwilling listeners from unwanted viewpoints. Because public sensibilities standards either do this overtly, or present the danger that public
"offense" is viewpoint based, a general protective interest, based upon the
346

See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (holding that a
pem1it scheme cannot depend upon the content of the speaker 's message) .
347
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ . of Va., 515 U.S. 819 ( 1995).
348
Id. (deciding that university cannot discriminate according to viewpoint in student activities fees
funding); Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992) (deciding that parade
permit fee cannot be content based) .
349
See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210 (1975) ("[T]he Constitution does
not permit government to decide which types of otherwise protected speech are sufficie ntly offensive to
require protection for the unwilling listener or viewer.").
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inevitability that a diverse audience will encounter the expression, should
not legitimate the use of such access standards .
In the realm of speech regulation, a more specific protective interestbased on audience captivity-can sometimes justify speech restrictions.
The concept of audience captivity is narrowly defined when the government
affirmatively restricts speech, 350 so that the government's protective interest
exists only when an unwilling listener is in his or her home. 351 Outside this
"narrow circumstance," "the burden ... falls upon the viewer to ... avert[]
[his] eyes." 352 The government, however, has greater discretion to limit access to a nonpublic forum. This discretion includes a somewhat greater
ability to justify access restrictions according to public sensibilities. In particular, the Court upheld a ban on political advertisements on public transit
advertising space, based in part on the government's interest in protecting
the sensibilities of captive riders. 353 On its face, the advertising ban was
based upon subject matter and not viewpoint, 354 and its application had been
consistent rather than suspiciously viewpoint related. Nevertheless, the
recognition of a greater governmental protective interest in this context provides a starting point for determining when it should justify other public
sensibilities access standards that pose a risk of viewpoint discrimination.
Broadening somewhat the concept of captivity and the government's
ability to respond to it makes sense in the context of a nonpublic forum.
One reason is that a captive audience strongly suggests that the forum has
some primary, nonspeech purpose, which the government may legitimately
seek to facilitate. Where disrupted public sensibilities would undermine
that purpose, a competing value exists that can, to some extent, balance the
danger of viewpoint discrimination posed by public sensibilities standards. 355
A second reason that supports a somewhat broader concept of audience
captivity in a nonpublic forum is the free speech interest in encouraging the
government to provide such public speech opportunities . The government
can close a nonpublic forum entirely if it does not have the discretion to
limit access according to what it perceives to be its legitimate interests .
350

See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) ("The ability of the government, consonant with
the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is ... dependent upon a
showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner .").
351
See Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970) (upholding statute allowing residents
to request nondelivery of sex-related mailings, noting the right of every person "to be let alone" in the
home).
352
Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 210-11 (quoting Cohen , 403 U.S. at 21).
353
See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
354
See id. at 304 (upholding a standard that prohibited "political" advertising because that political
advertising was more "controversial").
355
See Int'I Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 684 (1992) (upholding nosolicitation ban in airport terminal based on disruptive effects and risks of duress despite disproportionate impact that such a ban will likely have on marginal groups like the Krishnas who brought suit) .

1404

95:1357 (2001)

The Public Sensibilities Forum

This does not mean the government should be able to limit access on whatever terms it wants. 356 It does, however, mean that constitutional doctrine
must respond to this reality.
An appropriate compromise responds to the values on both sides of the
free speech spectrum by protecting minority speech while encouraging the
government to keep nonpublic forums open. To protect minority speech,
courts limit the government's ability to employ public sensibilities to instances where an audience is, in some demonstrable sense, captive . This
means a significant number of people will, by legal compulsion or practical
necessity, be forced to confront the expression in the nonpublic forum. On
the other hand, to encourage the government to create and maintain private
speech opportunities, courts must allow the use of limited public sensibilities standards when this type of audience captivity is present. A qualification of this ability, which again fulfills the minority speech protection
interest, requires that the public sensibilities standards be narrow and specific to limit the danger of invidious viewpoint discrimination when they
.
are employed. 357
Of course, the concept of audience captivity is imprecise. Certainly the
degree of audience captivity varies according to the situation-both the extent to which the audience is compelled to confront the expression and the
time during which it is required to do so-and the composition of the captive audience in any particular context, particularly whether children are
likely to be included. These differences mean that the strength of the government's protective interest will vary according to the situation. Still, with
limits on the substance and procedure for administering the standards, it is
possible to tolerate a fairly low captivity threshold. The government will
likely be able to demonstrate reasonable audience captivity in many nonpublic forums.
Still, the concept of audience captivity retains a meaningful boundary.
Even with a rather low threshold for demonstrating captivity, there will remain a significant number of government/private speech interactions that do
not meet it. The requirement of demonstrating a reason for imposing public
sensibilities standards thus may have its greatest importance in identifying
nonpublic forums where the government obviously lacks the protective authority to do so. For example, the government has a legitimate protective
interest in distributing advertising access in public transportation, space for
art in public buildings, or access to license plates to display private mottos.
In all of these instances, an audience, which will include children, is forced
by government mandate or practical everyday necessity, to confront the
subsidized expression beyond the brief time necessary to "avert one's
356

Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 680 (1998) (recognizing that constitutional rules must respond to this "reality" that the government can choose to close a nonpublic forum,
but also noting that this fact does not give the government "unfettered discretion" to discriminate) .
357
See infra Part 11.B.4.a.(l) .
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eyes." By contrast, however, the government does not have such a protective interest in distributing theater or classroom access, or general funding
for art of student publications, where the subsidized expression will occur
largely in places where individuals can choose to confront the speech or
avoid it after only a very brief confrontation with it.358 That the government
Jacks a protective interest in these instances means either that it must justify
its public sensibilities standards by locating its action on the government
speech side of the spectrum 359 or that, if it is operating a nonpublic forum,
it cannot impose them.

3. Limited Realm.-The primary danger that underpins the private
speech-protective side of the spectrum is that an all-powerful government
will impose its speech preferences to dominate the arenas for public expression. Accordingly, a crucial question that pervades First Amendment doctrine, and can support the government's ability to exercise discretion when
dealin~ with speech, is whether other avenues of communication remain
open. 3 0 Efforts to determine whether a government/grivate speech oppor361
or is "coercive," 02-meaning that the
tunity restriction is a "penalty"
government is regulating rather than managing its own property or
funds, 363-have looked to its speech market impact. 364 Because public sensibilities standards by the government threaten to distort the private speech
market in a viewpoint-based way, they should be valid only in nonpublic
forums that do not dominate the relevant portion of it.365
358

These instances where the government lacks a protective interest substantially align with the forums the Court has labeled as "designated" or "limited" rather than "no npublic." The Court has not,
however, pointed to the government's protective interest to make this determination.
359
See Nat'! Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 588 (1998) (noting that the democratic mandate to make quality judgments supports government's discrimination among speakers).
360
See, e.g., Heffron v. Int'! Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981) (explaining that time, place and manner restrictions are valid in a public forum "prov ided that they are justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they serve a significant governmental interest, and that in doing so they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the informa tion").
361
See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) ("A refusal to fund protected activity, without
more, cannot be equated with the imposition of a 'penalty' on that activity." (quoting Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297, 317 n.19 (1980))).
362
See, e.g., Cole, supra note 78 , at 679-80 (discussing unconstitutional conditions doctrine
and noting that it "seeks to identify those conditions on funding that have a coercive effect on the
recipient's freedom to exercise her constitutional rights on her own time and with her own resources").
363
See, e.g., Post, supra note 54, at 164 (distinguishing between "public discourse" and "managerial
domains") .
364
See id. at 193 (noting that constitutional rules that apply to arts funding depend upon the
NEA 's actual impact on the "wo rld of art production") ; Cole, supra note 78, at 680 (explaining
that a danger of government-funded speech is "the indoctrinating effect of a monopolized marketplace of ideas ").
365
SUNSTEIN,supra note 272, at 312 ("[Public sensibility] restrictions might be permissible if they
are limited in time and space.") .

1406

95:1357 (2001)

The Public Sensibilities Forum

Determining the impact of a government/private interaction requires
consideration of several factors. Both the physical and temporal dimensions of the subsidy are relevant to this determination. The physical dimension is the percentage of space in the marketplace of ideas that it occupies at
any particular moment. This determination requires the familiar comparison of the limited speech opportunity with the options. 366 For example, advertising space in one sports arena occupies hardly any space because there
are numerous alternate means for communication. 367 A rule that applies to
space in a large number of government buildings affects much more communication space.368 Still, such a rule probably does not dominate the relevant speech market, because other areas are available for public
communication.
The time frame of the subsidy is relevant as well. A one-time grant of
access or funds takes up much less of a portion of the speech market than
one that is continuous. Even a continuous speech opportunity does not
dominate the market if other, similar, opportunities remain available.369
The impact of government/public interaction also depends on the ramifications to a potential recipient of conforming or refusing to conform to the
government's standards. Assessing these ramifications requires assessing
the quantity and quality of alternate avenues through which the same type
of speaker can engage in the same type of speech and reach the same type
of audience.370 Where private or other governmental options are available,
the forum at issue is not dominant.
Nonpublic forums will rarely dominate the speech market in ways that
render the use of public sensibilities standards illegitimate. A nonpublic forum of government creation is usually similar to other available private
speech opportunities; the government aid is helpful, but not necessary, for
its recipients to communicate with the relevant audience. Nevertheless, the
limited realm inquiry remains important because sometimes a government/private speech interaction will have a dominant influence in the relevant speech market. Certain types of arts371 or student activities funding 372
366
See. e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (noting that time,
place, or manner restrictions must be "narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and
... leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information") .
367
See Hubbard Broad., Inc. v. Metro. Sports Facilities Comm'n, 797 F.2d 552 (8th Cir. 1986).
368
See, e.g., Public Buildings Cooperative Use Act, 40 U.S.C. § 490 (1994) (allocating art space in
government buildings) .
369
Cf Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 802 (1989) (holding that sound limit in New
York City bandshell meets First Amendment requirements because alternate channels of communication
remain open).
370
See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 54 (1994) (explaining that adequacy of alternative
means of communication relevant to constitutionality of residential sign ban).
371
Compare Donald W. Hawthorne, Subversive Subsidization: How NEA Art Funding Abridges
Private Speech, 40 U. KAN. L. REV.437, 438 (1992) (arguing that the NEA plays a "pervasive role ...
in the art world"), with Post, supra note 54, at 193 n.207 ("Although the NEA is an important and influential player in the world of art production, the actual extent of this world's practical dependence on the

1407

NORTHWESTERN

UNIVERSITY

LAW

REVIEW

might be examples, as might be the Combined Federal Campaign. 373 The
second-class mailing privilege certainly is one. 374 In addition, the limited
realm consideration keeps alive inquiry into creeping governmental domination of related speech markets. This concern should cause the government to act with caution in imposing access standards and allows courts to
react to changing circumstances in assessing the constitutionality of public
sensibility access standards .
In sum, the limited realm inquiry is contextual. Some indeterminacy is
unavoidable, but not unmanageable, given that this inquiry is familiar to
free speech doctrine . . As with the inquiry into whether the government has
a protective reason to impose public sensibilities standards, the inquiry into
whether it acts in a limited realm can tolerate some imprecision that favors
the government's ability to impose the standards so long as the standards
are narrow and precise when it does so. Moreover, because govemmentcreated nonpublic forums will sometimes dominate the relevant speech
market, even under a lenient standard, the limited realm inquiry provides an
important check on government action. Where the government/private
speech opportunity dominates the relevant speech market, public sensibilities standards threaten to skew private discourse and so are illegitimate in
the particular nonpublic forum.

4. The Standards.-While the ultimate determination of the constitutionality of a public sensibilities standard must depend upon the particular
standard in the context of a particular forum, the balancing of the risks these
standards create and the values they serve need not occur solely on a casespecific basis. It is possible to create a general outline of standards that
may apply in a public sensibilities forum . This subsection relates both to
the substance of the standards and to the procedures for implementing them .
a. Substance .-Public sensibilities standards are legitimate to
the extent that they address public offense that occurs primarily because of
the subject matter of the speech or the mode of communication. They are
illegitimate to the extent pose a substantial threat of suppressing particular
viewpoints unless the type of viewpoint discrimination is already embodied
in a Jess protected speech category or the government otherwise has a comNEA is uncertain .").
372
See Anne-Marie Cusac, Suing For Jesus: A New Legal Team Wants to Cleanse the Campuses
, Apr. l, 1997, at 31 (reporting that without student activity fee funding "most
for Christ, PROGRESSIVE
student expression will end"); Dave Newbart, College Student Fees Face First Amendment Test, CHI.
TRJB., June 4, 1997, at 17 (noting that were student activity fee funding declared unconstitutional the
hardest hit student groups would be the smallest and most controversial).
373
See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund , 473 U.S. 788, 790-91 (1985) (noting that
" [t]he CFC is an annual charitable fundraising drive" that applies to federal workplaces) .
374
See YUDOF,supra note 77, at 234-5 (using second-class mailing privileges as an example of a
government speech subsidy); Post, supra note 54, at 157 (arguing further that it falls within public discourse and so cannot be subject to content regulation) .
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pelling interest in reacting to the message. The goal in determining the substance of legitimate public sensibilities standards, then, is to identify particular standards that address the legitimate public interest with minimum
risk of invidious viewpoint discrimination. Of course, assessing this risk
for any particular standard is difficult, as viewpoint discrimination is most
375
fundamentally in the e1es of the beholder,
and every speech regulation
37
Nevertheless, a practical approach premised on exposes some risk of it.
isting constitutional understandings can establish standards that meet the
government's legitimate interests while confining to an acceptable level the
risk that the standards will result in invidious discrimination .

(]) Specifzcity.-Generally phrased public sensibilities standards,
such as those that require speech to be "in the public interest," "not controversial," "not offensive," or "in good taste," pose two related Free Speech
Clause dangers. The first is that they are unconstitutionally vague. The
second is that they may be unconstitutionally overbroad as well.
(a) Vagueness.-In the area of speech restraints, a law is unconstitutionally vague "if its prohibitions are not clearly defined." 377 This rule
applies because vague Jaws pose a number of Free Speech Clause dangers.
One is that the government will violate the fundamental fairness principle,
by "trap[ing] the innocent" who have no "reasonable opportunity to know
what is prohibited ." 378 Beyond the threat of criminal punishment, a concern
with government censorship underpins the "long line of precedent" that allows a facial challenge to licensing statutes that vest "unbridled discretion"
in the hands of a government official or agency charged with permitting or
denying private parties the right to engage in expression. 379 The absence of
express standards both poses the danger of use of illegitimate criteria by the
government decision maker and of self-censorship by applicant speakers
"even if the discretion and power are never actually abused." 380
The prohibition against vague access standards applies when the government assists private speakers by granting them access to a public forum. 381 In this context, "[i]f the permit scheme 'involves appraisal of facts,
375
See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1, 33 (2000) ("It is difficult to know whether a statute is viewpoint discriminatory in part because whether we see viewpoint
discrimination depends on whether an issue is seen as disputed in the current legal culture.") .
376
E.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 102 (1999) (Black, J., dissenting) (propounding that ostensibly content-neutral ban on sound trucks favors wealthy over poor speakers).

377
378

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 ( 1972).
Id.

379

City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co ., 486 U.S . 750, 757 (1988).

380

Id.

381
Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130-31 (1992) (deciding that precise standard requirement applies to parade permit fee); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420
U.S. 546, 552 (1975) (applying requirement of"narrow, objective and definite standards" to city auditorium managing board's rejection of application to perform musical Hair); Shuttlesworth v. City of Bir-
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the exercise of judgment, and the formation of an opinion,' ... 'the danger
of censorship and of abridgment of our precious First Amendment freedoms
is too great' to be permitted." 382
Toward the other end of the government/private speech interaction
spectrum, however, such precision in standards is not constitutionally required. Specifically, "[i]n the context of selective subsidies [such as arts
funding], it is not always feasible ... to legislate with clarity." 383 While a
"decency and respect for public values" access standard "could raise substantial vagueness concerns" in the context of private speech regulation, in
the context of arts funding "the consequences of imprecision are not constitutionally severe." 384 Rather, the standard "merely adds some imprecise
considerations to an already subjective selection process." 385
These different tolerances for vagueness in the standards through
which the government deals with private speech reflect the familiar balance
between the benefits of government speech and the risks of abuse that direct
the interaction's placement on the spectrum in the first place. 386 Arts funding such as that done by the NEA is on the government speech side of the
spectrum because the government acknowledges a quality arbiter role. In
such a context, subjectivity in the access standard is necessary so that the
government agents charged with making the "excellence" determination can
do so in a wa that reflects judgment rather than rote application of objective criteria. 38 The exercise of judgment is a government speech act with a
constitutional value that balances the risk of abuse posed by the subjective
criteria. The government is politically, rather than judicially, accountable
for any abuse that may occur because it has assumed responsibility for making the excellence determinations.
These considerations indicate that, although the public sensibilities forum is located between the open public forum and the competitively selective quality determinations program, for vagueness purposes the fact that it
is a "forum" for private speech should be controlling. When the government speaks through its assistance to private speakers, requiring specific
access standards undermines the government's legitimate speech interest.
The same is not true when it administers a forum. In this context, the government does not have a legitimate interest in employing subjective criteria.
Rather, one of the crucial elements that sets a forum apart from government/private speech interactions that constitute government speech is that

1

mingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969) (deciding that precise standard requirement applies to parade
licensing).
382
Forsyth, 505 U.S. at 131 (quoting Cantwell v. Connectcut, 310 U.S. 296, 305 (1940); Conrad,
420 U.S. at 553).
383
Nat'! Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 589 (1998).
384 Id.
385
386
387
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the access criteria are "comparatively objective." 388 To be sure, the government has greater discretion to limit access to a nonpublic than to a public
forum. But this greater discretion means only that more objective reasons
for limiting access may be reasonable to protect other, legitimate uses of the
property, not that the government can limit access for any reason at all.
Basing access decisions on the majority's approval of the viewpoint
expressed is strictly prohibited in any type of forum. 389 Public sensibilities
standards, if not precisely defined, present the great danger that they will be
applied in this way. 390 The legitimate grounds for denying access based
upon public sensibilities can be spelled out with reasonable specificity. Because the government can be specific without undermining a legitimate interest of its own, the Constitution requires that it do so.
Clear standards support the constitutionality of a public sensibilities forum in several related ways. As in the context of speech restrictions, specific standards limit the discretion of forum administrators to engage in
viewpoint discrimination. 391 In addition, the specificity of public sensibilities standards heightens their legitimacy. The specificity makes the standards more publicly visible and so ensures accountability of the
government's decision to make the particular type of discriminations embodied in the standards. 392 Finally, clear standards ensure that the decisions
of forum administrators can be subject to meaningful judicial review, which
is a crucial safeguard against unconstitutionally discriminatory action.

(b) Overbreadth.-A
government action is unconstitutionally
overbroad when it "creates an impermissible risk of suppression of ideas"
either by "delegat[ing] overly broad discretion to the decisionmaker" or by
"sweep[ing] too broadly, penalizing a substantial amount of speech that is
constitutionally protected. "393 As with vagueness, the overbreadth doctrine
388

Id.

389

Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S . 290, 304 (2000) (deciding that school cannot
"place[] students who hold [minorit y] views at the mercy of the majority"); Bd. of Regents of the Univ .
of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000) ("Access to a public forum ... does not depend
upon majoritarian consent.") .
390
See, e.g., Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc . v. Southeastern Pa. Transp . Auth., 148 F.3d 242, 250-51
(3d Cir. 1998) (considering policy prohibiting advertisements found "o bjectionable for any reason,"
which applied to exclude some advertisements about abortion but not others); AIDS Action Comm. of
Mass . v. MTBA, 42 F.3d I, 9 (1st Cir. 1994) (deciding that policy prohibiting "sexua lly explicit" or
"patently offensive" advertisements applies to create the appearance of viewpoint discrimination).
391
See United Food & Commer cial Workers Union v. Southwe st Ohio Reg'I Transit Auth., 163
F.3d 341, 359 (6th Cir. 1998) (explaining that official's decision to limit speech must be "constrained by
objective criteria" and not rest on "ambiguous and subjective reasons" (quoting Desert Outdoor Adver.,
Inc. v. City of Moreno Valley, 103 F.3d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1996))).
392
See id. (deciding that vagueness doctrine "requires that the limits the [government) claims are
implicit in its law be made explicit by textual incorporation , binding judicial or administrative construction , or well-established practice." (quoting City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750,
770 (1988))).
393
Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 129 (1992).
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embodies a concern beyond the parties before the court, specifically that an
overbroad action will chill others' speech by causing "those who desire to
engage in legally protected expression ... [to] refrain from doing so rather
than risk prosecution or undertake to have the law declared partially invalid."394 Courts require "substantial" overbreadth to find a government action facially invalid .395
For the same reasons that the vagueness doctrine should apply to access standards for nonpublic forums, the overbreadth doctrine should as
well. When examined, the standards currently used in many public sensibilities forums are overbroad because they create the great danger that they
will be used by government decision makers, or perceived by potential private speakers, to prohibit the expression of particular viewpoints. 396 These
standards can be narrowed to limit their application to viewpoints without
compromising legitimate government interests. Thus, as with vagueness
concerns, overbreadth concerns indicate that public sensibilities standards
must be narrowly and precisely articulated both to limit their constitutionally dangerous applications and to render the government accountable for
the types of exclusions that will occur in the administration of the forum.

(2) Categories of Speech.-The particular public sensibilities
standards employed in a forum will depend upon the nature of both the forum and the members of the public who will come into contact with it. It is
therefore not possible to delineate exactly which categories of speech can
permissibly be governed by public sensibilities standards. It is, however,
possible to generalize about the characteristics of an acceptable public sensibilities category, as well as to spell out some categories that have these
characteristics.
One possibility implied by some articulations of the rule that governs
nonpublic forums is that any access standard is valid so long as it does not
explicitly target disfavored viewpoints .397 Most public sensibilities forum
exclusions would qualify as legitimate under this standard. But such a
standard would remove almost all individual speech protections from administration of government-created private speech forums. Public sensibilities standards have, as their motivating rationale, public reaction to the
excluded speech . This rationale carries with it the great danger of majoritarian viewpoint bias even if it is not articulated on the face of the exclu394
Bd . of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus , Inc., 482 U.S . 569, 574 (1987) (quoting Brockett v.
Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503 (1985)) .
395
Broadrick v. Oklahoma , 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) .
396
See United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 163 F.3d at 361 ("We believe any prohibition
against 'contro versial' advertisements unquestionably allows for viewpoint discrimination .").
397
Int'! Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992) ("Limitations on expres sive activity conducted on [nonpublic forum] property must survive only a much more limited review.
The challenged regulation need only be reasonable , as long as the regulation is not an effort to suppress
the speaker's activity due to disagreement with the speaker's view .").
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sion. This great danger requires not only defining the instances when government assistance to private speakers constitutes a legitimate public sensibilities forum by reference to competing constitutional values, but
identifying appropriate categories of exclusion in this way as well.
The Court has alread~ identified categories of speech that the government can restrict entirely. 3 8 These categories include obscenity 399 and child
pornography, 400 defamation,4° 1 fighting words, 402 false or misleading commercial speech 403 and speech that is directed to inciting or producing immi40
nent lawless action.
The justification for the exclusion of these
categories from full Free Speech Clause protection is that the speech within
them is "of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." 405 Thus a balance of constitutional values determines the
composition of an excludable category, and the Court has defined each one
precisely to limit applications where the balance does not obtain. 406
The existing categories of less protected expression and the balancing
method of defining their boundaries provide a starting point for determining
categories of speech that may be excluded from a public sensibilities forum.
Their existing boundaries are a result of a balance of majoritarian interests
against the very strong individual free speech interests that animate the doctrine of speech restraints. 407 In the public sensibilities forum context, however, majoritarian interests are higher and individual free speech interests
are lower. Consequently, a limited broadening of the category definitions
may be appropriate for access exclusions to a public sensibilities forum .
Additional categories of exclusion not recognized in speech restraint doc398

R.A.V . v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992) ("From 1791 to the present, .. . our society, like other free but civilized societies, has permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a
few limited areas" and, despite decisions that "have narrowed the scope of [some] traditional categorical
exceptions," "a limited categorical approach has remained an important part of our First Amendment
jurisprudence .").
399
Paris Adult Theater Iv. Slaton, 413 U.S . 49 , 54 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S . 15, 23
(1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
400
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 , 764 (1982).
401
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
402
403
404
405

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire , 315 U.S. 568, 572 ( 1942).
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp . v. Pub . Serv. Comm'n ofN.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563-66 (1980).
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
R.A.V . v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572) .

406

Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72 (classes of proscribable speech are "well-defined and narrowly
limited") .
407
See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988) ("Generally speaking the law
does not regard the intent to inflict emotional distress as one which should receive much solicitude, and
it is quite understandable that most if not all jurisdictions have chosen to make it civilly culpable where
the conduct in question is sufficiently 'outrageous.' But in the world of debate about public affairs, ...
even when a speaker or writer is motivated by hatred or illwill his expression is protected by the First
Amendment.").
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trine may be appropriate for public sensibilities forum exclusion if the same
balance of constitutional values applies.
But several limitations directed at limiting the possibility of invidious
viewpoint discrimination must apply to public sensibilities forum exclusion
categories as well . First, absent a link to a type of viewpoint discrimination
inherent in the pre-existing less protected speech categories or compelling
interest in suppressing a particular viewpoint, the offense at which the exclusion aims must refer primarily to the mode or subject matter of the expression.408 Second, an exclusion must be capable of reasonably specific
articulation to limit its potentially viewpoint discriminatory applications. 409
This subsection will discuss the requirements and categories of legitimate
public sensibility forum exclusions.

(a) Vulgar Expression
(i) Sexually Explicit Speech.-Govemments
can prohibit
obscenity entirely.410This is true even though the reason for prohibiting obscenity is that it offends public values and sensibilities .41 Beyond the
defined category of obscenity, the Court has already acknowledged a penumbra, distinguishin~ explicitly sexual speech that is not obscene from
other types of speech. 12 It has recently reaffirmed that although "the First
Amendment will not tolerate the total suppression of erotic materials that
have some arguably artistic value, it is manifest that society's interest in
protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interests in untrammeled political debate." 413 This lesser
protection for sexually explicit speech is apparent in cases upholding zoning and other restrictions of businesses that sell or display the material. 414
Most recently, these cases have relied upon a determination that the restrictions are not content based because they target the speech's secondary ef-

408
Nat'I Endowment for the Arts v. Finley , 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998) ("[E]ven in the provision of
subsidies, the Government may not ' ai[m] at the suppression of dangerous ideas." (quoting Regan v.
Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983))).
409
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975) (explaining that in allocating
access to municipal theater, "the danger of censorship and of abridgment of our precious first Amendment freedoms is too great where officials have unbridled discretion over a forum's use") .
410
See Paris Adult Theatre Iv . Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
411
See Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 69 (deciding that State has a "right . . . to maintain a decent society") .
412
See Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 766-67 (1995) (plurality opinion) (noting that "sexually explicit displays" are in "a realm ofless-protected expression"); R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 422 (1992) (explaining that in the "rough hierarchy in the constitutional protection of
speech," "nonobscene, sexually explicit speech [is] regarded as a sort of second-class expression").
413
City of Erie v. Pap ' s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 294 (2000) (quoting Young v. Am. Mini Theaters ,
Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
414
Id.; Barnes v. Glen Theater, 501 U.S. 560 (1991) ; Renton v. Playtime Theaters, 475 U.S. 41
(1986) ; Young v. Am. Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50 (1976).

1414

95:1357 (2001)

The Public Sensibilities Forum

415

fects.
This second-class protection does not apply, however, to "blanket
ban[ s]" that "target[] the primary effects of protected speech. " 416 In particular, "[w]here the designed benefit of a content-based speech restriction is to
shield the sensibilities of listeners, the general rule is that the right of expression prevails, even where no less restrictive alternative exists." 417
The public sensibilities forum does not fall neatly into either of these
types of restrictions of sexually explicit speech. 418 Nevertheless, the lesser
scrutiny of some types of regulations suggests that broader restrictions of
such speech may be appropriate in other contexts where the free speech
dangers of a broad and direct speech restriction are not present. The public
sensibilities forum is such a context.
Although the live adult entertainment zoning cases ostensibly depend
upon a "secondary effects" rationale, underpinnin~ them as well is the determination that, unlike invalid speech restrictions, 19 the regulations do not
significantlic restrict communication of sexually explicit material to willing
recipients. 4 0 The same is true with respect to access limitations to a public
sensibilities forum, which by definition operates in a limited realm. Moreover, in the area of speech restrictions even a significant one can be justified
by a sufficiently compelling government interest. 421 One such interest is
that the government's legitimate responsibility to shield minors cannot be
achieved through other means. 422 The protective interest that can support a
415

City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 293 (plurality opinion) (deciding that ordinance prohibiting nude dancing is aimed at secondary effects and so intermediate scrutiny applies); id. at 310 (1402) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I . .. agree with the analytic approach that the plurality employs
in deciding this case."); Renton, 475 U.S. at 47 (applying intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny because secondary effects motivated zoning law); Young, 427 U.S. at 54 (explaining that secondary effects
of theaters on neighborhoods oflower property values and crime justified burden of zoning ordinance).
416
United States v. Playboy Entm ' t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000); City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 294
(explaining that nudity prohibition is not "a complete ban;" its "effect on the overall expression is de
minimis"); id. at 322 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("A dispersal that simply limits the places where speech
may occur is a minimal imposition whereas a total ban is the most exacting of restrictions.") .
417
Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813.
418
Public sensibilities forum access limitations directly based on the content of the expression and
often its effect on the audience, rather than on nonspeech secondary effects. They are not, however,
blanket bans as they apply only to the forum at issue.
419
Playboy, 529 U.S. at 812 (noting that the primary question is whether a speech regulation "is a
significant restriction of communication between speakers and willing adult listeners").
42
City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 294 (finding effect of nudity prohibition on expression of erotic dance
de minimis); Renton, 475 U.S . at 48 (finding that zoning ordinance merely "circumscribe[s] [theaters']
choice as to location"); Young, 427 U.S. at 81 n.4 ("(A) zoning ordinance that merely specifies where a
theater may locate, and that does not reduce significantly the number or accessibility of theaters presenting particular films, stifles no expression ."); id., at 78-79 (Powell , J., concurring) ("At most the impact
of the [zoning] ordinance on [free speech] interest is incidental and minimal.").
421
Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813 ("!fa statute regulates speech based on its content, it must be narrowly
tailored to promote a compelling Government interest.") .
422
Id. at 814 (" [E)ven where speech is indecent and enters the home, the objective of shielding
children does not suffice to support a blanket ban if the protection can be accomplished by a less restrictive alternative .") .

°
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public sensibilities forum is broader than that which can support a speech
restriction, both because it applies to the public generally 423 and because the
degree of captivity is less than required to justify speech restrictions. Nevertheless, achieving it generally cannot be accomplished by other means. 424
If the broader protective interest is accepted as legitimate, it provides a
countervailing constitutional value in the context of a public sensibilities forum that justifies some restrictions on sexually explicit speech.
Limitations on sexually explicit speech meet the feasibility requirements for access limitations to a public sensibilities forum. Although the
category poses viewpoint discrimination dangers, it is primarily directed at
the mode or subject matter of expression. 425 In addition, the category is capable of reasonably specific articulation. The restricted category should be
reducible to particular words or images, described in terms of body parts or
actions. Although some gray areas will remain, the specificity will allow
courts to review administrative decisions for uniformity, which may substantially reduce the viewpoint discriminatory potential remaining in the
standards. 426
(ii) Swear Words.- Early on, the Court identified "profanity" as
a category of speech that the government can excise entirely .427 Later, it
cast doubt on that conclusion, noting that to "forbid particular words" is to
"run[] a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process. "428 Despite
these comments in the context of a broad prohibition of "offensive" conduct, narrower prohibitions of swear words can perhaps be constitutional
even in the context of speech restrictions .429
At least, a swear words prohibition can constitute an appropriate access
standard in an otherwise valid public sensibilities forum. Although swear
words can be used to express a point of view that itself relates to swear
423

Although the protective interest in a public sensibilities forum extends to the public generally, in
most instances children will be part of the audience that must confront expression in a public sensibilities forum. Consequently, the purpose of protecting them may often justify denying access to sexually
explicit speech.
424
The captivity necessary to establish a public sensibilities forum means that the audience cannot
easily "avert[] (its] eyes." Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971 ).
425
See Kent Greenawalt, Viewpoints from Olympus, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 697, 700 (1996) (propounding that "sexually explicit speech differs from other presentations of similar ideas" according to its
"form of presentation").
426
See AIDS Action Comm. of Mass. v. MTBA, 42 F.3d I, 12 (!st Cir. 1994) (finding unconstitutional the appearance of viewpoint discrimination where transit authority allowed depictions that "represent the conventional exploitation of women's bodies for commercial advertising" but disallowed as too
sexually explicit "sexual humor addressed to men's bodies ").
427
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire , 315 U.S. 568, 572 ( 1942) ("(S]uch utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas , and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.").
428

See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
See Fed. Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (holding that the
government may prohibit afternoon broad cast of Filthy Words).
429
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430

words, the category has a primary application to the mode of expression
431
It is also, perhaps more than any other
rather than the ideas expressed.
category, capable of sr:ecific articulation, with the particular words prohibited reducible to a list. 32
(iii) Other Vulgar or Indecent Expression.-The categories of
"vulgar" or "indecent" speech can capture words and images that offend
public sensibilities in similar ways, but do not fall into the sexually explicit
speech or swear words categories. While common sense and experience
confirm that such speech may well exist, the catch-all nature of the category
counsels caution as it opens the door to arbitrary enforcement. The fact that
the vulgarity or indecency categories listed above can be described with
both the breadth and specificity that limit their viewpoint impact suggests
that other forms can be as well. 433 Because of the danger of discretionary
enforcement, a general "no vulgarity or indecency" access requirement is
not a legitimate public sensibilities standard. Officials should be required
to define vulgar or indecent types of speech with a breadth and specificity
that largely confines their application to the manner of expression in order
to enforce them.

(b) Controversial Expression
(i) Subject Matter Exclusions.-The Court's decision in Lehman
v. City of Shaker Heights 434 sets the precedent for the government's ability
to exclude certain types of speech from a nonpublic forum on the ground
that it is "controversial." In that case, the government excluded "political"
speech, 435 meaning candidate and public issue advertising, 436 from its buses

430

This was, in fact, the point of the Filthy Words broadcast. Id. at 730 ("[George] Carlin is not
mouthing obscenities, he is merely using words to satirize as harmless and essentially silly our attitudes
towards those words .").
431
See SVNSTEIN,supra note 272, at 313 (suggesting that restrictions on profanity can be content
neutral); Geoffrey R. Stone, Conlent Regulation and the First Amendmenl, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV.
189, 243 (1983) (noting that profanity restrictions are functionally equivalent to restrictions on the manner of communication) .
432
See Pruitt v. Wilder, 840 F. Supp. 414, 416 (E.D. Va. 1994) (finding that departments of motor
vehicles use "no-no" lists to determine profanity exclusions, among others).
433
Another category that could meet the breadth and specificity requirements would be words and
images that relate to bodily excretions-urine, excrement, vomit, and the like. A government could exclude the "Piss Christ" or an image of a bloody fetus under a properly defined prohibition . See Nat'I
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 574 (1998) (rewriting ofNEA grant guidelines occasioned , in part , by a grant to assist Andres Serrano , who produced Piss Christ, a photograph of a crucifix
immersed in urine) ; Claudio v. United States , 836 F. Supp 1230, 1232 (E.D.N .C. 1993) (considering
proposed art display in federal building that included depiction of a bloody fetus).
434

418 U.S. 298 (1974) .
Id. at 300 n. l (noting that transit agency does not accept "political copy" that makes certain representations).
436
Id. at 30 I.
435
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in order to protect riders from the "blare of political propaganda. "437 In this
context, the Court held that the city could constitutionally choose to limit its
forum "to innocuous and Jess controversial commercial and service-oriented
advertising. " 438
Practical and theoretical considerations indicate that a government's
ability to restrict "controversial" speech's access to a nonpublic forum
should extend to the point indicated in Lehman, but no further. On one
hand, the same considerations that allow the government to limit access to
nonpublic forums on other grounds counsel in favor of allowing the government in certain circumstances to choose to limit access to some types of
"controversial" speech. 439 Where the requirements of a legitimate public
sensibilities forum are met, as they were in Lehman, the government should
have reasonable discretion to define the types of "controversial" speech
from which the captive public needs to be protected. While it may seem
unwise as a matter of free speech values and what should be the public's interest in promoting it,440 the political visibility of the choice and the limited
realm of its impact suggest that the government should in principle have the
discretion to choose to create what amounts to an "insipid expression forum."
The government cannot, however, have unlimited discretion to excise
"controversy" from all of its voluntarily created forums. The government's
authority to limit controversial speech exists only in a legitimate public sensibilities forum. Specifically, outside limited didactic realms, the government must have a legitimate interest in protecting a captive audience before
it can structure its forum to protect that audience from controversy. Lehman supports this qualification .441
When the government otherwise has the ability to limit controversial
speech, it must do so in a way that minimizes the possibility of viewpoint
discrimination. Lehman also supports this qualification. The standard that
the Court reviewed did not generally deny access to "controversial" speech,
but only to the more limited category of "political" speech. 442 Moreover,
437
438
439

Id. at 304.
Id .

Briefly, these are that the government has a legitimate interest in protecting the unwilling listeners of a nonpublic forum that can counterbalance the interests of prospective speakers . If it cannot address those needs , it may terminate the forum, making it unavailable to all.
440
See Shiffrin, supra note 77, at 579-81 (arguing that Lehman "was a sorry day for freedom of
speech" and was wrong as a matter of constitutional Jaw because the government was not speaking ).
441
Lehman, 418 U.S. at 304 (holding that the limitation is justified in part because of "the risk of
imposing upon a captive audience ").
442
Another part of the policy , not directly subject to review, prohibited advertising that "is false,
misleading, deceptive and/or offensive to the moral standards of the community, or contrary to good
taste," among other limitations. Id. at 300 n. I. Even the section prohibiting "political copy" further
specified that it not portray opponents as "vulgar, greedy , immoral , monopolistic , illegal or unfair." Id .
The Court did not review these specific provisions .
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the transit authority uniformly applied the standard to limit candidate and
443
In the context of a specific standard, consistently
public issue speech.
applied, the Court held the city could limit forum access according to public
distaste for controversial communication.
Specificity is required to limit the risk of viewpoint discrimination
posed by more general standards. Specific standards must refer to subject
444
speech. These categories should
matters, not generally to "controversial"
be defined in such a way that it is possible to identify, as a concrete reality,
speakers with viewpoints on multwle sides of an issue who will be ex4
Moreover, the categories should be
cluded according to the standard.
ones that can plausibly pass as "controversial" in order to validate the government's protective interest.
Because the government should have reasonable discretion to assess
the public interest in avoiding "controversy" and to address it in a legitimate public sensibilities forum, it will be able to exclude numerous topics
from its forums. While it might seem troublesome, for example, for the
government to forbid speech on the topics of abortion or foreign policy in a
public sensibilities forum, the broader subject matter prohibition is acceptable in a way that more narrow viewpoint prohibitions are not.446 Political
process and commercial interest checks beyond the free speech guarantee
will dissuade the government from broadly enacting such standards. Further, because the access restrictions apply in limited realms, the subject
matters will occur in public discourse. To the extent that the government
assumes responsibility for limiting its otherwise legitimate public sensibilities forums to banal topics, then, it should be able to do so.

(ii) Religion.-Although it is a subject matter that can certainly
be controversial, religion as an exclusion from a private speech forum requires its own discussion because the Court has discussed it most thoroughly. In numerous instances, the Court has invalidated government
exclusion of religious groups from the benefits of a private speech forum on
443

Id. at 300-0 I ("There was uncontradicted testimony ... that during the 26 years of public operation, the [transit system), pursuant to city council action, had not accepted or permitted any political or
public issue advertising on its vehicles.").
444
E.g., Planned Parenthood Ass'n. v. Chicago Transit Auth., 767 F.2d 1225, 1230 (7th Cir. 1985)
("We question whether a regulation of speech that has as its touchstone a government official's subjective view that the speech is 'controversial' could ever pass constitutional muster.") .
445
See, e.g., Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Dep't of Aviation of Chicago , 45 F.3d 1144, 1157 (7th Cir.
1995) ("Unlike a consistently enforced prohibition on political speech, a claimed policy that enabled the
City to prohibit the narrower category of speech critical of airlines would virtually guarantee discrimination .") .
446
See Christ's Bride Ministries , Inc. v. Southeastern Pa . Transp . Auth., 148 F.3d 242 (3d Cir.
1998) (deciding that when transit authority accepts advertisements on topic of abortion , unconstitutional
to forbid certain advertisements as "m isleading ") ; East Timar Action Network, Inc. v. City of New
York, 71 F. Supp . 2d 334, 347 (S.D .N.Y. 1999) (deciding that exclusion of"Free East Timor" street sign
was unconstitutional when other "politically sensitive" signs were permitted) .
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the grounds that the exclusion was unconstitutionally viewpoint based. 447
The rule that emerges from these cases is that "speech discussing otherwise
permissible subjects cannot be excluded from a [private speech] forum on
the ground that the subject is discussed from a religious viewpoint." 448
Lower courts have sometimes applied this principle even more
broadly, implying that almost any type of religious exclusion from a forum
is invalid. For example, a federal district court found Virginia's vanity license plate exclusion of "any reference to ... deities" invalid, reasoning
that, because the state allowed other religious references, its exclusion of a
449
In response to a simi"GODZGUD" plate was viewpoint discriminatory.
lar lawsuit, by a woman whose "THNXGOD" or "IM4GOD" plates were
rejected, the Utah Department of Motor Vehicles rewrote its rule outlawing
any reference to religion to permit them, so long as they do not denigrate a
faith. 450
Even under the Court's broad reading of viewpoint discrimination
against religious groups, this reasoning goes too far. The crucial inquiry is
whether the exclusion prohibits religious perspectives on an otherwise includable topic. The Court has implied that "exclusion of religion as a subject matter" is different than exclusion of religious viewpoints on other
subject matters and may be permissible in a private speech forum. 451 Because of its confining definition, a public sensibilities forum is the location
where such an exclusion is most likely appropriate. 452 The government can
reasonably decide that it wants to avoid controversy in a public sensibilities
forum, and it can reasonably decide that the subject matter of religion 1s
447

Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 121 S. Ct. 2093, 2101 (2001) (deciding that exclusion of
religious group from forum where teaching of morals and character is permissible activity constitutes
viewpoint discrimination); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S . 819, 83 l
( 1995) (finding that university unconstitutionally "select[ ed) for disfavored treatment those student journalistic efforts with religious editorial viewpoints"); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch.
Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394 (1993) (deciding that because church's films dealt with a subject otherwise
permissible, its exclusion was viewpoint discrimination).
448
Good News Club, 121 S. Ct. at 2102. In this case, the Court identified the rule as applying to a
limited public forum, but as explained earlier, the categories of private speech forums have merged so
that the "operative principle" that forbids viewpoint discrimination defines them all. Bd. of Regents of
the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U .S. 217, 233 (2000) (noting that viewpoint neutrality explains Rosenberger).
449
Pruitt v. Wilder , 840 F. Supp. 414, 418 (E.D. Va. 1994) ("[B]y allowing one subset of religious
speech-that not directly referring to a deity-to be placed on CommuniPlates , while denying another
sub-set of religious speech-that referring to deities - the OMV policy discriminates on the basis of the
speaker's viewpoint.") .
450
Judy Fahys , State 's Tag Team Tries to Keep It Tasteful, SALTLAKETRJB., Oct. 17, 1999, at A I .
451

Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831.
None of the contexts in which the Court has articulated its broad standard of religious viewpoint
discrimination were legitimate public sensibilities forums. Specifically , a legitimate protective interest
because of audience captivity was lacking . Good News Club, 121 S. Ct. 2093 (forum is after hours use
of school facilities); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819 (forum is funds for student publications); Lamb 's
Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393 (1993) (forum is after hours use of public facilities).
452
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controversial. The question then becomes whether the government can articulate the exclusion to limit its potentially viewpoint discriminatory
applications.
The deity exclusion is one way to do so, at least in the context of the
vanity license plate forum. The concern that motivates such an exclusion is
often that both promoting or demeaning deities is inappropriate in the forum. 453 Even without this motivation, the exclusion has this effect, which
means that it is viewpoint neutral. In fact, it is the more targeted exclusions, prohibiting "blasphemy" or derogating deities that are more clearly
viewpoint discriminatory.
A ban on the subject matter of religion is another way to exclude such
controversy from a public sensibilities forum . It carries with it, however,
substantial vagueness dangers and overbreadth dangers. The exclusion
would need to be narrowed to include only discussions of the merits of particular religions or more general religious belief, or the use of religious
symbols, figures, texts, or maxims for this purpose. Religious groups
would have to remain free to discuss otherwise permissible subjects in the
forum, to identify themselves as the source of the perspective and to use religious references to support their perspective .454 The line drawing that this
requires is intricate, but with diligent and reasoned enforcement by government officials and judicial review for uniformity, in most cases it can be
done .
Either the more broad subject matter exclusion or a more narrow subset
of it, such as the deities exclusion, should be within the discretion of the
government to employ when it structures a nonpublic forum . It must be
noted, however, that often, the government will choose not to use the exclusions. A ban on the use of religious symbols in artwork placed in government buildings prohibits not only the "Piss Christ" 455 but the whole body of
art depicting and revering religion. Viewpoint neutrality requires the government to choose whether to ban all or none of, making exclusions less
frequent.
(c) llarmfu/Speech

(i) Hate Words.-One category of speech that the government
can prohibit completely is fighting words. 456 In the speech restriction con453

Pruitt, 840 F. Supp . at 416 ("The ban on references to deities was put in place by DMV, at least
in part, to 'avoid demeaning deities' and because 'DMV did not whish to have Virginia license plates
identified with any particular religion or deity .'").
454
Good News Club, 121 S. Ct. at 2102 (noting that "the invocation of Christianity" provides a
"foundation" for the discussion of morals and character development).
455
Nat'! Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 , 574 (1998) (noting that Andres Serrano 's
Piss Christ is one work that prompted public controversy and reevaluation of the NEA's grant-making
criteria) .
456
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (stating that fighting words are
those that "inflict injury or tend to incite a ... breach of the peace").
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text, however, this category is strictly limited 457 for fear it will be used to
suppress ideas.458 The line is drawn in the speech restriction area in favor
of free speech, allowinff a lot of hurtful group-based epithets and images 459
and individual insults 46 to go unpunished.
The government is not allowed to restrict hate speech more broadly-it
cannot limit expression that more generally communicates condemnation of
or disdain for certain groups. Such a restriction would at least be contentbased, and perhaps viewpoint based as well. 461 In addition, hate speech
regulations in practice are inevitably vague and potentially overbroad, capturing the expression of ideas alon~ with the hardcore epithets and insults at
which they are primarily directed. 4 2
While both the government and the targets of hate speech must broadly
tolerate it in general public discourse, the government's protective interest
confers authority to restrict access in the limited realm of a legitimate public
sensibilities forum. This suggests a different balance of interests with respect to some types of hate speech in this context. Although all types of
hate speech certainly embody the intolerance viewpoint, a subset within it
can be defined as having a pedigree of being a particularly offensive mode
of expressing it. In addition, because the types of speech that occur in a
particular nonpublic forum are usually more limited than in public discourse, it is possible to craft hate speech access rules more specifically, limiting their potentially unconstitutional application.
A standard modeled around fighting words, currently employed in
various forms in public sensibility forums, denies access to "terms" "of
contempt, prejudice, or hostility" or that are "insulting or degrading. " 463
This standard does not meet the specific requirements of the fighting words
category and therefore would be probably be unacceptable as a private
speech regulation.464 As a concept , however, it should be an acceptable ac457

See GEOFFREYR. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIO
NAL LAW 1152 (3d ed . 1996) (noting that '[t]he
Court has not upheld a convicti on on the basis of the fighting words doctrine since Chap/insky [and that
i]t has been argued that the Court's post-Chaplinsky decisions have so narrowed the doctrine as to render
it meaningless").
458
See R.A .V. v . City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 , 386 (1992) (holding that the government cannot
regulate fighting words because of hostility of favoritism toward the underlying message expressed).
459
See Nat'! Socialist Party of America v . Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977) (holding that the city cannot
ban Nazi march as fighting word s).
460
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell , 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) (holding that a damage award for outrageous speech is unconst itutional when the subject is a public figure) .
46 1
See R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 391 (stating that hat e spee ch prohibition "goes even beyond mere content
discrimination , to actual viewpoint discrimination").
462
See ERWINCHEMERI
NSKY, CONSTITUTIO
NAL LAW 827 (1997) ("[T]he Supreme Court's decision
in R.A. V. v. St. Paul makes it difficult for hate speech codes to survive judicial analysis; if they prohibit only
some forms of hate, they will be invalidated as impermissible content-based discrimination . But if the
codes are more expansive and general, they likely will fail on vagueness and overbreadth grounds.") .
463
CAL. CODE.REGS. tit. 13, § 170.00 (West 2001) .
464
See Cohen v. California , 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (deciding that epithet on jacket is not a fighting
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cess standard in a public sensibilities forum. Although there is content, and
probably viewpoint, discrimination inherent in prohibiting "degrading" as
opposed to "complimentary" references, this is a distinction already embraced in the fighting words category. A broad public consensus supports
tolerance over intolerance. In addition, explicit, democratically enacted
public policies embody this content choice. In particular, the government's
interest in enforcing nondiscrimination norms can support prohibiting the
use of such terms in limited realms similar to the public sensibilities forum.465 These considerations confirm that some types of "hate speech" access limitations, while unacceptable in speech restriction, should be
acceptable in a public sensibilities forum.
Despite the general acceptability of prohibiting "degrading terms" in a
public sensibilities forum, the term remains unacceptably vague and overbroad if left unmodified. Many current standards also distinguish among
types of degrading terms, 466 which also poses constitutional problems. 467 In
a nonpublic forum, however, it is possible to address these constitutional
difficulties by narrowing the definition of "degrading" to limit the discretion available in enforcement. Most specifically, it is possible to define the
unacceptable "derogatory references" in terms of a word list. While a word
list might seem pointless in other contexts, as harmful ideas can be con468
veyed in other ways,
nonpublic forums often offer more limited forms of
communication, and therefore alternative modes of expressing insulting
speech are less available. 469 Even if other ways of communicating are
available, excising the short, punchy epithets and insults most clearly addresses the government's legitimate interest in protecting a captive audience
from abuse while preserving the possibility of discussing viewpoints. A defined list makes the government accountable for the discrimination in which
it chooses to engage, and makes the specific choices available for debate
and for comparison for consistency with those not included. Because a list
leads to consistency in enforcement, it also results in an important political
process check on the forbidden words, as they must be forbidden in all contexts.
Controversy over California's recall of "DAGO" and "WOP" plates iiword because it is not "directed to the person of the hearer").
465
See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys ., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (holding that a workplace permeated
with "discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult" can be legally actionable).
466
See, e.g., CAL. CODE. REGS. tit. 13, § 170.00 {prohibiting a license plate configuration that is "a
. .. degrading term; a racially degrading term; or an ethnically degrading term").
467
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (stating that the hate speech ordinance
"goes even beyond mere content discrimination, to actual viewpoint discrimination" because it prohibits
references to some groups but not others).
468
See Larry Alexander, Banning Hate Speech and the Sticks and Stones Defense, 13 CONST.
COMMENT.71, 92 (1996) ("If the same ideas that these epithets convey can be conveyed as painfully,
offensively, and disrespectfully in other wrappers, what is the point of banning only epithets.").
469
The 7-letter vanity plate forum is an example.
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lustrates these points. While the recall was designed to protect ItalianAmericans from harmful epithets, it was primarily Italian-Americans who
owned the plates "as somewhat tongue-in-cheek tributes to their ethnic heritage."470 But vanity plates do not have the space to explain whether or not
the speaker intended to deliver a message of ethnic hate, 471ethnic pride, or
neither. 472 So, the recall of a single term -can affect multiple points of view.
Moreover, the visible recall inspired a public debate between those who favored and opposed it,473indicating that the ultimate decision . whether to
permit or disallow the term will be the result of a robust political process.
It may be possible to define the forbidden words more broadly than
with a word list, in terms of an articulated standard of public perception. 474
This allows for changes in public sensibilities while still cabining the opportunities for abuse. Unlike words, however, it will usually not be possible for the government to define "derogatory images" in an acceptably
specific way .475 Thus, the broadened category of "fighting words" in the
context of a public sensibilities forum should be limited to degrading
"terms" defined by a specific list or clearly articulated and reviewable standard.

(ii) Specific References to or Depictions of Identifiable
Individuals .-The government's interest in protecting individuals from
reputational injury permits it to allow subjects of defamatory speech to
recovery damages from the speaker. But where the speech is of public
interest or concerns public officials or figures, the constitutional value
balance favors the speaker, allowing much harmful speech to go
unpunished 476 unless the harmed individual can meet onerous proof
requirements. 477 This balance in the context of speech restraints protects
47

° Cheevers , supra note 164, at A3 .

471

Id. ("The word wop came into common use during the 1920s as a derogatory terms for an illiterate Italian immigrant working as a day laborer, according to the Dictionary of American Slang . Some
language experts believe the word may have originated as an acronym for ' without paper s' to describe
immigrants who entered the U.S. without passports .") .
472
Id . (noting that recall initially included "DUWOP39," "held by a Fresno couple who are ' 50s
music aficionados and drive a restored 1939 Ford coupe.'") .
473
Id . (quoting both plate holders and Sons of Italy spokesman) .
474
See McBride v. Motor Vehicle Div . of Utah State Tax Comm ' n, 977 P.2d 467, 470 -71 (Utah
1999) (adopting standard of"objective reasonable person" when offensiveness of term "REDSKIN" was
at issue) .
475
S ee Am . Book sellers, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (1985) , alf 'd mem., 475 U.S. 1001 ( 1986)
(invalidating anti-pornography ordinance as viewpoint discriminat ory becaus e anti-subordinati on is a
perspective) .
476
Gertz v. Robert Welch , Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) ("This [New York Times] standard admin isters an extremely powerful antidote to the inducement to media self-censorship of the common-law
rule of strict liability for libel and slander. And it exacts a correspondingly high price form the victims
of defamatory falsehood . Plainly many deserving plaintiffs , including some intentionall y subjected to
injury, will be unable to surmount the barrier of the New York Times test.") .
477
N .Y. Times v. Sullivan , 376 U.S . 254 , 279-80 (1964) (holding that to recover damages, public
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the vigorous discussion of public issues from government censorship. 478
The government's greater interest in controlling the content of discussion in a public sensibilities forum, and its lesser speech market impact,
suggests that a slightly less speech protective rule may apply to its interest
in protecting individuals from reputational harm: One possibility is to
lower the proof requirements, allowing individuals to recover with a lesser
showing of intent. Yet, for the reasons relied upon in speech restraint doctrine, this approach presents too great a danger of skewing public debate by
protecting the government from critical commentary.
A better balance is to allow the government in a public sensibilities forum to prohibit the depiction of or reference to particular individuals. This
is a subject matter restriction that limits potential viewpoint discriminatory
applications. In fact, because of the breadth that viewpoint neutrality requires, the government will often choose not to employ the prohibition . For
example, if, to prohibit unflattering references to Mayor Giuliani the New
York Metropolitan Transit Authority would have to prohibit all references
to specific individuals in the advertising it displays, both practical and economic consideration would almost certainly cause it not to do so.479
In some public sensibilities forum contexts, however, such a limitation
may be feasible, and may serve legitimate government interests without
compromising significant free speech interests. In an otherwise properly
structured public sensibilities forum, for example, the government should
be able to fulfill its interest in preventing satirical depictions of sitting
judges in courthouse artwork by such a broad, viewpoint neutral rule. Similarly, were it a public sensibilities forum, New York City could deny access
to the CowParade art exhibit to cow sculptures fashioned to look like identifiable individuals. 480 Vanity license plates are another example of a public
sensibilities forum where the government could legitimately and feasibly

officials must prove "actual malice" according to clear and convincing proof standard); see also Gertz,
418 U.S. at 343 (holding that New York Times standard applies to public figures and to presumed and
punitive damages recoveries where speech concerns a public issue).
478
N. Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 270 ("[W]e consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen , and that it may well include vehement, caustic , and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials .")
479
New York Magazine v. Metro . Transp . Auth ., 136 F.3d 135, 125 (2d Cir. 1998). In New York
Magazine , an advertisement for a magazine read, beneath the magazine's logo, "Possibly the only good
thing in New York Rudy hasn't taken credit for." Id. Mayor Giuliani's office requested removal on
grounds that it used his likeness to promote a commercial product , in violation of transit authority's access standards . Id.
480
People for Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Giulian i, 105 F. Supp . 2d 294, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(characterizing "CowParade " as a private speech forum when organizers deny access to "Moni-Co w
Lewinski" sculpture application); see Leslie Gielow Jacobs , Who 's Talking?: Disentangling Government and Private Speech (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (arguing that CowParade is properly characterized as government editorial speech ).
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choose to prohibit references to specific individuals. 481
This type of standard addresses the concern that underpins defamation
law, in a way slightly broader than would be permissible in a public forum.
It is capable of specific definition, however, in a way that limits its viewpoint discriminatory applications and allows for uniformity review. It is
thus an appropriate access standard for a legitimate public sensibilities forum.
(iii) Violent Speech.-Efforts to restrict private sfeech based upon
its violent content are fraught with constitutional danger .48 Unlike sexually
explicit speech, which surrounds the category of obscenity, violent speech
does not have a base recognized as "utterly without redeeming social importance"483 in constitutional doctrine. 484 Nevertheless, violent words and
images are widely perceived not only as violations of "good taste" but also
485
as affirmatively socially harmful as well.
Although these social judgments may not be enough to support private speech restrictions, 486they
should support limited public sensibilities regulations in nonpublic forums .
Like restrictions on sexually explicit speech, profanity, or insulting epithets, violent speech restrictions can be crafted so they primarily address the
mode of communication. Most important is defining the specificity required to ensure that an access standard primarily addresses the manner of
communication, rather than the ideas. In some forums, a word list can do
this. In other forums, a list of particular images or substances can do this as
well. The specificity limits the potential viewpoint discriminatory impact
of the standards. And, because the standards must be uniformly applied, the
number of items that will be on the forbidden list will be limited as well.

481

Or, since the use of the motorist's initials is so popular in vanity plates, the prohibition could encompass references to individuals other than the motorist.
482
See Eclipse Enters., Inc . v. Gulotta, 134 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 1997) (invalidating law that prohibits
sale of crime-depicting trading cards to minors); Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Webster, 968 F.2d
684 (8th Cir. 1992) (invalidating statute restricting location of violent videos in stores and rental shops) .
483
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 477, 484 (1957).
484
See Eclipse Enters., Inc., 134 F.3d at 67 ("[T)he standards that apply to obscenity are different
from those that apply to violence. Obscenity is not protected speech ."); Video Software Dealers Ass 'n,
968 F.2d at 688 ("[V)iolence on television is protected speech ."). But see Jendi Reiter, Serial Killer
Trading Cards and First Amendment Values: A Defense a/Content-Based Regulation a/Violent Expression, 62 ALB. L. REv. 183 (1998) (arguing that certain types of violence should be low value and thus
prohibitable); Kevin W. Saunders, Media Violence and the Obscenity Exception to the First Amendment ,
3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 107 (1994) (arguing that graphic violence should fit within obscenity prohibition).
485
See, e.g. , Susan Laccetti Meyers, Should Theaters Run Tighter Ship?, ATLANTACONST., June
12, 1999, at 16A (reporting that rising tide of violence leads to pressure to enforce voluntary movie ratings system more strictly).
4 86
Eclipse Enters .. Inc., 134 F.3d 63; Video Softwar e Dealers Ass 'n, 968 F.2d 684; Meyers, supra
note 485 (reporting that entertainment industry officials argue that strict enforcement of ratings system
"might be an abridgement of First Amendment rights") .
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(iv) Advocacy of lllegal Action.-In the context of speech restraints, the government can prohibit advocacy of illegal action only in narrowly defined circumstances. 487 The narrow definition protects the
discussion of antigovernment viewpoints unless it poses a substantial threat
that only immediate suppression of the speech can address. This formulation strikes a balance that strongly favors free weech rights against the gov4
ernment's interest in maintaining social order.
The different balance in the public sensibilities forum calls for a slight
broadening of the government's ability to exclude expression that may lead
to illegal action. One such broadening would address the advocacy definition. But any such broadening poses substant ial vagueness and overbreadth
concerns, as a determination of whether speech "promotes" illegal action
requires subjectivity that leads to Free Speech Clause danger. 489
The extension that can be more easily cabined addresses the extent of
the illegality. Specifically, that minors are part of the captive audience that
must receive the speech in a public sensibilities forum should broaden the
government's ability to prohibit speech that advocates conduct illegal for
them. That the conduct must be illegal as to minors substantially limits the
exclusion's potential application to valuable ideas. 490 The meaning of "advocacy" can be limited by explanation and consistent application. For these
reasons, the government's interest should justify restricting speech advocating the use of illegal drugs, alcohol and tobacco in a public sensibilities forum even though it may not justify such restricti.ons more generally. 491
The category of controlled substances, then, presents an extension of
the illegal advocacy category that can be narrowly defined to limit its application only to those instances of expression where the government has a
strong protective interest. The limited nature of the public sensibilities forum and the ability of the government to close it entirely if it cannot address
487

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (explaining that the State may only proscribe
advocacy that is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action").
488
See, e.g., NAACP v. Oaibome Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927 (1982) ("This Court hasmade
clear ... that mere advocacy of the use of force or violence does not remove speech from the protection
of the First Amendment'').
489
Brandenburg,395 U.S. at 449 (noting that Constitution folbids punishment of "mere advocacy"
of illegal action).
.
490
See United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1099 v. Southwest Ohio Reg'! Tran.sit
Auth., 163 F.3d 341, 352 n.5 (6th Cir. 1998) (noting that transit authority prohibits more broadly
"(a]dvcrtising that is harmful to children or is of a nature to frighten children, either emotionally or
physically," and then listing specific examples which include depictions of sexual activity, nudity, foul
language, violence and "glorified" criminal activity).
491
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 121 S. Ct. 2404, 2426 (2001) (deciding that a state's interest in
preventing underage tobacco use is substantial, and even compelling, but outdoor advertising restrictions
that prohibit advertisements within 1,000 feet radi~s of a school or playground "unduly impinge on [a]
5Peaker's ability to propose a commercial transaction and [anJ adult listener's opportunity to obtain in·
fonnation about (the) product'1,
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its legitimate concerns make the extension appropriate in this context.

b. Procedure:-In addition to clear standards, procedural safeguards are required to render a licensirt'g scheme constitutional in the speech
restraint context.492 These safeguards require the government to determine
promptly whether to issue a license and to make judicial review available
for license denials.493 The"procedural safeguards should not be as stringent
in nonpublic forums because the government bas more discretion to limit
access in this context.494 The requirement of viewpoint neutrality in the
government's exercise of discretion, however, suggests that some procedural requirements are necessary to ensure that this standard is met.
Because the standards in a legitimate public sensibilities forum may
create a somewhat greater risk of viewpoint discrimination than is acceptable in speech restriction; the procedures should limit this risk to what is inherent in the standards. A number of procedural safeguards can ensure that
this occurs. First, the government should be required to provide a reason
for denying access that is tied to one of the clear standards necessary to legitimate a public sensibilities forum. Second, this reason must be subject to
review beyond the initial decision maker, so the speaker can challenge the
·
basis of the decision.
Third, and perhaps most important, the "heckler's veto" method of enforcement common in the current public sensibilities forums-th at is, the
practice of justifying speech restrictions according to public complaintscannot be constitutional. Specifically, the existence of widespread public
"offense" cannot itself justify an access denial or revocation. Public complaints can be relevant in two ways. One is to alert the forum administrator
that it misapplied an existing public sensibilities standard. If the government argues this, then the speaker can look to see if the administrator has
consistently applied the standard in other instances. If not, -the ad hoc denial would not be legitimate. Public complaints may also alert the government entity responsible for creatirtg the forum access standards that it has
failed to limit access on a basis that can be legitimate. The government entity could then revise the access standards.

492

See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965) (stating that proceduralsafeguardsare required to avoid dangersof censorship).
493
See FW/PBS.Inc:, v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 230 (1990).
494
In SoutheasternPromotions,Ltd. v. Conrad,the Court implied that the same level of pro<:edural
protections as applied to speech restraintsapplied to a city's managementof access to its theater. 420
U.S. 546, 553 (1975). Toe censoring effect of official action is "indistinguishal?le''from "official ac·
tions consistentlyidentifiedas prior restraints." Id. At this time the Courthad no( howevet,articulated
its current forum doctrine. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983) (articulatingthe three types of forums). Undercurrentdoctrine,the theater wouldbe classifiedas
a limited public forum. Conrad,420 U.S. at.552 (referringto theater a "public forum"). Because the
government lacks a protectiveinterest, the theater would not meet the definitionof a legitimatepublic
sensibilitiesforum.

as
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III. APPLICATION
The above discussion spells out how the four factors of the government's assumed responsibility for discriminating, the extent of the government's authority to be selective, the magnitude of the impact on the
marketplace of ideas, and the nature of the standar;ds, define the boundaries
of a legitimate public sensibilities forum. This Part will apply this analysis
to a sampling of the public sensibilities forums 495 that are currently operating in various contexts.

A.

Vanity License Plates

The first factor for determining the legitimacy of a public sensibilities
forum is the extent of the government's assumed responsibility for discriminating according to viewpoint. The extent of any state's assumed authority will vary according to its standards. Many states assume a wide
authority to discriminate through broadly worded standards. 496
The next factor is the government's authority to react to public sensibilities. License plates create no special, restricted didactic enclave, so the
government only has the weak authority to set an example that applies to
any of its actions. It does, however, have significant protective authority.
While license plates are seen, not heard, and therefore can be avoided by
averting one's eyes, they are still pervasive in a way that supports the government's ability to protect the general public and, more particular, children, from unwilling exposure. License plates appear anywhere that motor
vehicles can go. People of all ages ride in motor vehicles and view license
plates. Moreover, it is not necessary to be riding in a motor vehicle to view
license plates. Pedestrians and other bystanders are exposed to license
plates. While the exposure may be brief with a moving vehicle, it may be
quite long as cars may stay parked on streets or in lots or residential driveways. The frequent and unavoidable appearance of motor vehicles very
close to homes, where homeowners have a heightened interest in avoiding
offensive communications, supports the government's protective authority.
Thus, when the factors of assumed responsibility and actual authority are
combined, states may have the broadest possible ability to consider public
sensibilities in operating their vanity plate programs.
At first blush, the marketplace of ideas impact of vanity license plates
appears minimal. After all, under such programs the state permits only
"minor variations from the precisely prescribed form and shape of the Ii495

See supra Part LB.
See, e.g., CAL. YEH. CODE§ 5105 (West 1987) (vanity plates cannot "carry connotations offensive to good taste and decency"); Mo. REV. STAT. § 301.144.2 (2000) (vanity plates shall not contain
"any letters, numbers or combination of letters and numbers which are obscene, profane, inflammatory,
or contrary to public policy"); Prial, supra note 36, at C8 (reporting that administrative Jaw judge rejects
appeal to have wine-related vanity plate on grounds that it "would cause public offense or embarrassment to the state").
496
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cense plate. " 497 The message that anyone can send with the six to eight
characters available is obviously limited. Furthermore, many of the configurations that individuals have sought to maintain hardly seem to rank at
the highest rung of First Amendment protection. 498 These reasons might
lead to the conclusion that government censorship of license plate configurations can work no great free speech damage.
This conclusion that license plate expression is of little value, however,
conflicts with the great personal attachment many individuals feel toward
their license plates and the messages that appear on them. 499 Certainly, the
Supreme Court viewed the impact of messages on license plates as of First
Amendment significance when it held that a state cannot require an individual to display the state's motto. 500 Moreover, the Court has recognized the
special importance of residential signs to conveying an individual message. 501 Apparently, many people attach the same significance to messages
on their cars . The limited space undoubtedly curtails the possible complexity of any "philosophical" message 502 but, at the same time, the brevity and
immediate visibility of a license plate message gives it a "punch" that
lengthy dissertations lack. The Court has recognized the expressive potential of short words and symbols. 503 In a way, license plates have the expressive potential of a work of art. The message is brief and visual, and often
comes without an explanatory context. Not everyone will understand messages in the same way. Many people will not understand the messages at
all. But like artists, plate holders can work within a limited medium to
make people see things differently. That not all, or even most, plate holders
use the opportunity this way does not undercut the expressive potential of
·
the speech opportunity.
The significance of the speech opportunity means that government manipulations of it will have an impact on the marketplace of ideas . It does
497

Katz v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 108 Cal. Rptr. 424, 428 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973).
See, e.g., McMahon v. Iowa Dep't ofTransp., 522 N.W.2d 51 (Iowa 1994) ("3MTA3," which
when viewed in a mirror reads "EA TME"); Kahn v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 6, IO
(Cal. Ct. App. 1993) ("TP U BG," which translates to the F-word in court reporting shorthand); Katz,
I 08 Cal. Rptr. at 428 ("EZ LAY") .
499
See, e.g., Kahn, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 11 (considering plate holder who claims that because she
"has 'made her philosophical statement in the language of her profession for [ 17) years[,) [h)er license
plate has become part of her identity, her persona, her statement of being and purpose'"); Cheevers, supra note 164, at A3 (reporting that a DMV official noted, in response to protests by Italian-Americans
with recalled "DAGO" and "WOP" plates, "[i]t's amazing that there's such attachment to a license
plate").
500
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
501
City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 54 (1994).
502
Kahn, I 08 Cal. Rptr. at 12 (considering license plate holder 's claim that license plate message
"If you can" is a philosophical one of great personal import).
503
See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (finding that "particular words" are expressive);
Tinker v. Des Moines Jndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (deciding that black armbands are
expression).
498
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not, however, mean that the impact of vanity license plate programs in any
way threatens to monopolize the relevant speech market. Bumper stickers
and other sorts of signs on cars are available as speech alternatives, as is the
possibility of communicating through nonvehicular means such as hand
bills, placards, or residential signs . The impact of these means does not
have the same "punch" as a license plate motto, but it is nevertheless adequate to dispel the concern that the impact of vanity plate programs is so
substantial that governments should not be able to engage in some form of
public sensibilities discrimination.
The factor of marketplace impact thus both confirms and limits the extent of a government's discretion to cater to public sensibilities in administering its vanity license plate program.
The government does have
discretion but, because the private speech opportunity is significant, standards that channel the government's ability to engage in viewpoint discrimination must apply.
As explained above, the best way to limit the government's discretion
to engage in viewpoint discrimination while acknowledging its ability to
protect public sensibilities is to require the government to justify any particular denial or revocation with reference to categories of speech that primarily address the mode of communication and can be stated with
specificity. Most such denials and recalls can be so justified. But some
cannot. For example, denial of plates such as "4JIHAD" and "GOVT
SUX" must be justified on some ground other than that the government, or
the public that it serves, is offended by the political message . In addition,
the "hate speech" extension around the fighting word category can justify
denials only so long as it is limited by a word list or narrow, objective standard and is consistently applied to all groups. 504
Clarity in the standards for denying access to vanity plates is particularly important because administrative officials so often make the decisions.
Standards that permit denial of license plates with connotations "offensive
to good taste and decency" alone are too vague to protect against the risk of
invidious viewpoint discrimination. Not only particular denials, but the
standards themselves must clearly trace to acceptable categories of regulation. Most states list examples of "offensive" configurations after the general prohibition. 505 These examples must trace to acceptable categories of
regulation as well.
Clear standards both protect against invalid exercises of administrative
discretion and prevent potential applicants from being "chilled" because of
the possibility of denial. 506 While it is acceptable in the context of quality504

R.A.Y . v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
See, e.g., CAL. CODE. REGS. tit. 13, §170.00 (West 2001).
506
Obviously, license plate applicants are less likely to be chilled than speakers facing the threat of
a criminal sanction . Standards and no-no lists, however, likely have some deterrent effect on applicants
who don't want to waste their time on an effort that appears fruitless.
505
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based grants that applicants would conform their speech to meet the government's vaguely expressed expectations, 507 it is not acceptable where the
government has not assumed responsibility for making quality-based judgments.
In addition to clear standards that trace to category penumbras, states
must follow procedures that ensure the accountability of particular denial
decisions. Particularly suspect is the practice of recalling plates based upon
citizen complaints . Citizen complaints can be a valid basis for prompting
review of particular configurations as well as evidence of how the public interprets configurations . They cannot, however, be dispositive. An established and visible review procedure must link the complaint to a valid
ground for denying a configuration, essentially establishing that the issuance was an oversight, or must use the complaint as the basis for determining that an unlisted standard for denial is appropriate and then enact it
according to an accountable procedure. Absent one of these links to a constitutionally acceptable ground for denying access, citizen complaints based
on "offensiveness" alone present the heckler's veto danger that is anathema
to the First Amendment.

B. Advertising
As set out below, the government's assumed resRonsibility to discriminate in its access standards is usually quite broad. 08 When the government's practice has been added to its articulated policy, its actual
responsibility it assumes has contracted in a number of cases. 509 The less
discriminatory of the two, either the articulated policy or the consistently
enforced policy, should establish the outer limit of the government's assumed responsibility for discriminating in any instance. 510
Once this point is established, the question becomes whether the government's legitimate authority to discriminate extends to the point of assumed responsibility. Because the decided cases have largely focused on
the mismatch between the government's articulated and assumed responsibilities to discriminate, they have not addressed the authority issue. 51 The
507

See Nat'! Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 571 ( 1998) ("[A]rtists may conform
their speech to what they believe to be the decision-making criteria in order to acquire funding . But
when the Government is acting as patron rather than as sovereign, the consequences of imprecision are
not constitutionally severe.").
508
See supra Part I.B.2. (discussing advertising access standards, which forbid advertisements that
are not "in good taste," that are "offensive," and that are "controversial").
509
See, e.g., AIDS Action Comm. of Mass . v. MBTA, 42 F.3d I, 11 (1st Cir. 1994) (stating that inconsistent application of articulated policy creates "the impression of discrimination") .
510
See Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Dep't of Aviation of Chicago, 45 F.3d 1144, 1152 (7th Cir. 1995)
(stating that the focus in free speech inquiry is on "the government's consistent policy and practice").
511
See, e.g., AIDS Action Comm. of Mass ., 42 F.3d at 10 (explaining that, assuming transit authority
can proscribe sexually explicit or patently offensive speech, the application is invalid because it is inconsistent with past practice) .
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government has no special didactic authority toward public transit riders. It
can, however, have a significant protective interest.
One important factor that determines the government's protective authority is where the advertising at issue is placed. 512 At least with respect to
advertising inside public transportation vehicles placed within view of riders, the government has a strong protective authority. Riders of public transit are all ages, practical necessity at least requires them to witness the
advertisements, and the duration of exposure can be substantial. The Court
has contrasted public transit advertising with other forms of advertising
which are more avoidable, and to which unwilling exposure can be less
lengthy .513 This strong protective interest means that the government's authority to discriminate according to public sensibilities can extend to the
furthest permissible point, and thus overlap, but not extend, the government's assumed responsibility for discriminating.
Gauging the marketplace impact of regulating public transit advertising
requires comparing other possibilities for obtaining comparable types of
exposure. Similar types of advertising areas include billboards and advertisements on nonpublic vehicles, such as taxis. These alternative options
demonstrate that other means of advertising communication exist and that
the public transit advertising opportunity is not a monopoly. Nevertheless,
examining the options also reveals that they are usually not fully comparable to the public transit arena. The very fact that supports the "captivity" of
the public transit ridership (many people cannot afford alternatives to government created and subsidized transportation) also demonstrates its value
as a speech opportunity (it is uniquely visible). Its value as a speech opportunity means that limits on the standards of access must apply . .
Courts have already rejected a number of public transit advertising ac514
cess standards as too vague.
To ensure accountability, the burden should
be on public transit authorities to articulate clear, specific standards of access. If they do so, their authority to discriminate according to public sensibilities should extend to the acceptable categories, but not beyond them.
So, for example, public transit authorities could forbid "sexually explicit"
or "violent" advertisements, so long as they further specified the content
and enforced the exclusions consistently. They could not, however, forbid
some advertisements within those categories because riders do not like the

512
The government's protective interest will usually be less when the advertising is placed on a billboard in a transit station or outside it, rather than in the transportation vehicle, because of the greater
ability of unwilling viewers to avoid prolonged exposure. Of course, other variables, such as the size
and location of the billboard, will affect the analysis as well. See Lebron v. Nat'! R.R. Passenger Corp.,
69 F.3d 650, 653 (1993) (considering controversy concerning "the Spectacular, 'a curved back-lit display space approximately 103 feet wide by ten feet high . .. [which] dominates the west wall of the rotunda on the upper level of Penn Station where thousands of passengers pass each day'").
513
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303 (1974).
514
See supra Part LB.2.
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message. 515 In addition, a public transit authority's ability to react to viewer
complaints should be limited in the same way as a motor vehicle authority's
ability: complaints can point out that the transit authority failed to consistently apply an existing policy to the advertisement in question but they
cannot, alone, provide the basis for excluding an advertisement.

C. Displays
The government's assumed responsibility to discriminate is crucial in
determining its ability to consider public sensibilities in administering access to display space. If the government assumes responsibility for the content of a particular display, it can transform a forum into government
speech. For example, when the government purchases art work and holds it
out as its own, the artist does not have a First Amendment right to dictate its
use or location. Quite simply, when the government purchases art it may
"control[] its own expression." 516 Similarly, the government may assume
control of other displays or display cases. If it publicly assumes responsibility for the content of a particular display area, government speech principles rather than public sensibility forum principles should determine the
scope of its discretion.
Public sensibility forum questions arise when the government does not
assume responsibility for the content of the display. In these instances, the
government's ability to discriminate according to public sensibilities should
extend only to the extent that its policy and practice assume responsibility
for it. So, Congress's open access policy in the Public Buildings Cooperative Use Act should limit the discretion of individual building administrators to take public sensibilities into account in rejecting particular
applications. Only a publicly visible policy has the accountability necessary to justify the risk of viewpoint discrimination. The stretch by courts to
validate decisions based on "taste" and "decorum" reriresent exactly the ad
hoc decision making that this factor protects against. 17 The judges' intuitions are correct-if properly assumed, the government can take public sensibilities into account in placing art in federal buildings-but
the
government must do it in the right way. This means Congress must react to
"visual horrors" and properly enact standards that authorize building managers to forbid access to them.
Unless display cases are in areas of special governmental didactic authority, such as public schools, the question is the extent to which a protec515

See AIDS Action Comm. of Mass., 42 F.3d at 11 (stating that the transit authority ' s decision not
to run condom awareness advertisements while running film advertisements with the same degree of
sexual innuendo "constitutes content discrimination which gives rise to an appearance of viewpoint discrimination").
516
Serra v. United States Gen. Servs . Admin ., 847 F.2d 1045, 1048-49 {2d Cir. 1988).
517
See Sefick v. Gardner, 164 F.3d 370 (7th Cir. 1998); Claudio v. United States , 836 F. Supp .
1230 (E.D .N.C. 1993).
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tive interest gives the government the authority to enforce public sensibility
standards. The nature of the area will determine the extent of this authority.
In an area of purely voluntary access, such as a museum or theater, the government will not have a protective interest. In areas where public business
is conducted, however, such as courthouses and government office buildings, the protective interest will exist. 518 Other public places, where people
pass by through practical necessity or convenience, such as hospitals and libraries, will generate a protective interest as well.
The determination of the marketplace impact of display opportunities
must also be made depending on the context.
Like most government/private speech interactions, display opportunities will almost certainly
fall between the situations of government monopoly and no speech impact
at all. Displaying a message on any government property is a valuable
enough speech opportunity so that some limits on the government's ability
to select according to public sensibilities must apply.
Finally, as with the other examples, the substance of the public sensibilities exclusions must be specific and must trace to acceptable public sensibilities exclusions. This means that exclusions to maintain "dignity,"
"decorum," and "taste" are too broad. Proper standards could forbid depictions of sex acts, of genitalia, or of nudity, so long as they were articulated
and consistently enforced. Other standards could forbid depictions of
graphic violence or words that disparage individuals or groups . Still other
types of standards directed at protecting public sensibilities might be permissible. What are not permissible in a public sensibilities forum, however,
are standards crafted to project a certain "image" of the government to display viewers. 519 Indeed, the government is "entitled to project" a chosen
image, 520 but it cannot do so through a forum for which it assumes no responsibility for the communication's content.
CONCLUSION

In a wide range of contexts, governments are operating "public sensibilities forums ." That is, governments are granting speech opportunities to
private citizens and groups, but are limiting access to speech that is, in one
way or another , consistent with, rather than offensive to, public sensibilities. This type of standard creates the possibility that the people who ad5 18

See, e.g., Claudio, 836 F. Supp. at 1235 (noting that persons who would view the "offensive" art
work "were in the courthouse involuntarily" and were "required" when placing items on the x-ray machine belt to "face the wall upon which the painting was displayed") .
519
See id. (stating that the offensive art work at issue is "incompatible with the image and sense of
decorum which the Federal Government , like any other property owner, is entitled to project"); Sefick,
164 F.3d at 373 (noting that the government may edit art submissions to prevent "[a]n implication in the
lobby that judges do not take their oaths seriously, deal hone stly with the facts, or respect the allocation
of authority within the judiciary" to promote "the seriousness with which other participants take their
own oaths and tasks ").
52
Claudio, 836 F. Supp. at 1235.
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minister the forum will engage in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination . At the same time, these government/private speech interactions are
acts of largesse, not regulation, and are often highly publicly visible . These
considerations suggest that the government, and the public it serves, should
not have to tolerate the same range of "outrageous" speech that they must
when the government does not provide the speech opportunity.
The resolution of these competing intuitions is a properly limited public sensibilities forum . This exists when the government: assumes responsibility for limiting access according to public sensibilities; has authority to
do so, usually because an unwilling audience will likely view the speech
created; does not monopolize the speech market by creating the speech opportunity; and articulates clear standards that primarily relate to the manner ,
rather than the viewpoint, ·of expression .
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